

the job he was doing it kept him humble, even if he hadn't been inherently so.

He was born August 3, 1903, on a farm near Dana, Ind., where his father, William C. Pyle, still lives. His mother, about whom he wrote from time to time in his column, died while he was in England in March 1941.

"T" FOR TAYLOR

His full name was Ernest Taylor Pyle—Taylor was his mother's maiden name. But to everybody he was "Ernie."

He was married July 7, 1925, to Geraldine Siebels, a pretty blond Government worker from Stillwater, Minn. Gerry is in Albuquerque, N. Mex., where they built a home a few years ago—a place Ernie loved. In Washington they lived in a tiny apartment on N Street SW.

Ernie attended Indiana University for 3½ years, quit without graduating.

WANTED TO TRAVEL

After 3 years on the News, he was overcome by a yen for travel in 1926. He and Gerry drew out their savings, bought a model T roadster, drove around the rim of the United States, taking their time, as though they had a million. They wound up in New York. For a time Ernie and Gerry lived in Greenwich Village, while Ernie worked on the World and Post for a year or two. Then he came back to the News as telegraph editor. From there he went to covering aviation. In 1932 he was made managing editor.

HE MADE GOOD

Early in 1935 the Pyles vacationed in Arizona. When they came back the late Heywood Broun was on vacation. Ernie wrote a dozen columns about his vacation experiences to fill the Broun spot. Being Ernie, they made good reading. So good, G. B. Parker, editor-in-chief of Scripps-Howard newspapers, took Ernie off the managing editor's desk to try him out at a roving-reporter job for Scripps-Howard papers.

WORE OUT ONE CAR

Being Ernie, he wrote about simple things. Being Ernie, he made good, as we knew he would.

He combed the United States, Canada, Mexico, Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Central and South America, traveling by train, plane, boat, on horseback, muleback, truck, but most of the time in his own convertible coupe. He wore out one car.

Eventually he worked so much of his personality into his columns that readers began to regard him as an old friend. His column was syndicated in more than 300 papers.

COVERED THE BLITZ

In 1940 he went to England and the blitz, cabled home such a picture of the most hateful, most beautiful scene he ever had witnessed, that parts of the dispatch were cabled back to London and reprinted in London.

Ultimately his columns were printed in his first book—Ernie Pyle in England.

He came back for a rest and was at Edmonton, Canada, preparing to shove off for Alaska when word came that Gerry was dangerously ill. He flew to Albuquerque and stayed with her for months until she mended.

Ready to go to Australia, his Clipper booking was canceled to make room for propellers needed by the Chinese. The plane arrived over Hawaii during Jap bombing of Pearl Harbor.

He toured this country for a while, in 1942 went back to the British Isles; spent months with our troops, went to Africa on an invasion convoy.

BEING ERNIE

On his first brief furlough from the European war he was lionized and recognized wherever he went. Being Ernie, he shut himself in a hotel room and worked on whipping columns into shape for his first famous book, *Here Is Your War*.

He went back to the war—was in the Normandy invasion. He stayed as long as he could stand it, then came home, saying he couldn't take it any longer. He was sick of the sight of death.

More lionized than before, he still was the same old Ernie. He took a long rest, spending most of the time in his beloved Albuquerque home, but went out again to the southwest Pacific.

His honors multiplied. He won the Pulitzer prize for distinguished correspondence in 1943, was voted the outstanding Hoosier of the year by Sons of Indiana, was made an honorary doctor of letters by New Mexico University and doctor of humane letters by Indiana University. He also was awarded Sigma Delta Chi's Raymond Clapper memorial award for war correspondence in 1944, and in both 1943 and 1944 received a *Headliners' Club* award.

JUST A SKINNY GUY

Some of us old timers recalled the morning he walked into the editorial room, then at 1322 New York Avenue NW. He had come with several others, * * * and was the least impressive of the bunch.

Skinny, his red hair beginning to recede, he cut no fancy figure in his baggy clothes.

But his shy, friendly smile, his wholesome attitude, his all-round newspaper know-how, won him friends, immediately. He laughed at himself, even in those days.

The last time we saw him he was the same Ernie Pyle. His shy friendliness was unaffected by the idolatry of millions. The red hair was graying, naturally.

But he was still Ernie. Being Ernie he would be.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

As in executive session,

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. WALSH, from the Committee on Naval Affairs:

Medical Director Clyde B. Camerer to be a medical director in the Navy, with the rank of rear admiral, for temporary service, to continue while serving as district medical officer, Fourteenth Naval District;

Capt. William W. Warlick, United States Navy, to be a commodore in the Navy, for temporary service, to continue while serving on the staff (logistics) of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean areas, and until reporting for other permanent duty;

Capt. Ruthven E. Libby, United States Navy, to be a commodore in the Navy, for temporary service, to continue while serving as senior naval member of the Joint War Plans Committee, and until reporting for other permanent duty;

Several naval aviators of the Marine Corps Reserve to be second lieutenants in the regular Marine Corps; and

Several citizens to be second lieutenants in the Marine Corps.

By Mr. McKELLAR, from the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads:

Several postmasters.

RECESS TO MONDAY

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, in view of the lofty sentiments which have been expressed in the Senate today it seems to me that the routine of legislation for the remainder of the day would be in the nature of an anticlimax. Therefore, in honor of not only of the members of the delegation from this body, but our entire delegation to the San Francisco Conference, and in recognition of the lofty and noble sentiments which have been expressed here today, I feel that it would be appropriate for the Senate of

the United States to take a recess until Monday.

I therefore move that the Senate take a recess until next Monday at 12 o'clock noon.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 3 o'clock and 21 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until Monday, April 23, 1945, at 12 o'clock meridian.

SENATE

MONDAY, APRIL 23, 1945

(Legislative day of Monday, April 16, 1945)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

God of the nations, Thou art from everlasting, and we, Thy creatures, have but a little span in this mortal sphere. Yet Thou hast set our lives upon an earth changed and different from what our fathers knew; vast, stretching seas and plains and towering mountains are but stepping stones to a neighbor's door, though it be half a world away.

In a world of blazing cities and slaughtered victims and starving multitudes, we see clearly now that we must love our neighbor as ourselves, as Thy law decrees, or the very stars in their courses fight against us and the works of our hands are turned to ruins. Falling upon our eager ears there are sounds upon the earth and signs in the heavens that quicken all hearts with expectation. In these fateful days as the nations plan for peaceful tomorrows we listen with radiant hope for the sound of Thy chariot wheels; we lift our mournful heads to see if it is Thy dawn that streaks the sky.

"Break, day of God, O break;

The earth with strife is worn;

The hills with thunder shake;

Hearts of the people mourn.

Break, day of God, sweet day of peace,
And bid the shouts of warriors cease."

In the name of the Prince of Peace we ask it. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. HILL, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of the calendar day Friday, April 20, 1945, was dispensed with, and the Journal was approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States submitting a nomination was communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Swanson, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (S. 105) to extend the life of the Smaller War Plants Corporation,

and it was signed by the President pro tempore.

THE SEED AND THE SOIL OF PEACE

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, last Friday we bade Godspeed to our two emissaries to the San Francisco Conference, the distinguished Senators from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] and Texas [Mr. CONNALLY].

As I listened to their inspired words of farewell and to the final messages to them by the able Senators from Maine [Mr. WHITE] and Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY] I could not help but search my mind for the most significant description of their mission.

At last it came to me: Our two colleagues and their fellow delegates were setting forth to prepare the seed of peace. That seed will be a compact or a charter for peace.

Whatever goes into that seed, the formula or the plan for the mechanism of the world organization will not be new. The elements of the seed of peace have been known since time immemorial. They have been compounded and recomposed, worked and reworked at countless international conferences following other wars. They have been sown, but they have never grown into full fruition.

In the words of the Master:

Some seeds fell by the wayside, and the fowls came and devoured them up. Some fell upon stony places, where they had not much earth, and forthwith they sprung up, because they had no deepness of earth. And when the sun was up, they were scorched; and because they had no root, they withered away. And some fell among thorns, and the thorns sprung up and choked them.

But never in the history of man for any long period have the following words of the Great Teacher been fulfilled:

But others fell into good ground, and brought forth fruit, some a hundredfold, some sixtyfold, some thirtyfold.

Now, Mr. President, another seedtime has come. Now some 1,100 delegates of 46 United Nations are gathering at San Francisco to prepare the seed of peace once again.

The hopes of humanity are high. But our joy is restrained, for we remember the lessons of the past. Again and again we have sown the seeds of peace, but we have not reaped lasting peace. Again and again we have established an organization, a mechanism, a procedure, a covenant for maintaining the peace, but war has come.

Why? Because, however perfect may have been our seed, the soil into which it was planted was not fertile, and therefore the seed did not flourish. The soil was barren, or it was rocky, or it was worn out, or the seed was not planted deep enough, or it was not nourished, or weeds were allowed to encroach upon it.

Now just what is the soil to which I refer? It is the spiritual and moral level of the peoples of the earth. What are the weeds? They are hate, distrust, suspicion, fear, and envy between nations. What seed can grow in such soil? None.

I know farming. I know that good seed cannot flourish except in good soil. It is my prayer that the San Francisco Conference will prepare good seed. But it is my further prayer that when the

seed is sown among the United Nations, the soil will be receptive to it. That soil will be the hearts of the great mass of people of the democratic nations and the hearts of the masters of those lands among the United Nations which are not democratic.

Will that soil be fertile? Will it be enriched and furrowed with the spirit of understanding, with the spirit of friendship, with the true spirit of collaboration? Are the nations in fact now ready for peace?

I know that America's soil is fertile. In our soil has grown the proudest tree of liberty. From our soil have sprung abundant fruits of happiness and joy for the great mass of our people. In our soil, racial and religious intolerance have found no shelter. Here class warfare has never risen above the ground. Upon our soil the warm sun of providence has shone almost continuously and has been hidden only intermittently by the clouds of wars which we did not seek. I know that America's soil is fertile. According to the last Gallup poll more than 83 percent of our people favor world cooperation. This percentage is almost uniform throughout all sections of our Nation. It is approximately the same percentage as that by which our people prior to Pearl Harbor voted not to intervene in this war.

America's soil is receptive. But now I ask in all humility, without criticism, without scorn, is the soil of the other United Nations as fertile as is ours? Have our allies prepared their hearts to receive the seed of peace? The answer to that question cannot be given merely in words. It must be given in actions following the San Francisco Conference.

When our representatives return with the seed, we shall want to hear the answer to this question: We shall want to know what their reactions were as to whether or not the "national soil" of the other members of the United Nations is now rich and fertile and receptive and sustaining.

We repeat, recent history; yes, history throughout all the ages, clearly demonstrates that there will be no lasting peace unless the nations of earth have the high will and the purpose and the desire to carry through on their obligations for peace. That is the productive soil which we are seeking, in which the seed of peace can thrive.

It is the combination of the seed and the soil under the sunshine and the rain of international give-and-take which will make for a lasting peace.

As the Prophet Ezekiel said:

Moreover, I will make a covenant of peace with them (if they are ready and receptive); it shall be an everlasting covenant with them (if they keep the faith).

Mr. President, what can we do to see that the soil of the other nations is made receptive for the seed? We know that we cannot vicariously be saved from this curse of war. Leadership is all-important, leadership which will sell a bill of goods to the peoples of earth. It requires straight thinking, straight acting, getting rid of mere emotional approaches, doing away with prejudices. There must be a spiritual renaissance, an awakening

to the fact that war is not the way out, that it solves no problems. This calls for an elevation of our thinking, a more uplifted attitude toward all mankind.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, at about the time of the taking of the recess Friday last my colleague the junior Senator from Missouri [Mr. BRIGGS] was on his way to the Senate for the purpose of asking to be excused from attendance for a few days. It happens that the junior Senator from Missouri has certain engagements in the State of Missouri which require his presence. He has taken the liberty of proceeding to Missouri, and asked me to present this statement to the Senate this morning, and therefore I respectfully request that he be excused.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the junior Senator from Missouri is excused.

CONDOLENCE ON DEATH OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate a resolution—a very beautiful resolution—adopted by the Shelby County court, sitting at Memphis, Tenn., concerning our late beloved President Roosevelt. It is a fine tribute. The resolution also refers to our present President, Mr. Truman. Without objection, the Chair will order the resolution printed in the body of the RECORD.

The resolution was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SHELBY COUNTY QUARTERLY COURT—APRIL TERM, 1945

MEMPHIS, TENN., April 16, 1945.

Court met, pursuant to adjournment, Hon. J. F. Dudley, chairman, present and presiding, when the following proceedings, among others, were had, to wit: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

The following resolution was read to the court by Hon. Lee Winchester, county attorney:

"Divine providence has seen fit to call the immortal soul of our matchless leader, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, from his earthly labors to enter into an even greater and more useful sphere of influence in heavenly abode.

"When the news of the death of this great man was flashed to the world, there was not a voice that was not hushed nor a heart that did not quail at Heaven's manifestation in our world affairs. We could not at first believe that our great leader was mortally stricken. We could not comprehend why an omniscient being would permit the earthly life of such a vitally useful and good man to end and at the same time permit such contemptible wretches as Adolf Hitler and the rest of the Nazis and Japanese war lords to clutter up the earth.

"The last words of our great Democratic President, Thomas Jefferson, were said to be, 'Now, Lord, let thy servant depart in peace,' and may we not with reverence say that Franklin Delano Roosevelt also departed in peace and that the Master of men greeted his spirit with expression. 'This is my beloved servant, with whom I am well pleased and he is now called to his reward.'

"On March 21, 1945, only a few days before the President's official work in the city of Washington terminated, our own great leader, the Honorable E. H. Crump, at the President's request, conferred with him about

matters of state and the members of this court and other friends of Mr. Crump's have repeatedly heard him give utterance to the same thought, relative to the marvelous personality of the President, as was so forcibly expressed by our own Senator McKELLAR, who said upon being advised of the President's death, 'President Roosevelt had the most remarkable and gracious personality of any man I have ever seen. He was firm, but in our long association, I never saw him permit himself to show anger.'

"During the most troublesome years of our Nation's history, this peerless leader presided over the destinies of this Nation and it is our fervent wish and thought that his spirit may still continue to hover over his contemporaries in the affairs of Government, not only in this country, but in all Allied Nations; inspire their consuls and continue to guide them in virtuous, wise, and noble paths as he has always done in the past. And may that God, in whose hands are the issues of life and death, in His infinite wisdom, confirm and strengthen us all to follow along the pathway blazed by our great President.

"The Nation is thankful that in this, its dark hour, it may turn with confidence to that great Democrat in whose hands the torch of liberty is now placed, and it is our sincere belief that President Harry S. Truman will wisely, successfully, and courageously lead the Nation through the troublesome days that lie ahead: Therefore we, the members of the Quarterly County Court of Shelby County do hereby

"Resolve, That we join with every sovereign body of this great land and stand with bowed heads and with deep sorrow lament the passing of that great American whose earthly career has just terminated; and be it further

"Resolved, That the course he set out for this great Nation, and which he so fearlessly and unswervingly followed, be adhered to; and that the people of the United States continue to uphold the hands of our new President, Harry S. Truman, so that under his leadership, this great Nation will continue to be the bright exemplar for all people who love liberty, freedom, and democracy around the globe."

Upon motion by Justice Paul Barret, duly seconded by Justice Hughes, the said resolution was adopted by the following vote: Barret, Hughes, Barrett, and Law. Ayes 4; noes 0.

SHELBY COUNTY COURT,

By J. F. DUDNEY, *Chairman*.

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

Shelby County, ss.:

I, MARVIL POPE, clerk of the county and probate courts of this county, hereby certify that the foregoing 3 pages contain a full, true, and exact copy of the resolution adopted by the Quarterly County Court of Shelby County, Tenn., on the death of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt; as the same appears of record in minute book 32, page 110 of this office.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and affixed the seal of said court, at office, in the city of Memphis, this 18th day of April 1945.

MARVIN POPE,
Clerk.

L.T. COL. JOSEPH CHABOT

Mr. TOBEY. Mr. President, in 1934, as a Member of the House of Representatives, it was my privilege to appoint as a cadet to the Military Academy at West Point Joseph Chabot, a young man, 1 of 11 children, from the town of Whitefield, N. H. He completed his course of 4 years at West Point with credit, and then went to Texas in the military service.

In 1939 he was sent to the Philippines, and there, under General Wainright and General MacArthur and General Jones, he carried on until he was captured by the Japanese. After being captured, he participated in the infamous March of Death, with all the suffering and travail connected with that experience, but God spared his life. Later, he was confined as a prisoner, and was finally incarcerated in the Bilbid prison. He came down with pneumonia the day before our troops recaptured Manila, and was transferred to Bilbid Hospital, thus being saved from being shipped to a prison in Japan, to which our enemies had consigned him.

He has been made a lieutenant colonel by the War Department, and is now back with his attractive wife and two children, and will shortly leave for his home town of Whitefield in the State of New Hampshire, for recuperation, then later to return to service.

Mr. President, I cite this case, not as an exception, but as one showing how a young officer of the Army has made the great traditions of the Army even more imperishable than before.

Mr. President, it is with pleasure that I recall that I appointed Colonel Chabot to West Point, and it is gratifying that he and his wife are in the gallery this morning to observe the Senate in action.

DISPOSITION OF EXECUTIVE PAPERS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a letter from the Archivist of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a list of papers and documents on the files of several departments and agencies of the Government which are not needed in the conduct of business and have no permanent value or historical interest, and requesting action looking to their disposition, which, with accompanying papers, was referred to a Joint Select Committee on the Disposition of Papers in the Executive Departments.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore appointed Mr. BARKLEY and Mr. BREWSTER members of the committee on the part of the Senate.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDENT pro tempore:

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of New Jersey, to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

"Joint resolution commending the Congress of the United States for its affirmation of the principles of the freedom of speech and press and advocating the adoption of the same principles upon a world-wide basis, and urging upon the delegates of this country to the peace conference the adoption of an international compact

"Whereas the New Jersey Legislature is advised that the Congress of the United States has adopted Senate Resolution 53, which reads as follows:

"That the Congress of the United States expresses its belief in the world-wide right of interchange of news by news gathering and distributing agencies, individual or associate, by any means, without discrimination as to source, distribution, rates or charges; and that this right should be perfected by international compact; and

"Whereas the New Jersey Legislature fully subscribes to the principles enunciated by said resolution: Therefore be it

"Resolved by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

"1. The New Jersey Legislature hereby extends its commendation to the Congress of the United States for its affirmation of the principles of speech and press and advocates the adoption of the same principles upon a world-wide basis in freedom and equality of access to the truth and the facts, and urges upon the delegates of this country to the peace conference the adoption of an international compact to guarantee the maintenance of such principles.

"2. The secretary of state is directed to transmit, immediately following the passage of this joint resolution, a copy thereof, properly authenticated, to the Secretary of State of the United States, to the Secretary of the Senate of the United States and to the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

"3. This joint resolution shall take effect immediately."

A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii; to the Committee on Finance:

"Senate Concurrent Resolution 11

"Concurrent resolution requesting the Congress of the United States of America to exempt all patient employees and paroled-patient employees at Kalaupapa Settlement from any Federal income tax

"Be it resolved by the Senate of the twenty-third session of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress of the United States of America be, and it is hereby requested, to exempt patient employees and paroled-patient employees of every hospital, settlement, and station maintained for the treatment and care of persons affected with leprosy from the Federal income-tax law; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this concurrent resolution be sent to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States of America, to the Secretary of the Interior, and to the Delegate to Congress from the Territory of Hawaii."

SHIPMENT OF LIQUORS TO MEMBERS OF ARMED SERVICES ON THE FIGHTING FRONT—PETITIONS

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to present for appropriate reference two petitions of sundry citizens of Springvale, Maine, praying for the enactment of legislation to prohibit the shipment of intoxicating liquors to members of the armed services on the fighting fronts.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the petitions will be received and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

PETITIONS FROM CITIZENS OF WISCONSIN

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to present two petitions on different subjects signed by sundry citizens of Wisconsin, and that the body of each of the petitions be printed in the RECORD, without the signatures attached, and that they be appropriately referred.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the petitions presented by the Senator from Wisconsin will be received, appropriately referred, and the body thereof will be printed in the RECORD without the signatures attached.

To the Committee on Banking and Currency:

MILWAUKEE, WIS.

To Senator ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, JR.,

Washington, D. C.

HONORABLE SIR: The undersigned citizens appeal to you to take appropriate action to help bring about a modification of our present drastic and unreasonable rationing of food with particular reference to meat and butter.

We read that there is no food rationing in Canada or Mexico; and that in Russia there is not only no food rationing, but that there even the price of food has gone down during the past year. Just what are they doing on lend-lease?

Our national farm subsidy was intended to increase food production, but that is bungled somewhere down the line for food production is decreasing. In addition, the O. P. A. is so incompetent in the matter of investigating black market operations and discovering red point frauds, that the entire rationing program is way out of balance. Also to exact no red points from those who can get their meat by eating at restaurants is a direct slap in the face for the average American family which just must feed itself at home by whatever red points it can scrape up.

We are told all nations are in this thing together, but are they equally so? Will our lend-lease and needless reserves of food turn out to be another national scandal?

We are told that we still have plenty to eat, but may we answer that we are fed up with what we get—it is coming out of our ears—and if it is good enough for us, may we not ask that why not send some of it to those we send lend-lease food to and keep the meat and butter for ourselves?

We also resent the fact that every time these things are pointed out, certain elements in America are always ready to start shouting pro-Hitler at the protestors instead of helping to correct this rotten mess. We are all loyal Americans and we would be fools indeed not to protest any rank injustice.

In view of the foregoing we ask that Congress take immediate action to remedy this disgraceful state of affairs or face the evil consequences that such conditions must eventually bring about.

To the Committee on Military Affairs:

To Senator ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE and Senator ALEXANDER WILEY, Washington, D. C.:

We the mothers and wives of American soldiers fighting in Europe want our sons sent home after the end of the European war instead of sending them to the Pacific zone. We feel that our boys have done a wonderful job, and need rest and recuperation. There are thousands of boys here in camps all through the United States, some of whom have been there for 2 and 3 years. These would be fresh and vigorous to release the poor boys that have gone through so much. They are also well trained and are receiving the benefit of the experience of those who have done the fighting. Our boys write continually that all they want is to get home after Germany falls and we feel that every effort should be made to promptly bring them home. After winning one war they should be released by those in camps to help win the other.

We are all loyal to America and do our part in the buying of War bonds, giving to relief funds, assisting the Red Cross and working in defense plants. We have all helped to make America and worked to save her, and we do not think it is the part of justice to leave so many fresh troops here in camps and not get our own boys home after the fall of Germany.

We ask that you give this matter your most careful consideration and take such

steps as may be helpful in bringing the speedy return of our sons after the end of the war in Germany.

POLISH DECISION AT THE YALTA CONFERENCE

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, about 2 weeks ago I placed in the RECORD a copy of a letter to the New York Times commenting on the Polish settlement at Yalta. I now ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix, resolutions adopted by delegates representing organizations of Americans of Polish descent in Connecticut, at a convention held at New Haven, February 25, 1945. These resolutions take quite a contrary view of the Polish settlement at Yalta from that of the writer of the letter which I had inserted in the RECORD. I think both sides should be presented, and therefore I ask unanimous consent that these resolutions be printed and appropriately referred.

There being no objection, the resolutions were referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

We, the delegates of organizations representing some 300,000 Americans of Polish descent, who reside in Connecticut, in convention assembled at New Haven, Conn., feel conscience bound to express our most profound grief and bitter disappointment in the conclusions reached at the recent Yalta Conference participated in by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of England, and the Marshal Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These sentiments, we find, are not confined to the 300,000 Americans we represent but are shared by many thousands of other Americans of this State who are outspoken in their belief that the gravest injustice that yet has been recorded in history will take place if the proposed plans, as published, will be put into effect.

If all human emotions have been abandoned; if all the sacrifices, loyalty to a cause, the suffering and insults to a people are to be swept aside to satisfy the demand of one power; if the privation, starvation, deportations, and cruelties inflicted upon an ally are to be forgotten, and if the punishment imposed by the deliberate refusal to admit relief unless selfish political demands of one of the powers are met are to be tolerated; if all the promises of the Atlantic Charter and the "four freedoms" are to be ignored, then let us at least apply the light of truth to the situation.

President Roosevelt in his report to Congress of the doings at Yalta stated that the decisions concerning Poland were not satisfactory. This in itself indicates compromise. A compromise reached at the expense of an Allied country whose record is one of untiring effort, sacrifice, and zeal in its strife for justice in a cause from which it has not wavered. This is a compromise at the expense of a nation which paid; and paid more than its share, and now when very little is left is called upon to suffer further agony by being called upon to pay more.

Poland has made sacrifices, and any nation should be willing to make sacrifices, if such sacrifices insured future peace in the world. But is it not here that the seed is planted for World War No. 3? Is this not appeasement of a great power at the expense of a small country? We have seen what this kind of appeasement does to the peace of the world by events as recent as 6 and 7 years ago. An agreement reached on the theory of appeasement is treacherous. The unilateral declarations of one power with respect to the small nations adopted by the three

powers at Yalta establishes a precedent for similar future conduct by any power.

There is no escaping the fact that the conclusions reached lead into another scheme of balance of power, the underlying cause of World War No. 1 and a powerful factor in World War No. 2. The so-called sphere of influence, merely a convenient substitute in terminology for balance of power, violates all of the precepts of the Atlantic Charter.

No matter how solemn, no matter how strong, no matter how sound the peace agreements may be, what guaranty and what respect can there be for the terms of any peace arrangements when precedent shows that these have been ignored conveniently and all principles abandoned? Promises have been broken, pacts have been discarded, and smaller countries have been subjected to the whims of greater powers which not only are superior in arms but who stoop to the use of deceptive propaganda unjustly to accuse a smaller country and place the blame upon it to conceal their injustices.

Can lasting peace be obtained with this kind of an approach?

Can any peace be reached unless it be based on justice?

We surely would be remiss in our responsibility if we did not take this opportunity to demand from our leaders the taking of immediate steps to prevent future wars which will involve our country, the United States.

We ask that the problem be met now. This is the time to solve it courageously. As citizens of this State and Nation, we disagree with our Government's participation in the partitioning of any country, large or small, with its enforced expulsion of millions from their native countries and homes.

We commend the honesty and courage of the Polish Government in exile in London for confronting this issue directly in the face of threatened catastrophe. We hope that the pitfalls and dangers to be found at diplomatic tables will be avoided. We stand firm in insisting that the war which will be won on the battlefields by our courageous soldiers be not lost at the peace conference.

We have further resolved to send these resolutions to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States, Senators and all Members of the House of Representatives in Congress from Connecticut, and to the Honorable Harold S. Stassen, Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally, Representatives Sol Bloom, Charles A. Eaton, Virginia C. Gildersleeve, and Edward R. Stettinius, Secretary of State.

For the delegates:

Dr. B. L. SMYKOWSKI,

President.

Rev. JOHN J. SOBOLEWSKI,

Secretary.

MISSOURI VALLEY AUTHORITY

Mr. CAPPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to present for printing in the RECORD and appropriate reference two resolutions adopted at a meeting of the Missouri River States Committee, at Omaha, Nebr., April 5, 1945.

While I have the floor, I call attention to the fact that this committee consists of the Governors of 10 Missouri Valley States and two appointed committeemen from each State.

I desire also to call attention to paragraph 6 of the resolution concerning the development of the Missouri River Basin and concerning authority measures now before the Congress. Paragraph 6 reads as follows:

We do not approve the authority measures which have heretofore been introduced in Congress, as we object to granting any agency unchecked authority to engage in

private business, operate farms, remove hundreds of thousands of acres of land from the tax rolls, take over the administration of education and of local and State laws, and in general do the economic planning for the entire area.

I believe the Governors correctly interpret the general sentiment of the people of the Missouri Valley Basin.

I also call attention to the very legitimate complaint of the Governors that by sending the M. V. A. bill S. 555 to three committees for consideration the Senate has placed an unjustifiable burden on the Governors and others who want to present their views to Congress on this important legislation.

There being no objection, the resolutions were referred to the Committee on Commerce and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION CONCERNING HEARINGS BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEES ON THE MISSOURI VALLEY AUTHORITY BILL S. 555

The Missouri River States Committee, representing the 10 States of this valley watershed, with a membership of 10 Governors and 2 appointed committeemen from each State, in session at the city of Omaha on April 5, 1945, takes note of the fact that the Missouri Valley Authority bill, S. 555, has been referred, first to the Senate Commerce Committee, second to the Senate Reclamation and Irrigation Committee, and third to the Senate Agriculture Committee, each for a 30-day period. It points out the inconvenience and cost to the States of the Missouri River Basin where the Governors and other officials of these States required to make three separate trips to appear before each committee. It is hereby respectfully urged that these committees at some definite time arrange for a joint hearing before which such Governors and officials may appear.

RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MISSOURI RIVER BASIN AND CONCERNING "AUTHORITY" MEASURES NOW BEFORE THE CONGRESS

The Missouri River States Committee, representing the 10 States of this valley watershed, with a membership of 10 Governors, and 2 appointed committeemen from each State, in session at the city of Omaha on April 5, 1945, wishes to review accomplishments, legislative and otherwise, since its last meeting on August 5 and 6, 1944—also, to present findings with recommendations looking to early and complete development of the land and water resources of the entire river basin.

First and foremost, the committee wishes to express generous appreciation and thanks to the President, the Congress, and to the administrative agencies for what has been accomplished relative to the development of the Missouri River Basin since its August 1944 session.

The recommendations of the former session were that there must be a unified plan of development. The President and the Congress were urged to direct the Army engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation to bring before the Congress a plan of coordinated engineering. It was further urged that any unified plan which might be adopted should not adversely affect the use of water for the irrigation of land in the upstream States.

There is now abundant cause for satisfaction because each of these recommendations has been made effective. The Federal agencies concerned have coordinated their engineering, as authorized by law, and the Congress, through the amended Flood Control Act, the amended rivers and harbors bill, and otherwise by congressional enactment, has established policies and law so that existing agencies may carry on a complete development of the land and water resources of

the Missouri River Basin, including irrigation, flood control, navigation, hydroelectric power, soil conservation, and other beneficial uses. Initial congressional authorizations have been made to so provide.

Therefore, the Missouri River States Committee, sincerely appreciating this enabling legislation and administrative action, wishes now to further comment and recommend to the President and to the Congress:

1. The early appropriation of funds sufficient to complete plans and specifications—following the \$400,000,000 authorized by the Seventy-eighth Congress, and the President's request for additional funds for this purpose—because that will enable development of this great area, as well as to provide for post-war construction and employment.

2. The speeding up of these pre-building plans in order to afford time and opportunity to observe and make effective the new statutory provision that there shall be consultation with the States in cases of misunderstandings or differences of opinion.

3. A further study by Congress as to the necessity of additional provisions governing what each agency shall continue to do, as the Nation and the States enter upon a solution of the problems pertaining to the development of the Missouri River Basin and other interstate watersheds.

4. That the time has come to consider the establishment of Federal statutory water policies, and then by using existing agencies develop not only the 2,500-mile Missouri River Basin, but also other watersheds of the Nation.

5. We strongly urge that any consideration of the administration of the facilities resulting from the proposed development of the Missouri River Basin recognize the rights of and grant adequate representation to the people and the States affected.

6. We do not approve the "authority" measures which have heretofore been introduced in Congress, as we object to granting any agency unchecked authority to engage in private business, operate farms, remove hundreds of thousands of acres of land from the tax rolls, take over the administration of education and of local and State laws, and in general do the economic planning for the entire area.

MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE RESOLUTIONS

Mr. SHIPSTEAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to present for appropriate reference and printing in the RECORD several resolutions adopted by the Legislature of the State of Minnesota dealing with certain subjects of public interest to that State, memorializing Congress for legislation thereon.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the resolutions will be received, appropriately referred, and, under the rule, printed in the RECORD.

To the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads:

Concurrent resolution memorializing the Congress of the United States to enact legislation providing for wage readjustment for postal employees

Whereas employees of the United States Postal Service are today required to perform greater duties than heretofore; and

Whereas employees of such service have not received a permanent wage readjustment in more than a decade, and

Whereas the tremendous amount of work being done by the employees of the Postal Service is being performed in an efficient manner and is deserving of wage readjustment: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives of the State of Minnesota, the senate concurring, endorses wage readjustment for postal employees in order that such employees may receive increased compensation commensurate with their work and respon-

sibilities, and to that end urges the Members in Congress from the State of Minnesota to vote for and support H. R. 2071; be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be transmitted to the presiding officers of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States and to each Member of Congress from the State of Minnesota.

To the Committee on Interstate Commerce:

Concurrent resolution memorializing the President and Congress of the United States and the Federal agencies concerned to amend S. F. A. W. Regulation 26, effective April 1, 1945, to eliminate certain restrictions contained therein with a view of preventing undue hardship to the consuming public and dealers in solid fuel in the State of Minnesota

Whereas on the 14th day of March 1945, Solid Fuels Administrator for War, Harold L. Ickes, issued a directive effective April 1, 1945, providing among other things that consumers be allotted only 80 percent of their normal annual yearly requirements of scarcer solid fuel from April 1, 1945, to March 31, 1946; that the retail dealer cannot deliver to a consumer more than 50 percent of his annual yearly normal requirements of solid fuel before August 31, 1945; that solid-fuel dealers shall be required by the regulation to verify consumers' normal annual requirements of solid fuel; and that retail solid-fuel dealers are frozen to old contracts which they previously served and are not permitted to accept any new business with schools, municipal buildings, and Government agencies; and

Whereas 80 percent of the consumers' normal annual requirements is not sufficient solid fuel to properly insure sufficient heat and to assure healthful conditions during the long winter months encountered in Minnesota, particularly in view of the fact that firewood is not available in sufficient quantities which can be used for heating purposes due to the fact that pulpwood is selling at such a high price; that labor is not sufficiently interested under the present conditions in cutting firewood; and

Whereas because of the severity of the weather conditions in the State of Minnesota causing bad road conditions due to snow, storms, and blockades, which prohibit wintertime deliveries and because of the necessity of providing fuel to the farms, rural schools, industry, and homes, a sufficient stock must be on hand at the docks to provide enough fuel to supply this area and therefore the restriction that the retail dealer cannot deliver to a consumer more than 50 percent of his annual yearly normal requirements of solid fuel before August 31, 1945, is not only impractical but is bound to cause severe hardship; and

Whereas the provision to verify consumers' normal annual requirements of solid fuel by the dealer will entail such tremendous amount of detail and office work that it will be practically impossible under the present wartime conditions to secure sufficient help to properly check and provide this information and will add to the already high cost and burden of handling distribution of solid fuel in Minnesota; and

Whereas the provision contained in S. F. A. W. Regulation 26 prohibits dealers from contracting to supply new patrons during the heating season from April 1, 1945 to March 31, 1946, is unconstitutional and by the provisions of the regulation creates an abnormal distribution of solid fuels in the State of Minnesota and places certain consumers in a position where they may not be able to obtain solid fuel without great inconvenience and unnecessary delay; and

Whereas the provisions contained in the regulation have been given serious study and consideration it appears obvious to those who are acquainted with the weather condi-

tions in Minnesota, the manpower shortage, the lack of equipment, and other burdensome wartime delivery restrictions will make the regulation impossible of performance without creating great hardship and suffering on the part of the people. Compliance with S. P. A. W. Regulation 26 will create a shortage which will result in severe hardships on the consuming public and retail coal dealers creating a back-log of solid-fuel orders during the winter months; and

Whereas Minnesota receives nearly all of its coal requirements via the Great Lakes; whereas it is necessary to obtain an adequate supply at the docks before navigation closes; whereas any deficiency in movement via the Great Lakes cannot be supplemented except via all-rail movement; whereas facilities for all-rail movement are already overburdened and cannot be relied upon to bring coal into Minnesota: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That copy of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, to the presiding officers of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, to Harold L. Ickes, Solid Fuels Administrator for War, and to each member of the Minnesota delegation in Congress, with the request that S. F. A. W. Regulation 26 be amended to permit sufficient coal to move via the Great Lakes docks during the navigation season and to eliminate the provision pertaining to 80 percent of the solid-fuel allocated to the coal-consuming public and by striking out dealers' verification of consumers' requirements and to eliminate the restriction providing that only 50 percent of the consumers' normal annual requirements can be delivered before August 31, 1945, with a view of eliminating the plight of the solid-fuel industry and the consequent impairment of the solid-fuel supply for Minnesota.

To the Committee on Commerce:

Joint resolution memorializing Congress to authorize a survey of the upper Mississippi River navigation reservoirs

Whereas the Winnibigishish, Leech Lake, Pokegama, Sandy Lake, Pine River, and Gull Lake Reservoirs, known as the upper Mississippi River navigation reservoirs, designed to increase the navigable stages of the Mississippi River below the Twin Cities for the promotion of commercial navigation, were authorized by Congress some 50 to 60 years before the development of the areas adjacent to and surrounding the reservoirs, had begun; and

Whereas progress in the development of the agricultural, scenic, and recreational resources of the reservoir areas during subsequent years has emphasized that the lakes and bodies of water used for and affected by the reservoirs and their operations, in common with other lakes and scenic attractions, are proving a dominant source of revenue and livelihood to local communities, the value of which was not, and could not have been, given full weight at the time the reservoirs were authorized; and

Whereas the construction of the locks and dams in the Mississippi River below Minneapolis apparently has lessened the need of the reservoirs for maintaining navigable stages in the Mississippi River below the Twin Cities; and

Whereas those interested in the fullest development and use of the resources of the reservoir areas feel that this cannot be accomplished until a study and appraisal has been made of the present and potential future uses and operations of these reservoirs for the fullest development of the scenic, wildlife, and recreational assets and control of floods in the communities adjacent to and affected by them, as well as for the improvement of navigation, increased water supply for water power, domestic, and industrial needs, and pollution statement for down-river interests: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Minnesota Legislature in regular session assembled, That we request the Congress of the United States to authorize and direct the War Department to make a survey of the upper Mississippi River navigation reservoir system for the purpose of determining and adopting the best plan of operating these reservoirs for the greatest benefit to all of the interests affected, said survey to embrace such changes, if any, in existing structures which might be found desirable, what additional structures might be needed to facilitate operations, and what channel improvements should be made to improve conditions in the areas; be it further

Resolved, That the secretary of state be instructed to send copies of this resolution to the Minnesota Representatives and Senators in Congress; the Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.; Col. Malcolm Elliott, division engineer, upper Mississippi Valley division, Syndicate Building, St. Louis, Mo.; Col. L. C. Barnes, district engineer, Post Office Building, St. Paul, Minn.

Concurrent resolution memorializing Congress to enact into law H. R. 5295, relating to the domestic raising of certain fur-bearing animals

Whereas fur farming is an important and valuable industry within Minnesota; and

Whereas the raising of pen-bred fox, mink, persian lamb, karakul, and chinchilla is, in reality, an agricultural pursuit and the products of such fur farms are livestock, notwithstanding the fact that the Minnesota Legislature, for purposes of expedient administration and regulation, defines such animals as wild animals and polices the industry through the personnel of the division of game and fish; and

Whereas it is the belief of this legislature that great benefits can accrue to this valuable pursuit if the Federal agency concerned with the promotion of fur farming be designated as the Department of Agriculture: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Legislature of the State of Minnesota, That Congress be urged to take such steps as are necessary to enact into law H. R. 5295, which provides that the breeding, raising, producing, or marketing of the animals herein referred to shall be deemed an agricultural pursuit under the jurisdiction of the Federal Department of Agriculture: Be it further

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be sent to each member of Congress from the State of Minnesota.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

Mr. BANKHEAD, from the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry:

S. 383. A bill to provide for the further development of cooperative agricultural extension work; without amendment (Rept. No. 198).

By Mr. McCARRAN, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. 565. A bill to extend the privilege of retirement to the judges of the District Court for the District of Alaska, the District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone; with an amendment (Rept. No. 200).

PROGRESS REPORT ON WAR PLANTS DISPOSAL (REPT. NO. 199)

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, on behalf of the Military Affairs Committee I ask unanimous consent to submit a progress report of the work which is being carried on jointly by a subcommittee of the Special Senate Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning and

the subcommittee of the Military Affairs Committee on War Contracts with respect to disposal of war plants. This report is merely an account of the steps which have been taken to date to gather information for the Congress on the problem of war plants disposal, which I may say is a problem of the utmost magnitude.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the body of the report, that is to say, that part of the report not including the appendixes, may be printed at length in the RECORD at this point.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the report submitted by the Senator from Wyoming will be received and printed in the RECORD without the appendixes.

The report is as follows:

Negotiations for the disposal of the Government-owned steel plant which was built at Geneva, Utah, at a cost of \$196,000,000 have been begun by the Defense Plant Corporation. Formal notice that Arthur G. McKee & Co., of Cleveland, Ohio, a firm of industrial engineers, has been named by Defense Plant Corporation to make an economic and physical study of the plant was given to the chairman of these subcommittees by Mr. Sam H. Husbands, President of Defense Plant Corporation, in a letter dated April 9, 1945, which appears in appendix I of this report. United States Steel Corporation, Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation, and Kaiser Co., Inc., have each notified Defense Plant of a desire to negotiate for the acquisition of this plant by lease or purchase. Each of these corporations likewise is preparing economic surveys for the purpose of determining the productive uses to which the plant may be devoted.

The fact that these negotiations have been initiated should not, however, be regarded as in any degree furnishing a basis for the conclusion that war work in the Geneva plant is drawing to an immediate end. That is not the case. Victory day in Europe will not, according to the thinking of the War Department, result in any reduction within a foreseeable period of the demand for steel for the prosecution of the war against Japan.

WAR PRODUCTION STILL AT HIGH LEVEL

Months will be required before the war materials, including iron and steel products, which have been shipped to Europe, can be inventoried, repacked, and transported to the Japanese theater of war. While this is being done, a continuous stream of products will have to be produced in the United States and transported across the Pacific. Moreover, it will be necessary to rehabilitate ports in the Philippine Islands and elsewhere in the Pacific as well as to construct new port facilities in order to continue to equip our forces there and to prevent any let-up in the continuous pressure upon the Japanese. I desire to make this point as clear and emphatic as possible lest any inference be drawn from the negotiations and from the studies of the Military Affairs Committee and the Special Senate Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning that the period of war production at the Geneva plant is coming to an early termination.

The War Department has been taking about 30 percent of the Geneva output for steel shells. This demand will continue indefinitely. The remainder of the output is absorbed by the Maritime Commission and the Navy. The Maritime Commission's western requirements for steel plates have been filled primarily by the Fontana plant. Beginning with a demand of about 5,000 tons per month a year ago, an increasingly larger proportion, however, of Geneva plate has gone to Maritime Commission uses, and although the requirements of the Commission

are being steadily reduced, it will continue to take a portion of Geneva output at least until the fall of the current year.

The Navy Department does not anticipate for the present any reduction of its demand for steel plates, and will continue to take steel plates from Geneva. Assuming that the Japanese war continues throughout the present year, production of steel plate at Geneva for the Navy is not expected to be reduced during the year 1945.

Negotiations for the disposal of the Geneva plant must, however, be undertaken now because of the tremendous magnitude of the task of framing a policy for its utilization. Not only is it necessary to determine how the plant will be operated and managed and by whom, but it is also essential for any operator to know what markets can be developed for the products of the plant, and indeed, what type of product should be made.

The need for market studies is imperative since the over-all productive capacity of the steel industry has increased from about 81.6 million net tons before the war (January 1, 1940) to 95.5 million net tons at the present time (January 1, 1945). On the other hand, in 1939 less than two-thirds (64.5 percent) of the then existing capacity was utilized to meet all requirements—civilian as well as military—while at present practically our entire existing steel capacity is being utilized for war and essential civilian purposes. It is, therefore, necessary to study thoroughly the possible markets for the present capacity, the types of steel products which will be required by our post-war economy (including both domestic consumption and exports), and the adaptation of the existing finishing facilities to such post-war uses.

STEEL POLICY MAY BE PATTERN

What is done at Geneva may well be the pattern for what will be done with the other vast war plants built at Government expense and owned by the people of the United States through their Government. The Defense Plant Corporation is acting with wisdom and foresight in opening the subject now, and it has established a laudable policy of complete disclosure of plans to the committees.

Nevertheless, the initiation of the negotiations raises an important question with respect to the entire policy of surplus-property disposal. The act of October 3, 1944, does not give the Surplus Property Board any authority over surplus property until it has been determined to be surplus by the agency which has control of it. Section 11 of the Surplus Property Act makes it the duty of every owning agency to make a continuous survey of property in its control and to determine what property "is surplus to its needs and responsibilities." This same section empowers the Board to secure from the owning agencies such information as to all kinds of property in their hands (before it is declared surplus) as it believes necessary for the proper planning of the Board's job. The agencies are required to report promptly to the Board and the Board is instructed to report to the Senate and to the House of Representatives if it has any reason to believe that any owning agency has surplus property which has not been reported as such to the Board.

The Geneva plant disposal has not been determined to be surplus. The jurisdiction of the Surplus Property Board, therefore, does not attach. Yet, it is highly important that consideration of disposal problems with respect to this and all similar plants should not be postponed until after the plants have ceased to operate and have actually become surplus property.

It is the purpose of Defense Plant Corporation to be prepared for immediate action when war production ceases so that there will be the least possible interruption of employment. The committees' studies have been initiated with the same purpose in view. There will be much greater likelihood of sub-

stantial salvage to the Government as well as much greater likelihood of economic benefit to the country if the plans for reconversion are ready to be applied when war production ceases.

This aspect of the problem appears in all of the categories of war plants listed in section 19 of the surplus property law by which the Surplus Property Board was directed to prepare and submit to Congress a report on plants and facilities which cost the Government \$5,000,000 or more each in the following categories: Aluminum, magnesium, synthetic rubber, chemicals, aviation gasoline, oil and steel, pipe lines, patents, aircraft, shipyards, transportation, and radio and electrical equipment. With respect to the first eight categories, Congress provided that no disposal should be "made or authorized until 30 days after such report (or additional report) has been made while Congress is in session except that the Board may authorize any disposal agency to lease such property for a term of not more than 5 years."

PUBLIC SCRUTINY ESSENTIAL

It would probably be impossible to describe all of the various situations which may arise in the handling of the properties. The complexity of the problem, its possibilities for good or ill upon our whole national economy are beyond imagination. It is for this reason that the formulation of plans and the carrying on of negotiations should all be in the public view. It was because public scrutiny was desired that Congress, in the surplus property law, provided as it did for reports. The fact that that law does not give the Surplus Property Board authority over any property until it has been determined to be surplus by the owning agency serves only to increase the responsibility of Congress to throw the spotlight of public attention on whatever steps may be taken. The chairman is happy to report that both the Defense Plant Corporation and the Surplus Property Board show every intention to cooperate unreservedly in the work of the two committees.

Notice should be taken of the fact that section 20 of the surplus-property law provides for notice to the Attorney General "whenever any disposal agency shall begin negotiations for the disposition to private interests of a plant or plants or other property, which cost the Government \$1,000,000 or more, or of patents, processes, techniques, or inventions, irrespective of cost."

This provision was inserted in the law for the purpose of determining what, if any, applicability of the antitrust laws there might be with respect to any program of disposal.

PREPARATION OF COMMITTEE HEARINGS

The committee is approaching its study in a completely objective manner, and it has invited the cooperation of those who may be in a position to make constructive suggestions. The program of hearings now being formulated does not contemplate merely the appearance of witnesses one after another to recite opinions, but the development rather, in the first instance, of an agreed statement of facts after which it is hoped that a round-table discussion to be participated in by Government, industry, labor, and consumers may be held for the purpose of securing not only a wide public understanding of the facts, but of developing, if possible, an agreed policy in the public interest.

Accordingly letters¹ were addressed by the chairman to more than 100 steel companies, including forge shops and foundries, soliciting their cooperation in the preparation of the hearings. This letter transmitted a preliminary outline of subjects which the subcommittee felt should be considered in the course of the hearings. This outline follows:

I. What economic factors will affect the utilization of the additional productive capacity for steel created by war plants and facilities?

(1) What level of post-war steel demand do you anticipate? Special attention should be paid to—

(a) The anticipated volume of exports.
(b) The anticipated demand in various regions of the United States.
(c) New or expanded uses for steel products.

(d) Possible inroads made by light metals, plastics, etc. on steel consumption.

(2) What special problems exist in connection with the utilization of plants in areas where previously no steel plants had been located?

(a) Will adequate supplies of raw materials, labor, and power be available, and at what relative costs as compared with old established plants?

(b) What are the relative transportation costs in connection with assembly and distribution as compared with old established plants, and what should be the Government's policy with respect to present railroad and shipping rates?

(c) What effect would new basing points or nonbasing point pricing have?

(3) Should the Federal Government, States, and local governments adopt special tax policies in order to facilitate utilization of new capacity?

(a) Should operators dependent on undeveloped markets be granted special tax privileges?

(b) Should operators of surplus facilities generally be granted special tax privileges?
II. What methods of disposal will assure effective utilization?

(1) In order to assure uninterrupted operations, should plants, whenever possible, be disposed of before their present use is discontinued and they are declared surplus?

(2) Should plants be sold, leased, or exchanged, or how else should they be disposed of?

(3) Should the Government extend credit to purchasers and lessees, and should it finance conversion of, or additions to, plants in order to make them more suitable for peacetime uses?

(4) On what basis should prices and rentals be determined, and should they be fixed or flexible until business possibilities are revealed?

(5) Should special conditions attach to the disposal with respect to the level of operations and employment, steel-price policies, maintenance of plants in the interest of national security, transfer to other operators, or as to any other factors?

(6) Should any companies be preferred with respect to, or excluded from, buying or leasing plants, and what should be the criteria for such preference or exclusion?

The companies were requested to comment on the adequacy of the outline, and to submit to the subcommittee a short statement with respect to the issues.

Similar letters were sent to labor organizations² as well as to all departments and agencies of the Federal Government which have any function with respect to any of the iron and steel plants.³ States and local governments of the areas in which the plants are located were also consulted.³

IMPORTANCE OF FREIGHT RATES

Recognizing the importance of freight rates in connection with the future utilization of Government-owned plants and facilities, letters³ were also addressed to the executives of approximately 50 railroads² inviting them to advise the committees of their views as to what relationship exists between railroad rates and the post-war utilization of Government-owned steel plants. It was felt that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the *Georgia railroad rate case*, allowing the State of Georgia to present to that tribunal a petition to enjoin an alleged rate-fixing combination, might

¹ See appendix IV.

² See appendix III.

³ See appendix II.

make it desirable for the committee to consider the relationship between transportation and the best utilization for the civilian economy of Government-owned plants. It is recognized that these plants, not the steel plants alone, but all of the plants, may have to be closed to the great detriment of the national economy unless markets are found for their products. It was felt that no group of executives would be more interested in studying the possibilities of expanding civilian markets and civilian products than the railroads, and that no industry would be likely to benefit more than the railroads if a wise and successful program of plant disposal is developed.

The chairman is happy to report that the responses to the letters have indicated widespread interest throughout the country. Not all replies have been received as yet, but the cooperation indicated, both by letter and orally, has been excellent.

CLASSIFICATION OF STEEL PLANTS

Several companies prefaced their answers by making the general observation that the Government-owned iron and steel facilities are so varied in character that it would be difficult to lay down general rules as to their disposition. Therefore, they suggest that all Government-owned steel plants and facilities be divided into three or four different classes which will have to be treated differently as far as utilization and disposition are concerned. While there are some differences in the classifications suggested, they may roughly be summarized as follows:

Class 1: Strictly war-purpose facilities installed in private plants or built nearby, which are not readily adaptable to peacetime uses. The following are examples: Equipment for shell forging and machining, for the manufacture of cartridge clips, bombs, special tank parts, guns, etc.

Class 2: Facilities installed in or nearby private plants designed to supplement existing standard facilities. They are generally described as "scrambled" facilities and, unless it is economical to move them to some other location, the present operator will be the only and logical party to acquire or operate these facilities after their present uses have expired.

Class 3: All newly built integrated plants (as for example, Geneva) and those non-integrated plants which are capable of independent operations.

With respect to the plants falling into the third class, replies emphasize strongly that no general rules as to disposition and utilization can be made but that it will be necessary to make a study, plant by plant, to identify and separate those which have possibilities for post-war operation.

SUMMARY OF REPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE OUTLINE

As far as the specific questions contained in the outline are concerned, the answers received as of April 15, 1945, may fairly be summarized as follows:

ANTICIPATED LEVEL OF POST-WAR DEMAND

With respect to the first question, as to the anticipated level of post-war steel demand, there seems to be a basically different approach as between some of the companies which have attempted to answer this question, concerning the feasibility of answering this question and the value and the importance of economic forecasts for the development of specific disposal policies of steel plants. Bethlehem Steel Co., for example, doubts whether real progress can be made at this time through an examination of economic factors suggested by part I of the outline. Bethlehem feels that no reliable statistics are obtainable with respect to most of the questions and that any attempt to answer them would be purely guesswork.

Inland Steel Co., on the other hand, feels that sound policies with respect to the dis-

position of surplus facilities should be formulated on the basis of sustained demand for steel as distinguished from short-term accelerated needs immediately after the war. Therefore, Inland, on the basis of past experience and anticipated population increases, attempts to make a forecast as to what this sustained post-war demand is likely to be. Inland arrives at an average demand for ingot steel of approximately 54,000,000 net tons for the 30-year period between 1945 and 1975, and a maximum demand by 1975 of 63,000,000 net tons.

As far as the initial post-war demand is concerned, Inland believes that the estimate of 65,000,000 to 70,000,000 net tons, made by Walter S. Tower, director of the American Iron & Steel Institute, is a reasonable estimate.

The United States Steel Corporation estimates that the post-war demand will be about 65,000,000 to 70,000,000 tons of ingot steel in good years in the post-war period. United States Steel, however, calls attention to the fact that in comparison the country had an ingot capacity on January 1, 1940, of in excess of 81,000,000 tons and on January 1, 1945, in excess of 95,000,000 tons.

Summarizing all the forecasts made by the various companies who have attempted to reply to question I as to post-war demand, it may be said that all of them anticipate a post-war demand substantially in excess of pre-war demand. The demand for steel immediately following the war is anticipated to be considerably higher than the average demand over a long-time period after the war. Some of the companies qualify their estimates by pointing to the impact which general Government policies with respect to taxes, and so forth, will have on steel demand.

Specifically, most of the companies anticipate a greatly increased volume of exports, particularly during the reconstruction period, while steel plants located in devastated countries are incapable of filling the needs abroad.

As far as the regional distribution of steel demand in the United States is concerned, a greatly increased steel demand is anticipated in the far West and in the South. In addition there is anticipated a high demand for steel in regions where the automotive industry and manufacturers of household utilities are located.

The development of new uses for steel, and the expansion of old uses, is anticipated particularly for stainless and alloy steels. Some companies anticipate increased requirements, not so much because of new uses but because of the need for replacement of existing machinery and equipment.

With respect to possible inroads on steel demand by light metals, plastics, and other materials, the answers are extremely optimistic. The reasons given vary. Some point to the high price levels of light metals in comparison with steel. Others believe that light metals, plastics, etc., will be used merely to supplement and complement steel consumption. Others again believe that new uses which may be found for steel will more than offset any inroads made by light metals and plastics.

NEW PLANTS IN NEW AREAS

With respect to the second question as to special problems which exist in connection with the utilization of plants in areas where previously no steel plants had been located, it has been pointed out that the replies received emphasize strongly the need for a plant-by-plant study of these problems. Some of the replies point out that in some instances the location of plant sites were chosen in order that certain other plants engaged in the production of war materials could have their source of raw materials readily available rather than that the steel plants involved should be favorably situated to compete in after-the-war markets. However, only a careful market analysis and an

analysis of the available facilities will produce the necessary answer as to whether and how the plant in question can be utilized.

The United States Steel Corporation points out that a market analysis should be made for each plant for the life of the investment in question, the normal economic life of a steel plant being from 20 to 25 years. This analysis, detailed by products, should, according to the United States Steel, be broken down into three periods: A short period following cessation of hostilities of from 2 to 3 years; a 5-year period following thereafter; and, finally, a 15-year period after the latter period.

The market analysis will have to show what demands will arise for these different periods for durable goods, such as railroad equipment, building construction, public works utilities, and ship building, and for consumer goods, such as automobiles, refrigerators, agricultural equipment, and containers, and for all classes of export trade.

Finally, such market analysis must include a study of whether the estimated post-war markets can be reached competitively by other steel plants.

The analysis of the existing facilities requires a study of the rate of capacity, the availability of raw materials, and the source and cost of assembly, the suitability of existing facilities, the need for additional capital expenditures necessary to reconvert or to add additional facilities, the probable operating costs of the reconverted plant when running at 50, 75, and 100 percent, and present and anticipated freight rates from the plant to markets for each product to reach destination.

The American Steel Foundries suggested that an important consideration on the part of prospective purchasers will be the economics of disposition by such purchasers of their existing privately owned facilities which may in whole or in part become excess capacity on account of the acquisition of the Government-owned facilities.

As to the question of relative transportation costs in connection with assembly and distribution as compared with old established plants, the Pacific Tube Co. points to the difficulties faced by western fabricators in meeting competition of eastern steel manufacturers. The Pacific Tube Co. points out that the eastern steel manufacturers will quote approximately the same prices for steel products whether they be delivered to Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, or Los Angeles, inasmuch as the freight from the eastern plant to destination will be about the same in every case. On the other hand, a west-coast manufacturer, who is not fully integrated, is required to buy his basic products from the East and pay thereon the same amount of freight as would be paid for the finished product if sold on the west coast by the eastern manufacturer. Therefore, the west-coast manufacturer who endeavors to sell to a west-coast destination located a considerable distance from his plant finds that to be competitive he is required to absorb the cost of the freight from his plant to his customer.

In view of this situation, the Pacific Tube Co. pleads for special relief until the west coast can become a fully integrated manufacturing area.

On the other hand, the replies received emphasize that freight rates unprofitable to railroads are not justified to keep plants in operation, and no railroad rates should be made which would discriminate in favor of any such plants.

As far as new basing points or non-basing-point pricing is concerned, the answer supplied by Inland Steel suggests that there is ample justification for the continuation of the base-point method of pricing. Inland Steel points out there are no restrictions on the number or locations of basing points and

that new basing points may be designated by any steel producer with the announcement of the base prices applicable. Inland Steel further points out that the basing point system meets the unusual requirements of steel producers to keep up high-volume, low-cost production of steel, and that any change over to a non-basing-point method of pricing would create serious dislocation within the industry and in the national economy.

This view is strongly supported by the National Supply Co.

TAX PRIVILEGES

The majority of the companies replying to the committees' question is strongly opposed to the granting of any special tax privileges. The American Rolling Mills maintain that the granting of such privileges or any direct subsidy would in the end destroy private competitive enterprise. The American Steel Foundries suggest that, instead of any special tax privileges, the selling price or rental for the facilities should be adjusted downward to meet the existing conditions as to cost, markets, etc. The Isaacson Iron Works, at Seattle, however, suggests that some provision might be made which would allow special amortization, such as wartime certificates of necessity to encourage private purchase of equipment that would enable private industry to employ a maximum number of employees.

Atlantic Steel Castings Co. feels that any venture capital which is provided for the utilization of new capacity should be afforded some measure of protection incident to the development of new markets particularly as present revenue laws preclude the establishment of any reserve funds necessary to permit many companies to sustain themselves through periods of adverse business conditions.

The Pacific Tube Co. asks the question whether operators who have used their own capital in operating Government-owned facilities should not receive treatment preferential to those operators who have worked on the basis of a fixed fee from the Government. It suggests that the former operators have taken great risks in using their own capital and therefore might be accorded advantages not given to operators who risked virtually nothing.

The United States Steel Corporation points out that subsidizing uneconomic operations to increase employment artificially in one locality at the expense of employment in other localities would produce the over-all effect of less efficient production which would cause a net loss rather than a net gain to the Nation. In this view United States Steel is joined by Bethlehem Steel Co. and Inland Steel Co.

METHODS OF DISPOSAL

The Inland Steel Co. points to the principles of the Baruch-Hancock report with respect to disposition of surplus property. First and foremost, that all negotiations for the disposition of such property should be conducted in a "goldfish bowl," and, secondly, that the facilities should not be operated by the Government in competition with private enterprise.

As far as the specific questions asked by the committee are concerned, the replies are practically unanimous that disposition of plants before their present use is discontinued and before they are declared surplus is desirable. Here are some of the reasons given: Early disposition will avoid the high cumulative cost of custodial, watch, legal, and accounting services. Blast furnaces, rolling mills, coke ovens, and other equipment of this character, no matter how new or modern they are, will deteriorate rapidly if shut down.

One of the answers, on the other hand, cautions against any disposition which will affect present operations, and some of them doubt whether the major companies now operating Government-owned plants can de-

cide whether they want to continue operations or not after the war.

The National Supply Co. warns against any fixed policies to dispose of plants before their present use is discontinued, since the haste may lead to some bad deals. The Government should entertain negotiations, the National Supply Co. points out, whenever buyers are in prospect and should not follow any fixed policy as to time of disposal.

SALE OR LEASE

Basic disagreement exists between the companies who replied to the question of whether plants should be sold or leased, or how else they should be disposed of. The Inland Steel Co. takes the extreme view that plants should be disposed of by sale only, in order to get the Government completely out of the business. American Rolling Mill Co. likewise feels that plants should be sold to private enterprise at the best possible price obtainable.

On the other extreme, Copperweld Steel Co. believes that, in order to protect the Government's interests, new facilities should not be sold because the Government would have to dispose of such facilities at a sacrifice. Copperweld Steel Co., in stead of sale, advocates a 20-year lease on a tonnage basis. This would enable the Government, so Copperweld believes, to liquidate its entire capital investment and would not necessarily add any burden to management. On the other hand it would permit management to increase its markets and thereby materially increase the employment of labor.

Other companies replying do not feel that any set rules can and should be established with respect to sale or lease. National Supply Co., for instance, believes that sale would be preferable but that the conditions surrounding each transaction should determine the method of disposition. Atlantic Steel Castings Co. suggests that many companies who wish to acquire surplus capacity are not sufficiently well entrenched to risk an undue portion of their resources in the acquisition of these facilities, and it appears equitable to Atlantic Steel Castings that such companies should be granted leases on favorable terms with options to purchase the properties at a fair valuation.

Bethlehem Steel Co. is pessimistic as to the purchase of Government-owned integrated plants and other facilities which can be operated as independent units. Bethlehem Steel feels that the purchase of these Government-owned facilities at any price would involve an unusual degree of risk on the part of the purchaser and this risk, Bethlehem Steel feels, is bound to influence the views of any prospective purchaser as to the price it is willing to pay.

With respect to the facilities installed primarily for the production of wartime products, Bethlehem Steel Co. suggests that the Government's interests might best be served by preserving the ownership of the Government for future emergencies rather than to sell these facilities for the very nominal price which they might bring, since most of them are not readily adaptable to the production of commercial products. To whatever extent they can be advantageously used, Bethlehem suggests that they be leased, thus leaving the Government in full ownership and control if they should be needed in some future emergency.

As for facilities installed at or near existing plants designed to supplement existing facilities in the production of standard steel products, the owners of the existing plants should be given an opportunity of acquiring such plants. Should it be impossible to agree on a satisfactory purchase price, Bethlehem Steel Co. suggests that a lease with an appropriate rental base might be worked out.

The Continental Foundry & Machine Co. suggests that, in establishing the purchase price for Government-owned buildings and machinery within a given plant, considera-

tion should be given to the fact that the company made rental payments for the use of such buildings and machinery for the war effort.

GOVERNMENT CREDIT TO PURCHASERS AND LESSEES

The same divergence of views which existed with respect to the question of sale or lease exists with respect to the question of Government extension of credit to purchasers or lessees. American Steel Foundries, Inland Steel Co., and Copperweld Steel Co. oppose the extension of credit for the purchase of surplus facilities. The first two companies feel that, if the venture was really sound, private financing should be available for it. American Steel Foundries is apprehensive that Government financing of either the purchase money or the conversion expense might lead to the risk remaining that of the Government and to possible recall of the facilities back to the Government.

Copperweld Steel Co., while opposing credit for the purchase of surplus facilities, believes that an extension of credit for operating purposes would be highly desirable in order to maintain a high standard of employment.

National Supply Co., on the other hand, feels that, while the Government might extend credit to purchasers, it is doubtful whether credit should be extended to lessees. In any case, however, National Supply Co. insists that the credit should be negotiated with the intention that it will be refinanced through private channels in a few years.

BASIS FOR PRICES AND RENTALS—FIXED OR FLEXIBLE PRICES OR RENTALS

As far as the basis of the price or rental is concerned, several companies suggest that it will be impossible at the present time or immediately following the war to establish a sound price or rental bases. The suggestion, therefore, is made not to determine such bases until the industry has had an opportunity to survey its post-war prospects.

Copperweld Steel Co. suggests that rentals should be based on the production and shipment over a 20-year period. Atlantic Steel Castings Co. likewise believes that rentals should be fixed on a relatively low per ton of production basis for a period sufficiently long to permit the lessees to operate pending clarification of market conditions.

American steel foundries, on the other hand, feels that flexible prices might encourage the launching of unsound ventures at Government risk.

Those who believe that it might be possible to establish bases now insist that, in fixing a selling price, the conditions facing the particular plant or facilities should be evaluated and that the price should not be based exclusively on original cost and depreciation. Inland Steel Co., for example, points out that in many instances plants have been constructed at an abnormally high cost or have been placed in locations in which competitive disadvantages exist. Inland believes that the value of the capital equipment is no greater than its earning capacity, and that in fixing a fair value, due recognition must be given to this important factor.

As far as moneys received by the Government for sale or lease of surplus property are concerned, American Rolling Mill Co. has suggested the use of these moneys for the purpose of carrying on intensive research within the armed forces and in cooperation with private enterprise in the interest of national defense.

Inland Steel Co. suggests that the proceeds from surplus sales should be used to reduce the national debt.

SPECIAL DISPOSAL CONDITIONS

All of the companies replying to the question with respect to special conditions are opposed to any conditions with respect to the level of operations and employment and steel price policies. They argue that no industry could long exist if it is required to pay for

services not rendered. Inasmuch as little steel can be produced against future orders, the level of operations must necessarily fall if orders fail to come in.

Some of these companies deem it advisable to attach a condition to the sale of properties requiring persons acquiring such properties to maintain them in good working order for a limited number of years in the interest of national security.

PREFERENCE FOR OR DISQUALIFICATION OF COMPANIES

The question of whether any company should be preferred with respect to, or excluded from, buying or leasing plants has resulted in a variety of suggestions. Some companies, as for example Inland Steel Corporation, suggests that, in the absence of any conflict with the antitrust laws, no company should be excluded as a prospective purchaser.

Several companies have expressed the opinion, as, for example, Atlantic Steel Castings Co. and American Steel Foundries, that those companies now leasing or operating plants should be afforded the first opportunity to acquire or lease the facilities.

Copperweld Steel Co. suggests that facilities should be leased to present operators or that preference should be given to such institutions that could maintain the highest level of employment.

United Engineering & Foundry Co., is opposed to the sale of steel plants to companies not now engaged in the steel business, as for example, automobile or refrigerator manufacturers, or railroad companies. This view is supported by Continental Foundry & Machine Co., which believes that no company which has not been operating in peacetimes in a given basic industry should be permitted to buy or lease any Government-owned plants in any basic industry which has too much productive capacity for normal peacetime years.

American Steel Foundries, on the other hand, believes that the opportunity to purchase steel plants should be open to any industry.

American Radiator Co. takes the middle position and feels that steel plants should first be offered to people engaged in the steel business, and, secondly, to people who might want to engage in the steel business.

SUMMARY OF REPLIES TO RAILROAD LETTER

The majority of the replies received to the letter sent to approximately 50 major railroads, point out that the freight-rate structure of the railroads is "highly complex, that it reflects circumstances and conditions, economic and otherwise, surrounding the movement of each kind of traffic from each origin to each destination individually, and a general relationship to other origins and destinations, as well as a reasonable relationship to competitive commodities" (Atlantic Coast Line Railroad). Therefore, most of the replies suggest that the over-all problem with which the subcommittees are confronted insofar as railroad rates are concerned, is such that the situation can best be dealt with as and when definite, specific information is available as to the purposes to which individual plants and facilities are to be used, together with information in regard to the general areas in which raw materials will originate, and destination territories of the manufactured products.

This latter point is made very strongly by William Jeffers, president, Union Pacific Railroad, and I quote from his telegram:

"If a plant should pass to private operation then the freight rates can be negotiated but not as a condition precedent to sale or disposal of such plant. If the rates in effect are not deemed to be proper and negotiations fail then the subject should properly be referred to Interstate Commerce Commission for adjudication. Otherwise other private

interests engaged in competitive efforts would be at a decided disadvantage, which I am sure would create widespread public resentment."

Otherwise, the railroads generally emphasize that the continued existence of the prosperity of their roads is based upon their ability to establish new industries and to assist the old ones in maintaining a profitable business. The roads point out that if a buyer or lessee of a Government plant proposes to manufacture a product never before shipped from that point, rates will have to be worked out with the industry and with connecting lines to territories to which the industry desires to ship. Emphasis is placed on the fact that its rates must be properly related to those enjoyed by established competitors, both on raw materials and the finished products.

The Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey states that "it is a truism that transportation costs practically determine the life or death of any major industry, particularly one such as the steel industry." The Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey points out that the privately owned steel plants which were in existence in this country prior to the war, were built up primarily with relation to the then-existing levels of transportation costs, so that the life and death of these privately owned plants is dependent upon a delicately adjusted pattern of these costs, relative changes in which should be undertaken with the utmost caution.

The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. stresses the fact that the building of new war plants was spread throughout the country apparently for strategic rather than economic or commercial reasons, and has thereby brought about a different distribution of traffic than existed before the war. The railroad believes that it is a matter of speculation whether the reconversion of industrial plants to normal peacetime pursuits, and the conversion of war plants to commercial business, will or will not continue this dislocation of normal traffic flow. Until conditions have become settled, the road believes, it will not only be difficult, but impracticable to indicate rates that would be equally satisfactory to the shipper and the carrier.

The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. points out that it would be hurtful to industry and the economy of the country "to expect or require the railroads to adjust their transportation charges for the purpose of maintaining artificially Government plants or facilities which are not soundly located with respect to the raw materials and the markets for the finished products."

The Missouri Pacific Lines believe that there is no issue as to the relationship between railroad rates and the utilization of Government-owned plants and facilities which cannot be satisfactorily resolved by conference and negotiation between the railroads and the owners of the erstwhile Government plant. As far as the rates for steel are concerned, the railroad points to the fact that steel is sold on certain base-point prices and that, in the road's opinion, the freight rate that enters into the picture may or may not be the rate from the point from which the steel is shipped, and that therefore, in some cases it is likely that the measure of the rate itself, whether it be high or low, may not be of any great importance.

Finally, the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. expresses grave concern over the decision of the Supreme Court in the *State of Georgia* case. It anticipates serious confusion in view of the uncertainty which it feels has resulted from the decision and fears that out of the "welter of that confusion" there may come "some Government-ordained rate structure, which . . . would freeze freight rates on a mileage basis."

REPLIES FROM STATE GOVERNORS TO STEEL LETTERS

The only reply received as of April 15, 1945, from any of the State Governors which deals with the substance of the problems involved is one from Gov. Edward Martin, of Pennsylvania. Governor Martin suggests that the following questions should be dealt with in the course of the hearings:

1. What are the replacement needs of old established steel plants as a result of war production and to what extent do added wartime facilities supply these replacement needs?
2. To what extent has improved technology affected the capacity of existing plants to supply anticipated normal demands?
3. What would be the effect on employment in eastern industrial cities of diversion of peacetime steel demand to newly constructed steel plants in West and Northwest?
4. What effect would Government subsidies in form of reduced taxes, preferential rail rates or the like, to maintain steel production in new areas have on reconversion problems and demands of other industries?
5. To what extent would such a policy delay post-war readjustment to a stable and self-maintaining economy?

BILLS AND A JOINT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED

Bills and a joint resolution were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. WILEY:

S. 912. A bill conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claims of Arthur Dewitt Janes; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. HAYDEN:

S. 913. A bill to protect scenic values along and tributary to the Catalina Highway within the Coronado National Forest, Ariz.; to the Committee on Public Lands and Surveys.

By Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado (for Mr. WHEELER):

S. 914. A bill to amend the tariff act, as amended; to the Committee on Interstate Commerce.

(Mr. CHANDLER introduced Senate Joint Resolution 60, which was ordered to lie on the table, and appears under a separate heading.)

MISSOURI VALLEY AUTHORITY—AMENDMENTS

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado submitted amendments intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 555) to establish a Missouri Valley Authority to provide for unified water control and resource development on the Missouri River and surrounding region in the interest of the control and prevention of floods, the promotion of navigation and reclamation of the public lands, the promotion of family-type farming, the development of the recreational possibilities and the promotion of the general welfare of the area, the strengthening of the national defense, and for other purposes, which were referred to the Committee on Commerce and ordered to be printed.

PEACE AND PROSPERITY: OUR SHARE IN ESTABLISHING IT—STATEMENT BY SENATOR BURTON

[Mr. BURTON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Record excerpts from a statement entitled "Peace and Prosperity—Our Share in Establishing It," delivered by him before the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, Cleveland, Ohio, April 17, 1945, which appears in the Appendix.]

CITIZENS' DEDICATION TO A LASTING PEACE PLAN—STATEMENT BY SENATOR BURTON

[Mr. BURTON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a statement by him entitled "Citizens' Dedication to a Lasting Peace Plan," made in Washington, D. C., April 22, 1945, which appears in the Appendix.]

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE IN PEACETIME—ADDRESS BY SENATOR WALSH

[Mr. WALSH asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address in opposition to compulsory military service, delivered by him for the Massachusetts Women's Political Club, in Boston, on April 22, 1945, which appears in the Appendix.]

JUSTICE FOR LITHUANIA—ADDRESS BY ARCHBISHOP RICHARD J. CUSHING

[Mr. WALSH asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a sermon asking justice and freedom for Lithuania, delivered by Most Rev. Richard J. Cushing, D. D., archbishop of the diocese of Boston, on April 22, 1945, at the cathedral in Boston, which appears in the Appendix.]

ANNIVERSARY OF BIRTH OF THOMAS A. EDISON—ADDRESS BY SENATOR PEPPER

[Mr. BILBO asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a radio address on the birthday anniversary of Thomas A. Edison, delivered by Senator PEPPER in Washington, February 10, 1945, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE—ADDRESS BY ALF M. LANDON

[Mr. CAPPER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address on the subject The San Francisco Conference, delivered by Hon. Alf M. Landon, in Topeka, Kans., April 22, 1945, which appears in the Appendix.]

EULOGY OF THE LATE PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT BY D. D. MONROE

[Mr. HATCH asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a eulogy on the late President Roosevelt delivered by D. D. Monroe, grand sire of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, at Clayton, N. Mex., on April 13, 1945, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE JEWISH PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION—ADDRESS BY WILLIAM B. ZIFF

[Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address on the subject The Jewish Problem and Its Solution delivered by William B. Ziff, at the Hotel Astor, New York City, at a meeting in commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the creation of the Jewish Legion in World War No. 1, which appears in the Appendix.]

ACCIDENTS IN THE AIR

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, in this morning's Washington Post I find the following article:

CURTISS PLANT DENIES PLANES WERE DEFECTIVE

BUFFALO, N. Y., April 21.—Curtiss-Wright Corporation's Buffalo plant tonight issued a denial of charges that it produced defective planes and permitted improper inspection.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER (Republican), North Dakota, last Wednesday accused the plant of producing defective aircraft and forcing them into the armed services through improper inspection. The Senator offered as proof a document he said was signed by a former Curtiss inspector, Frank R. Hirsch, of East Aurora. The firm said Army intelligence had reported "the statements made by Mr. Hirsch were wholly inaccurate."

Mr. President, as will be noted, the article mentions the fact that I made certain charges, and I wish to say that I have testimony in addition to the statement of Frank R. Hirsch, a former inspector. The Mead committee, or the Truman committee, has failed to report for a period of 21 months. Unless we get some report by a week from today, I intend to offer a resolution asking for the appointment of a special committee, because the records show that our pilots are still dying at a greater rate in this country than they are in the theater of war.

Mr. TOBEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LANGER. I yield.

Mr. TOBEY. If my memory serves me correctly, the planes in question, which it was brought out by the Truman committee were defective, were used as training planes for the instruction of the youth of America in flying, and Government inspectors were barred from the planes while these phony operations went on, if I remember the evidence correctly.

Mr. LANCER. The Senator's recollection is correct.

ATROCITIES IN GERMAN PRISON CAMPS

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, the people of our country have been deeply stirred at the messages just received from General Eisenhower and others referring to the treatment accorded by Germans to prisoners of war. They are now convinced that American prisoners, and the prisoners of our allies, have received atrocious treatment at the hands of the Germans. It has taken the American people a long time to become convinced that the Germans would descend to the level to which apparently they have fallen in the abuse of prisoners.

Last Friday, when reports came through, after advising with officials of the O. W. I. and Representative BROOKS, of Louisiana, we jointly prepared a joint resolution to be introduced into both Houses of Congress this morning. The joint resolution will be presented in the other House by Representative BROOKS today. In the meantime, some of our colleagues are either on the way to visit the prison camps, or perhaps by this time may have arrived.

I daresay the Senate will desire to take some action, and the joint resolution I have in my hand is intended to give the President of the United States the authority to appoint a permanent war atrocities commission, or a semipermanent commission, as he may desire, to examine and keep a record, so that for all time the American people may have a record of the treatment of Americans and Allied prisoners by the Germans in the war.

This is a very short joint resolution, and is not intended to conflict, of course, with what has already been done. It may be that if a permanent commission is organized, the President will want to appoint the Members of the House and Senate who are already serving, and there is no idea on the part of either Representative BROOKS or myself to do anything today except to be certain that the brutal treatment being accorded prisoners is called to the attention of the

American people, and that the Senate and House of Representatives have an opportunity to make their wishes known to the President and to the country.

Mr. BILBO. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. BILBO. The Senator referred to atrocities committed by the Germans. Does the Senator include the Japs also?

Mr. CHANDLER. If the War Atrocities Commission is appointed by the President it will of course inquire into atrocities wherever committed, in any part of the world. By reason of information gained by members of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and of the Mead Committee and of the Appropriations Committee, when we visited war areas in 1943, it has been generally known that the Japs have been guilty of bestial treatment to American prisoners. In diaries captured by the forces of General MacArthur and others, Japanese soldiers have themselves told stories of atrocities committed by them in order that they may be considered to be great men when they return to their own country. Fortunately not many of them are going to return. General MacArthur has in his possession statements by Japanese in their own handwriting, which clearly set forth the atrocities committed by them upon American prisoners.

The joint resolution I am about to introduce reads as follows:

Whereas American prisoners of war released from Nazi prison camps are a living testimonial to the complete disregard by the Germans of the concepts of mercy and decency included in the Geneva Convention; and

Whereas American news services have recently released reports confirming the existence of prison camps wherein the members of the armed forces of our gallant Allies have been subject to similar bestial treatment; and

Whereas the nationals of our Allies from France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Norway and the Soviet Union have been enslaved, tortured, and slaughtered with the full knowledge of Axis authorities; and

Whereas such brutal and inhumane conduct is the natural product of those debased political ideas and degrading social concepts held in common by Nazi and Japanese militarists; and

Whereas the United Nations have signified their intention of holding personally responsible for these vile assaults against the dignity of mankind those Germans who have authorized as well as those who have committed such acts: Therefore be it

Resolved, etc., That it is the sense of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States, that the President of the United States appoint a commission to be known as the War Atrocities Commission to examine, investigate, and report upon the descent of the Axis annihilations far below the level of animal cruelty, outreaching the lust to kill of the most primitive savages; and be it further

Resolved, That this Commission should consist of equal membership from both Houses of Congress, from private citizens of the United States, and provided that at least two wearers of the Purple Heart from the lower echelons of the armed forces of the United States be included; and be it

Further resolved, That the Commission should be immediately appointed and immediately sent to the scene of these atrocities, so that:

1. The people of the United States shall have the benefit of the information collected and the decisions made by this representative commission; and so that

2. The United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference shall likewise have this information and these decisions at their disposal.

It is desirable that this information be in the hands of the delegations to the San Francisco Conference so they may consider it in connection with decisions to be made by them with respect to the people involved.

Mr. President, certainly there can be no peace reestablished in the world until we insist that conventions dealing with treatment of prisoners are lived up to. Senators have but to visit a German prison camp in this country or a Japanese prison camp in this country and see the kind of treatment accorded German and Japanese prisoners. The other day at Como, Miss., a German major general was buried with full military honors. The American authorities permitted the Hitler Fascist salute to be given at the burial of the general. They permitted the firing of a salute of guns and the display of the Nazi emblem. The treatment we accord German and Japanese prisoners is far and away different from the treatment accorded American prisoners in the hands of the Germans and Japanese. We must see to it, Mr. President, that in the future mistreatment of our soldiers shall not again occur.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I wish to ask the Senator from Kentucky if his joint resolution refers to the committee which, according to the press, has already been formed and is on its way to Europe, or does the resolution refer to a committee in addition to that one?

Mr. CHANDLER. When we prepared the resolution it was not known either by Representative Brooks, or by me, or by the O. W. I., so far as I am informed, that any group Members of Congress had been appointed, or would be appointed. This is the first opportunity which the House or the Senate have had since the report and request came from General Eisenhower when either House could take official action. Action has heretofore been taken by someone. The action proposed by the resolution is not intended to be competitive with previous action. I have no desire to interfere with anything that has been done previously. If the permanent Commission is appointed it is possible that Members of Congress who are now on the tour of concentration camps will be appointed to the Commission.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, how is it possible for so many Members of the Congress to take these trips to the battlefields of the world and to foreign countries? It was day before yesterday, I believe, that we heard that 3 Members of the House of Representatives had visited a certain place in Europe, and this morning the press states that 8 Members of the House are visiting battlefields and concentration camps in Europe. Then we hear over the air that 17 editors, and no one knows how many

Members of both Houses, are taking another trip. How do they get there? Do they go on their own account, or how?

Mr. CHANDLER. I have been informed that some of them have been invited to go by the British Government, and perhaps by other governments.

Mr. AIKEN. Who pays the expenses?

Mr. CHANDLER. I am not advised as to that. If you are invited, I assume the one who invites you pays the expenses. I have been told that some Members of the House and others have been invited by the British Government to visit the concentration camps, and have already gone. If a Senator or a Representative is named by a Senate or House committee to go over there, the War Department has arrangements whereby the expenses are paid. I understand that 12 of our colleagues are on the way overseas, or perhaps by this time have arrived. I do not know who is going to pay their expenses. I have not been consulted in that matter and I cannot answer.

Mr. AIKEN. It does not seem to me to be a very good or safe rule for Members of either House—probably I should not refer to the other House, but I may say it is not a good or a safe rule for Members of the Congress to go anywhere merely because someone offers to pay their expenses. I should think the United States Government should pay the expenses, if it is not already doing so, of any Members of the Congress who are visiting various parts of the world.

Mr. CHANDLER. Let me say to the Senator that a committee of Senators went all the way around the world, and, so far as I know, our expenses were paid by the United States Government. I have never accepted any invitation by any other government, and I would not do so.

Mr. AIKEN. I think that is the way all these trips should be made.

Mr. CHANDLER. We were authorized to make the trip by our respective committees and by the Senate, and we made the trip under that authority.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. HILL. It is my understanding that nearly any Member of Congress who desires to do so may go overseas at the invitation of the British Government. It is also my understanding that most of the Members of the House of Representatives who have been overseas, and have been in the European theater during the last few weeks, or who may be there now, made the trip at the invitation of European governments.

As the Senate knows, on Friday last, General Eisenhower cabled to the War Department urging that the War Department send a committee of 12 Members of the Congress, 6 from the Senate and 6 from the House of Representatives, and a number of members of the press, to visit and to see at first hand the prison and concentration camps of the Nazis, in order that the Members of such committee might see with their own eyes the horrors of those camps and the evidences of the brutality and of the atrocities which had been committed in those

camps. As a result of this request by General Eisenhower the War Department designated the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. BROOKS], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] as the 6 Senate Members of the committee to go over and to represent the Senate.

Mr. AIKEN. How long has it been since the War Department was naming Members of congressional delegations? What right has the War Department to say who shall represent the Senate, and what authority is there for letting foreign governments pay the expenses?

Mr. HILL. I would say in reply to the distinguished junior Senator from Vermont that the War Department would have no power to name Members from the Senate unless the naming of such Senators was perhaps agreeable both to the distinguished majority leader and the distinguished minority leader. I can well imagine that the minority leader was consulted in this matter. General Eisenhower was anxious to have six Members of the Senate visit Europe for the purpose indicated. As the Senator knows, so far as the majority is concerned—and I believe also so far as the minority is concerned—most distinguished Senators, occupying the most important positions in the Senate, were selected. For example, the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY] is the majority leader. The distinguished Senator from Georgia, chairman of the Committee on Finance, is now also acting chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, in the absence of the distinguished Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] at the San Francisco Conference. The distinguished Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS] is chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. So it will be seen that so far as the majority is concerned, the majority leader, the acting chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs were designated. I believe that an examination of the list of names from the minority will show that the minority Members are equally distinguished.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I have not the slightest objection to the make-up of the committee which has gone to Europe; and it is probably a good thing that it has gone. The question I raise is whether we should permit the War Department to name such committees, or whether it should be done by the Senate itself. I do not recall that the question has been brought before the Senate. Possibly it has. I do not recall that leave of absence has been given. Furthermore, I believe that expenses of trips such as this should be paid out of congressional appropriations, and not by any foreign government or by any other department of the Government.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. HILL. So far as expenses are concerned, I presume that the Members of both Houses will travel in War Department or Navy Department planes. In this case, General Eisenhower having made the request, I suppose they will travel in War Department planes, and that while the members of the committee are over there they will be billeted with our troops. No doubt they will be fed at Army messes, and will live in an Army camp while they are there.

If the Senator from Kentucky will further yield to me in that connection, at this time I ask unanimous consent that the six Members of the Senate to whom I have referred may be excused from calls of the Senate during their visit to inspect and see at first hand the German prison camps.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Alabama?

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I shall not object, but I wish to register an objection to the procedure by which the designations were made. In my judgment, when a committee of the Senate of the United States proceeds on such an inspection trip as this, the members of the committee should be designated by the Senate, and not by the War Department, or any other executive agency of the Government.

Mr. CHANDLER. I had not assumed that the War Department selected the Senators. Of course, I have no way of knowing. The reason for this resolution was to give authority for what was done. I wish the Senate to understand that this resolution is not intended to be competitive. I think perhaps it was exceedingly important that General Eisenhower's request be complied with at the earliest possible moment. I believe he wanted Members of Congress to be on hand as soon as possible. It seems to me important that the bodies of those who were mangled, bruised, and beaten be viewed immediately, so that they may be buried. I think perhaps that was the reason for haste. As my friend from Oregon has suggested, personally I would not approve of the War Department's selecting Senators or Members of the House to make inspection trips on behalf of the Congress.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. My comment is based upon my understanding of the statement made by the distinguished Senator from Alabama. I understood him to say that the designation of the particular individuals selected was made by the War Department. To that principle I object. As to the request for leave of absence to the Senators involved, I do not object.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. WHITE. Perhaps I can say a word in clarification of the situation. At any rate, I can assume some of the responsibility for what has happened.

The first I heard of this matter was on Friday afternoon, when the majority leader of the Senate told me of the invitation which had come from General Eisenhower, through military channels,

embodying a most earnest appeal that a group of Senators and Representatives be sent to Europe at the earliest possible moment so that on their return they might report to the American people and to the Congress the precise situation with respect to the German concentration and prison camps, and as to the atrocities which had been practiced not alone upon our own people, but upon citizens of Germany and others.

I heard of the invitation Friday afternoon. There was a cablegram from General Eisenhower. I believe it came through General Marshall. The appeal of General Eisenhower that such a visit be made was concurred in by General Marshall.

I knew nothing about the make-up of the senatorial group until the following morning. Then I obtained further details as to the trip. Members of the group were to leave Sunday morning, because it was imperative that if they were going at all, they should be there at the earliest possible moment.

As minority leader, I took the responsibility, after consultation with such Members of the minority as I could reach on Saturday morning, of submitting the names of three Members of the minority to go on this trip. I submitted the list to the majority leader, and I assume that he passed it on to the War Department, and that final arrangements were consummated by the War Department.

I do not know whether I have violated the proprieties, or offended the sensibilities of any Senator; but there was what seemed to me to be an imperative request from the highest military authority overseas that this group of Senators be sent over there. If it were to be done, it had to be done at the moment. There was no opportunity for reference of the matter to a committee of the Senate. There was no opportunity for committee consideration, or consideration by the Senate. After consultation with such Members of the minority as I could reach, the names of three Members of the minority were submitted by me. I did not assume that I was appointing a committee of the Senate or members of such a committee. I acted on the assumption that I was recommending Members of the Senate as desirable and proper persons to go on this trip.

I think it would be tragic if in the circumstances leave of absence should now be denied to those Senators. From my conversations with the Members recommended I know that they were reluctant to take the trip. The senior Senator from Kentucky was most reluctant to go. The Senator from Georgia expressed himself as being reluctant in the extreme. I know that the Senator from Utah did not wish to go; and I know that Members chosen from this side did not wish to go. However, they went in response to what they felt was a call to service.

I shared that view. I participated in the selection of the Members who went; and I approved, so far as I had any authority to do so, sending them to make this survey of conditions.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. I for one am perfectly delighted to learn that this delegation has gone abroad. As the able minority leader has stated, the necessity was great; the need was urgent; and I am very much pleased that the able majority leader [Mr. BARKLEY], the Chairman of the Committee on Finance [Mr. GEORGE], and the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs [Mr. THOMAS of Utah] are representing this side of the aisle. This is an official delegation, on important and urgent public business. There have been cases in which it seemed to me that certain representatives of the Congress went on frolics of their own, conferring with generals on various fronts about military strategy, of which they knew nothing, and taking up the time of men who have something more important to do, than to entertain persons who knew nothing about the problem. So in my opinion this delegation, as I have said, Mr. President, is important. These gentlemen should have gone in answer to the call of General Eisenhower; but I think that we and all other Members of the Congress should give some care and consideration to the question of going across the water in these times, lest we unnecessarily burden the war effort.

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. BRIDGES. Wholly aside from the question of this particular trip, addressing myself to a point raised by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CHANDLER] and developed by the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Aiken], namely, the matter of Members of Congress going across the ocean or leaving this country and being guests of a foreign country, I think that is wholly uncalled for and improper. I think that Members of Congress who might happen to leave this country and not pay their own expenses certainly should go at the expense of our own Government, not at the expense of a foreign government.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, I do not know any way to keep a Member of Congress from accepting an invitation from a foreign government if he chooses to do so. I understand that some have received invitations. I never had one; but if I had, I would not have accepted it. The only trip I ever made on an inspection tour was made at the direction of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and was approved by the Senate. I think that is the best way, perhaps.

The joint resolution was prepared before it was known that such an emergency would arise or that a committee would be appointed. I desire to repeat that it is not competitive; but I think the Senate and the House of Representatives should take notice of this matter officially. If the joint resolution is not objectionable, I think it should be adopted. I think it should give the President the authority to appoint a bipartisan commission of Members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, Republicans and Democrats, as the civilian part of the commission, and—as the resolution suggests—two wearers of the Purple Heart, two G. I. soldiers who have served in the Army. They should see these things

and should be advised, because they would be able to make some practical suggestions about what the Government of the United States should do under the circumstances.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. I take no issue with the suggestion made by the Senator from Kentucky; but I would assume that General Eisenhower and other responsible military leaders, with the military departments they have available with which to deal with matters such as that to which the Senator from Kentucky has referred, would gather the evidence, document it, take photographs, and in other ways perpetuate it, so that their records would be the best evidence.

While I think that in the circumstances it might have been wise to send one committee over there, fundamentally the obligation of Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives is to remain in Washington and attend to the business of Congress here, and do it as well as we can, and let the military and naval experts conduct the war. It is my opinion that, while this case is an exceptional one, and it might be well to act upon it, and certainly so if General Eisenhower requests it or if the President has requested it, as a general rule a congressional committee cannot do anything over there that the Army or Navy cannot do better. When the evidence is assembled, it could be presented to the Senate and the House of Representatives, and we could, in line with what the Senator has suggested, set up a committee which could review the evidence here.

I am doubtful whether it would be wise for some of us to take 6 months off or 3 months off from our own work here—and that length of time would be necessary in order for a committee to do a complete, good, and thorough job—I doubt whether it would be wise for Senators or Representatives to take off that much time from their work here, on which the Army and the Navy must rely as the source for all the money and support and legislation necessary in order to win the war.

I am not taking any issue with the resolution, except to say that if a commission is appointed, it should sit in Washington, and should let the evidence flow in to Washington from reliable sources, rather than go around and see for itself.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, I think the commission should be appointed. Where it sits is a matter to be determined later. But in this war the American people are wholly committed together with their lives and property and money. I do not agree that a Senator who votes for war and votes taxes on the American people to support the war and votes billions of dollars in money and property of the people—and their money and property are scattered all over the earth—has no duty aside from voting. I think he owes an obligation to follow that investment as closely as the circumstances allow. Our allies are very smart. They do not make much fuss about sending people to all

parts of the world to see about their affairs.

We are not going to be a provincial country any more. We are not going to be able to live within the borders of the United States, when our sons and our substance are literally scattered all over the globe.

I think the committee trip in 1943 did a great deal of good. I think it has meant a great deal not only to those who took the trip but to those who talked with them later.

This time the War Department has made the request. That is rather unusual, because generally the only time the War Department talks to the Senate is when it wants something.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I wish to say that I think the trip made by the committee in 1943 accomplished a tremendous amount of good; but I wish to state for the Record that that was a duly authorized committee of the Senate, and the expenses were paid by the United States Government, whether through the War Department or some other agency of our Government.

Mr. CHANDLER. The Senator is quite correct.

Mr. AIKEN. That is the way such committees should operate and that is the way they should be designated. They should be authorized by the Congress. If we correctly understand the current newspaper reports, there are approximately 30 or 40 Members of both Houses of Congress abroad, today, investigating the war. How many of them have been authorized to make such trips, I do not know; but certainly such trips should be authorized and the Members of Congress who make the trips should be named in the same manner that the committee which made the very excellent trip in 1943 was named.

Mr. CHANDLER. Yes. I desire to repeat what I said a while ago. If a foreign government wishes to invite a United States Senator or a Member of the United States House of Representatives to visit a country across the ocean, and if the foreign government wishes to pay his expenses, and if the Member of the Senate or the House of Representatives wishes to go, there is nothing we can do to keep him from going, except to expel him. If he wishes to accept the invitation, I do not know of any way to stop him.

Mr. AIKEN. Except that under the rules of the Senate he must obtain the consent of the Senate to make the trip.

Mr. CHANDLER. Yes; but if he did not obtain it, the only thing we could do would be to expel him, I suppose, because otherwise he probably would go if he wanted to go.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me again?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. I think the trip made by the five Senators, who subsequently have been able to view the situation as a result of their memorable trip some time ago, was a good venture. I think the trip made to the Aleutians by the sub-

committee of the Committee on Military Affairs was a good venture. We might keep in mind that one of the sections of the world over which the American flag flies is the Philippine Islands. The Philippine Islands have been devastated to an extent of from \$700,000,000, so I am advised, to more than \$1,000,000,000. Bills are pending in Congress to pay the damages in the Philippines resulting from the war, to revive trade, to establish air bases and military bases, and so forth; so we have a considerable amount of work of that character to do, without going to places where the American flag is represented only on a battlefield.

Inasmuch as large sums of money are involved in these proposals, it seems to me that if there is a desire to investigate some matter with which the Congress has to do, it would be "right down the alley" to examine into the situations I have described. I do not wish anything I say to be regarded as criticism of what has already happened in respect to the committee which is to visit the camps at which atrocities have been committed, because the request to make the trip came from General Eisenhower, nor do I wish to have anything I say regarded as a criticism of the five Senators who went around the world or of the Senators who visited the Aleutians. But from now on we shall have plenty of investigating to do, if we are going to act wisely, in regard to some of the bills relating to territory over which the American flag flies. Until we have handled such matters fairly well, I think extraneous problems might well be left to the military and naval authorities of the United States.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I should like to propound a question to the Senator from Maryland. If it seems advisable to send a committee to investigate conditions in the Philippines before expending vast sums of money to repair the damage there, should not the work which will be involved fall upon the committee of Congress which must deal with the Philippine Islands?

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I should say that the answer is in the affirmative. A number of bills are now on the Senate Calendar which are very far-reaching, and which will undoubtedly provoke some debate on this floor before the Senate acts upon them.

In reference to the Philippine Islands, I do not believe that the elimination of the enemy in those islands has progressed sufficiently far to enable a congressional committee to do more than to get in the way if it should go there. However, I think that as soon as the situation clears up, and these bills are pressed for action, some of us will have to look the situation over. I am not hunting for a trip to the Philippine Islands, and would not want to go there unless the President, the Senate, or the naval or military authorities asked me to go. I believe that is a rule which we should follow in connection with all congressional

investigations. I cannot see why Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives should travel all over the world and get in the way of military movements when they have plenty of work to do right here at home.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. HATCH. I wish to address myself for a moment to what I believe to be the question pending before the Senate, namely, the request of the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL] that the Senators who have now departed on a trip abroad be granted official excuse for being absent from the Senate.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold his remarks until I have finished?

Mr. HATCH. May I make an observation upon the subject?

Mr. CHANDLER. I am glad to yield.

Mr. HATCH. I certainly have no objection to the Members who were selected from the other side of the Chamber; but in my opinion no better men could have been selected than the majority leader [Mr. BARKLEY], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], and the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS]. I strongly approve their selection.

If there is any question as to the authority of this committee to make the trip, I am ready to vote now. I am willing to move that the request of the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL] be amended so as to provide that the Members of the Senate who compose the committee which is now on its way to perform its duties, shall be designated the official representatives of the Senate in that connection.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, I agree in part with the statement made by the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYNINGS], but as to another part of it, I do not agree. I think we should consider our British allies. They are permitted to send representatives all over the world, and they are careful to insure that British interests are protected at all times. In connection with the present war, Congress was asked to appropriate large sums of money. Sometimes it has not been known where all the money was being used. When committees made trips to other countries they were able to ascertain where some of the money had been spent. I dare say that not many Senators would put a considerable sum of money in a bank in Louisiana or in North Dakota without first either going themselves or sending someone on their behalf to investigate the standing of the bank. Persons have been known to buy farms in various sections of the country who later found that no farms had actually been purchased. The land turned out to be a swamp, or something of that nature. We have more than \$100,000,000,000 worth of surplus property located in various parts of the world. I hope that when the war is over that property, in large part, will be salvaged and used for the benefit of the American people. I hope that the part which cannot be salvaged will be sold at a price which will be of some advantage to the American

people. It should not be destroyed or given away.

Mr. President, I do not ask for an immediate consideration of my joint resolution. A similar one was introduced today in the other House. The committee which would be appointed under the resolution would not be a competitor of the committee which has recently left Washington. I have no objection to that committee. However, I believe that the committee for which I ask should have the authority of Congress. My joint resolution was prepared before the committee to which reference has been made was appointed by the majority leader, the minority leader, or the War Department. If my joint resolution is passed I shall be very happy. It is not an offensive resolution, and it will at least indicate that it has back of it some authority on the part of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, the joint resolution is in no way offensive. I find myself very much in sympathy with its purposes. However, I think it might be well to have the joint resolution go over for the day, so that opportunity may be afforded to examine it. I have found in my long experience in Congress that oftentimes when a proposal is allowed to go over, and an opportunity given to make an examination of it, it is sometimes possible to find ways of improving it. I think the joint resolution should go over.

Mr. CHANDLER. I have no objection to the joint resolution going over.

The joint resolution (S. J. Res. 60) to provide for the appointment of a War Atrocities Committee by the President of the United States, was read twice by its title and ordered to lie on the table.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL] that the Senate authorize the appointment of the members of the committee, and that they be granted leaves of absence from the Senate?

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. I do not believe the Senator from Alabama said anything about authorizing the appointment of the committee. I think the Senator's request was that the six members composing the committee be granted leaves of absence from the Senate.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, my original request was that the six Members who were designated as a committee to go abroad in response to General Eisenhower's request, be granted leaves of absence from the Senate in order that they might perform their duties.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Alabama?

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—I wish to ask the Senator from Alabama if he wants to stick to the statement that was made that the members of the committee were designated by the War Department. That point may confront us later.

Mr. HILL. I will state to the distinguished Senator from Kentucky that I

was not in the city at the time the committee was designated. As the Senator knows, on Wednesday I obtained consent of the Senate to be absent on Thursday and on Friday. I felt sure there would be no session of the Senate on Saturday, so I returned to the Senate only this morning. However, it was my understanding that, after consultation, the War Department designated those Senators as a committee to go abroad in response to General Eisenhower's request.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, I wish to say a further word in explanation. I believe I am warranted in saying that neither I nor the distinguished majority leader had ever heard of this matter until sometime last Friday afternoon. I have already stated that I submitted a list of minority Members of the Senate to make the trip. I understand that that list was transmitted, or in some way made known to the War Department, and that the War Department made all the necessary arrangements for the trip. I have felt, and I now believe, that the Members who went were, in fact, invited by the War Department through the majority leader and me, although I must admit that there was more or less informality in connection with the matter.

Mr. CHANDLER. Would the Senator say that the members of the committee were not selected by the War Department?

Mr. WHITE. The names were suggested to the War Department by the majority leader and by me. I believe it may be said that final acceptance was a War Department action.

Mr. CHANDLER. Would not the War Department have accepted any selection which the majority leader and the minority leader had made?

Mr. WHITE. I believe that is probably true.

Mr. AIKEN. I notice that on the majority side of the aisle the party leaders were selected to go. Did the War Department invite the leaders of the minority party to go?

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President—

Mr. HILL. I yield to the Senator from Maine.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, I will say that I was very strongly urged to go.

Mr. AIKEN. By whom?

Mr. WHITE. And I know that the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], as chairman of the Republican steering committee, was urged strongly to go. Neither of us was able to accept the assignment.

Mr. AIKEN. Then, so far as this side of the aisle is concerned, the ones who are going are really going as substitutes for the ones urged by the War Department.

Mr. WHITE. I do not think that the War Department urged me to go, but did urge the Senator from Ohio to go. I was urged to go by the majority leader and I in turn urged the Senator from Ohio to go, but both of us declined. The suggestion to me came from the majority leader. I believe if it is desired to trace the matter back, it will be found that the majority leader was importuned by the War Department to go.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President—

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Alabama yield to the Senator from Oregon?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I want to say that this further discussion of the minority leader and the Senator from Alabama clears up at least some statements by others. I am very much of the opinion that the particular individuals selected should have gone. I am very happy to know that for this side they were selected or named by the minority leader. Anyone he names is perfectly satisfactory to me. But again, for the RECORD, I want to make perfectly clear that point on which I shall stand in future instances, namely, that I think when Members of the Senate of the United States go forth on any such mission as this it should be clearly understood that each should be named by the Senate of the United States, as I now understand was the case in this instance, and that no question as to whether they are acceptable to the War Department should be a point at issue. Whenever the Senate sends them then they become a committee of the Senate of the United States, and any suggestion in the discussion which has just taken place that they were submitted to the War Department for its acceptance, it seems to me, is entirely out of order procedurally. It does not make any difference whether they are acceptable to the War Department; when we decide what Members of the Senate should go on such mission they should be the men who should go.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to request of the Senator from Alabama?

Mr. CHANDLER. Will the Senator from Alabama yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. CHANDLER. I want to associate myself with the views just expressed by the Senator from Oregon. I do not want the War Department to name Senators; I do not want them to have to approve the names, and I want it understood, so far as I am able to have it understood, that the Senate can select its own Members to take the trip.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Alabama? The chair hears none, and leave of absence is granted by the Senate to the six Senators mentioned by him.

Mr. BILBO. Mr. President, we are in the midst of a war; things are happening every hour. The committee that has been sent to view these atrocities, as the Senator from Oregon says, of course is not a committee of this body, because it was not appointed by this body. My information, from a statement made by the Senator from Maine, is that this request came from General Eisenhower for immediate action; the Senate was not in session, and could not be gotten in session, and that the leader on the Democratic side, the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], and the leader on the minority side, the Senator from Maine [Mr. WHITE], assumed the responsibility upon the request of the Secretary of War, the invitation coming through the regular channels from General Eisenhower. The suggestion was made, and the list

of Senators was selected by our leader and the leader on the other side of the Chamber. I think the decent and proper thing for the Senate to do is to consent and approve the action of our two respective leaders and make this committee a committee of the Senate. I think we can do that because I believe we all respect what the two leaders did in this emergency. They could not wait for the Senate to act today, because these atrocities were being found and uncovered and the bodies of the dead were being buried. General Eisenhower wanted the committee to get there in time to enable them to see these tragedies before burial had taken place.

I think the respective leaders acted wisely, and I think the proper thing for the Senate to do is to approve their action in naming certain Senators. No Member of the Senate has objected to the personnel, I am sure, because they are all distinguished Members of this body, and men we can believe and rely upon when they come back and make a report. But since they in a sense, at least, represent us, I think the Senate ought to make them a committee of the Senate, and we can do that by approving the action of our respective leaders. I am not going to make a motion, I am merely making the suggestion. I think in that way we can approve of the action which has been taken and make the Senators who have already gone, and who are already there, if you please, a committee of the Senate. We ought to do it, but I am not going to assume the authority to make such motion.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I believe that the distinguished Senator from New Mexico made such a suggestion to the Senate a few minutes ago, and later, perhaps, made a motion. I certainly find myself in accord with such a motion. I am desirous, however, of getting the facts straight in the RECORD. The Senator from Mississippi just said that the Senate was not in session when the request was first made. Unless I have misunderstood some remarks made by preceding speakers, I think the request was made on Friday at a time when the Senate was in session.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I did make the suggestion referred to by the Senator from Oregon, but it was merely a suggestion and expression of my own personal feelings. I did not make a motion or a request, but I want the Senate to know that I agree heartily with what the Senator from Mississippi has said, and I am perfectly willing, if the leaders so desire and think it is proper, to vote for a resolution or a statement authorizing this committee as a committee of the Senate to go to Europe to view these terrible and horrible atrocities, to come back and report to us, and to go to San Francisco and report to the conference there, if necessary. That, however, is only the expression of my own views.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I should like to propound a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Alabama yield to the Senator from Maine?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. I simply wish to associate myself with the suggestions which have been made regarding the very great value of a formal resolution validating and recognizing this committee and the great service they can render. I believe it will be very important in years to come that there be no question as to the casual character of their selection and the Senate clears, beyond any doubt, the reason for their mission.

I was a member of a committee which had a somewhat casual origin and the fruits of the efforts of the committee were, I think, not all that could have been desired, inasmuch as we simply reported as individuals. I think that when this committee return they should report as a committee of the Senate duly authorized. Their report may become a very important and a very historic document, and I do not think there should be any question that this committee, in whom we have confidence, has the full support of the Senate of the United States in the tremendously important task they are undertaking.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, would it be in order at this time to move that the distinguished Senators who have gone on this trip be constituted a committee authorized by the Senate to inspect the German prison camps and act in any and all other matters which might be pertinent, and that they make a report of observations to the Senate on their return?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Such a motion or resolution would be in order.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I would feel that such a resolution should be quite carefully formulated, and that it should be initiated by the War Department, who, I understand, requested the trip, citing that whereas the War Department has asked, or that General Eisenhower has requested, that the Senate of the United States make this inspection, we are responding. Then there would be no question as to the circumstances under which the trip took place. It should also specify rather particularly the scope of the authority of the Senators.

Mr. President, I agree with what the preceding Senators have said about the desirability of proceeding through regular channels. I have not heard all the discussion, but I was somewhat regretful that the President pro tempore was not taken more into account. I think that was unfortunate.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Alken	Cordon	Hoey
Austin	Donnell	Johnson Colo.
Bailey	Eastland	Johnston, S. C.
Bilbo	Ellender	Kilgore
Brewster	Ferguson	La Follette
Bridges	Gerry	Langer
Buck	Green	McClellan
Burton	Guffey	McFarland
Bushfield	Gurney	McKellar
Butler	Hart	McMahon
Byrd	Hatch	Magnuson
Capehart	Hawkes	Maybank
Capper	Hayden	Millikin
Chandler	Hickenlooper	Mitchell
Chavez	Hill	Moore

Morse	Revercomb	Tunnell
Murdock	Robertson	Tydings
Murray	Russell	Walsh
O'Daniel	Shipstead	White
O'Mahoney	Smith	Wiley
Pepper	Stewart	Willis
Radcliffe	Taft	Wilson
Reed	Taylor	Young

Mr. HILL. I announce that the Senator from Virginia [Mr. GLASS], the Senator from New York [Mr. MEAD], and the Senator from Nevada [Mr. SCRUGHAM] are absent because of illness.

The Senator from Florida [Mr. ANDREWS] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Missouri [Mr. BRIGGS] and the Senator from New York [Mr. WAGNER] are absent on public business.

The Senator from Montana [Mr. WHEELER] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] is absent as a delegate to the International Conference at San Francisco.

The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], and the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS] are absent visiting various concentration and prison camps in Europe.

The Senator from Alabama [Mr. BANKHEAD], the Senator from California [Mr. DOWNEY], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. LUCAS], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. OVERTON], and the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. THOMAS] are absent attending committee meetings and public business pertaining to their States.

The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MYERS] is absent because of a death in his family.

Mr. WHITE. The Senator from Illinois [Mr. BROOKS], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] are absent on official business.

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent on official business as a delegate to the International Conference at San Francisco.

The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. BALL] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Idaho [Mr. THOMAS] is absent because of illness.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Sixty-nine Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is present.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, as soon as a formal resolution can be prepared with reference to the trip of the Senators to visit the German prison camps, I shall offer the resolution, and ask for its consideration, and for action on it.

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, as a member of the Committee on Military Affairs, I wish to say that I am in thorough accord with what the Senator from Alabama has said, and deeply appreciate his statement. I believe such a resolution as that to which he has referred should be adopted and I think we are very fortunate in having such a committee from the Senate.

DEFERMENT OF FARM LABOR

Mr. SHIPSTEAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a concurrent resolution which was adopted by the House of Rep-

resentatives by a vote of practically 4-to-1, dealing with the question of drafting farm help, and its effect upon the production of agricultural products, and asking for the appointment of a joint committee of the House and the Senate to investigate.

There being no objection, the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 29) was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That in order that there may be no further misinterpretation of the will and the desire of the Congress in enacting subsection K, section 305, title 50, United States Code, commonly known as the Tydings amendment to the Selective Service Act, Congress reaffirms the necessity to our war effort of said subsection K and again expresses its will and desire that the local selective-service board, in classifying the registrant, observe subsection K and concern itself solely with the registrant's essentiality to an agricultural occupation or endeavor, and to the question of whether or not a satisfactory replacement can be obtained.

That there is hereby created a joint congressional committee to be composed of three members of the Senate Committee on Agriculture to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and three members of the House Committee on Agriculture to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to determine who is responsible for the wholesale induction of essential farmers and farm workers where no replacements are available, in violation of the Tydings amendment, and to determine the effect of such induction upon agricultural production and upon the war effort, are to return its findings to the Congress at the earliest possible date.

ECONOMIC REGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORTATION

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, one of the very serious problems confronting our post-war civil aviation arises out of the present movement for State legislation to establish economic regulation of air transportation by the States. Simply stated, the issue is whether our common carriers of the air are to be subject to the economic regulation of one government, as at present, or whether they are to be subject to the regulation of 49 governments, as is now proposed.

I have just read a comprehensive article on this important question by Mr. Oswald Ryan, a member of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which has just appeared in the Virginia Law Review of the University of Virginia, and which I think will be of great interest to the Members of Congress and all others who are interested in the progress of American aviation. Mr. Ryan is known to many Members of Congress by reason of his former service as general counsel of the Federal Power Commission, during which time he frequently represented this Government before the Supreme Court and other Federal courts in important regulatory cases, and by reason also of his having been a member of the Civil Aeronautics Board since its establishment in 1938.

I ask that the parts of the article which I have marked be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ECONOMIC REGULATION OF AIR COMMERCE BY THE STATES¹

INTRODUCTION

Its amazing capacity for speed and its indifference to the barriers of land and water have enabled air transportation to make the greatest contribution thus far made toward the conquest of time and space. Despite a notable past achievement, this three-dimensional transportation now appears to stand at the threshold of its greatest opportunity. Whether that opportunity can be realized depends upon the favorable resolution of several factors, among which will be the public policies that will guide its further development. For air transportation, like all other public-service industries, must operate within the framework of public policies and whether it attains or fails to attain its full capacity for public service will hinge in large part upon the soundness of unsoundness of those policies. And its ability to overcome the physical barriers of land and ocean gives no assurance of an ability to surmount political and economic barriers that may be unwisely and unwittingly reared against its advance.

Vitality important among the factors that will affect the future of air commerce in the United States will be the economic regulatory pattern. Thus far the economic control over our common carriers of the air has been the function of the Federal Government; there has been no significant exercise of State power. Recently advanced proposals, however, contemplate the entrance of the States into the economic regulation of intrastate air commerce. It is the purpose of the present article to inquire into the need for such proposals and their validity in the light of their probable effect upon air commerce and upon the national regulatory policy which Congress in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 has provided for its development.

The evolution of economic regulatory policy with respect to air transportation has followed a different course from that taken by public-utility regulation in the United States. The economic regulation of railroads and highway carriers, of water, gas, electric power, rapid transit, and telephone companies began in each instance with the States and Federal economic regulation was instituted only when the interstate operations of the respective industries reached such volume as required the assertion of the Federal power.²

In each instance, the States were concerned with the regulation of an industry which, at least in the beginning, was essentially local in character. The transportation and communications industries soon became interstate, but even today the bulk of their transactions are intrastate. The one exception prior to the advent of air transportation was radio broadcasting and communication. From the beginning, radio broadcasting and communications have been essentially interstate in character and have developed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government with little or no regulation by the States.

¹ "Economic regulation" in the present article refers to regulatory control over the development of scheduled air services, the establishment of rates, control of consolidations, mergers, and acquisitions, interlocking relationships, abandonment of services, supervision of accounts and records, etc. The other type of regulation to which air transportation is subject is commonly referred to as "safety regulation" and involves the prescription and enforcement of safety standards, the issuance, revocation or suspension of licenses or certificates for aircraft and airmen, regulation of air traffic, etc.

² The power industry is typical example. See Irston R. Barnes: The Economics of Public Utility Regulation, p. 770.

Air transportation has developed almost entirely under the stimulus of the Federal Government. The Post Office Department inaugurated, fostered, and promoted the air mail service through the experimental stages. Congress in the various air mail acts of 1925, 1928 and 1934 gave support and financial aid to the development of this new form of transportation not only as a means of securing its advantages for the Postal Service but also with a view to extending its benefits to the commerce, domestic and foreign, and the traveling public of the Nation.³ Thus Congress provided assistance in the form of air navigation aids, civil airways, funds for the construction of airports, and the establishment and enforcement of safety standards.⁴ In general, therefore, it may be said that the States had no significant part in the development of this national and international system of air transportation beyond their limited promotional activities in providing airports and emergency landing fields, often with the substantial financial assistance of the Federal Government and such activities as they undertook in the field of air safety.

It was recognized from the beginning that aviation presented a unique problem requiring uniformity of treatment and those who were most interested in its progress seriously considered the question whether there should be a single and exclusive Federal regulation or whether the control and promotion of aviation should be entrusted to the dual jurisdiction of the State and Nation. In all this, however, there was no suggestion for economic control of air transportation by the States.

After the passage of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, which extended Federal licensing requirements only to aircraft and airmen in interstate and foreign commerce, the States took action to provide licensing requirements for aircraft and airmen subject to State jurisdiction. In nearly all instances the State legislation enacted either required airmen and aircraft to have Federal licenses, or adopted the Federal regulations as the State standards. An endeavor was thus made to secure among the States the uniformity with the Federal standards which all recognized as necessary.

The foregoing describes the general legislative situation with respect to air safety regulation which obtained at the time of the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. The new Federal act provided regulation for air transportation both in the economic and in the safety fields. But while it limited the economic control to interstate, overseas and foreign air transportation (and all transportation of air mail), its safety provisions covered not only interstate, overseas and foreign air commerce but also "the navigation of aircraft within the limits of any civil airway or any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects or which may endanger safety in interstate, overseas or foreign air commerce." The jurisdiction imposed with respect to air safety was broader, therefore, than that imposed upon the economics of air transportation since it embraced all air transportation that traverses the vast system of Federal airways; all air navigation which directly affects or may endanger safety upon those airways; all air transportation that carries air mail; the great volume of nonscheduled air commerce of an interstate character which operates outside

the Federal airways, and also all air navigation that directly affects or may endanger the safety of this "off the airways" interstate navigation. The power thus conferred upon the Civil Aeronautics Board to regulate all flying to the extent necessary to protect interstate commerce was exerted by the Board when it issued its regulation requiring Federal certification of all pilots and aircraft in the United States, thus embracing all flying anywhere in the air space of the Nation.⁵

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as previously noted, limited its economic control to air transportation defined as interstate, overseas or foreign air transportation or the transportation of mail by aircraft. Thus, nonmail air carriers whose routes lie wholly within the limits of a single State and which do not transport traffic moving in interstate commerce are not included within the terms of the act.

When the various legislative proposals which led to the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act were before the Congress, 10 States had provided some degree of economic regulatory control of air carriers.⁶ This control had its source generally in the State constitutions or in statutes regulating or governing public utilities and common carriers. The degree of control exercised by the States has been relatively unimportant although they have claimed the right to exercise the same control as has been applied to the other forms of transportation—the railroads and motor busses.⁷ Those States which have exerted economic control over air carriers have not limited this control to carriers operating physically within the boundaries of the State but have extended it also, to a greater or lesser degree, to the interstate operations of interstate air carriers. Thus Pennsylvania has required interstate carriers to file tariffs with the State commissions. Arizona, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New Mexico, and Colorado have required certificates of convenience and necessity for intrastate operations of interstate carriers.

Active interest in State control of aviation was stimulated by the introduction in the Seventy-eighth Congress of bills which proposed to extend Federal economic control over all air transportation.⁸ This interest manifested itself in bills which were introduced in many State legislatures in session in 1943. Economic regulatory statutes were passed during 1944 in Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Virginia. In addition to the requirements of a certificate of convenience and necessity, the acts generally provided for the regulation of rates, the filing of tariffs and reports, and the other usual economic regulatory provisions.⁹

As previously stated, the need for uniformity in State aviation legislation has been recognized from the beginning and there has been a very real and earnest effort by such organizations as the American Bar Association, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the National Association of State Aviation Officials to propose legislation which would meet that need. A number of bills covering such

subjects as the establishment and enforcement of safety standards, construction, operation, and financing of airports and airport zoning have been proposed and sponsored by one or more of the named organizations, but, because of the rapidly changing situation, including changes in Federal legislation, little if any progress toward uniformity has been attained. However, 44 State legislatures now in session are being asked to consider four uniform legislative proposals—a State aeronautics department act, a State airports act, a model State airport zoning act, and a State air carrier bill. The Aeronautics Department Act has a twofold function—promotion and the enforcement of air safety regulations, the promotional features of which are pre-dominant. The regulatory features are designed chiefly to secure the application of the safety standards and requirements of the Federal Government to flying within the State. No provision is made for the economic regulation of air transportation through the issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity, the control of rates, fares or services, or the other customary economic controls and interstate air carriers are exempted from the act's safety requirements.

As the titles imply, the State airports act and the model airport zoning act are concerned with the development of an adequate system of airports and with insuring safe conditions on the approaches to the airports.

The uniform State air carrier bill would establish economic regulatory jurisdiction over intrastate air commerce and also over the air carriers which engage in such air commerce whether they be interstate or intrastate carriers. It is this proposal for the establishment of State economic regulation which has caused grave concern among members of the air carrier industry and the Federal officials charged with the administration of the national regulatory policy established by Congress for civil aviation.

THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE FOR STATE ECONOMIC REGULATION

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Any appraisal of the appropriate scope for State economic regulation of air commerce must consider both the economics of air transportation and the objectives which public policy should seek to achieve in this industry. There appear to be criteria for judging whether a particular regulatory program is in the public interest. Inasmuch as air transportation is still in its developmental stage, the primary test should be whether the fullest possible economic development of this new form of transportation is facilitated. Air transportation is intimately related to the national defense, the efficient performance of the postal functions, and the advancement and promotion of the domestic and foreign commerce of the Nation; and any development which impairs the efficiency of air transportation in serving these three objectives of national policy must be regarded as contrary to the public interest. The users of air transportation, the travelers and the shippers, are interested in more, better, safer, and cheaper transportation and regulatory policy should be directed to the promotion of these goals. So long as public policy looks to private enterprise to provide public transportation services, a commercially self-sufficient and technically efficient air operation must remain an objective of public policy. The opportunity for air transportation to achieve commercial self-sufficiency and a sound economic condition should not be lightly sacrificed by the adoption of a regulatory program which would hamper or defeat that achievement.

Other considerations are pertinent in weighing the wisdom of a regulatory program. It is obvious that there should be no conflict of jurisdiction between the Federal and the State Governments; conflicting

³ Civil Air Regulations, secs. 60.30 and 60.31, amendment No. 135, effective December 1, 1941.

⁴ Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Wyoming, West Virginia.

⁵ The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives recently reported that: "Thus far there has been practically no economic regulation by the several States. With an occasional rare exception, State agencies, even where they have had the power to regulate, have refrained from exercising the power" (H. Rept. No. 784, 78th Cong., 1st sess.).

⁶ H. R. 1012 and S. 246.

⁷ Virginia, 1944, C. 267; Kentucky, 1944, C. 147; Rhode Island, 1944, C. 1500.

⁸ Air Mail Act of February 2, 1925, 43 Stat. 805, amended by act of June 3, 1926, 14 Stat. 692; act of May 17, 1928, 45 Stat. 594; act of March 8, 1928, 44 Stat. 248; amended March 2, 1929, 45 Stat. 1449; act of April 29, 1930, 46 Stat. 259; Air Mail Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 933.

⁹ Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, as amended by act of February 28, 1929, 45 Stat. 1404.

and inconsistent regulations must be avoided. But consideration must be given to the possibilities of such conflicts, for the lawbooks are full of cases where the courts have found it necessary to decide whether the regulations of one government can be reconciled with those of another, and if not, which of the conflicting controls should prevail. The history of Government regulation of the railroads and other interstate utilities has witnessed the progressive extension of Federal responsibility in the wake of the changing character of public-utility operations from local enterprises to large interstate undertakings. Also serious for the new industry would be a lack of uniformity among the several States exercising supervision over the same air carrier. The interstate barriers that have been erected by the inconsistent and divergent State regulations of the highway carriers constitute the classic example of the harm that can be done to the industry and the public when there is no single authority responsible for the sound regulation of an industry. Although there is little likelihood that divergent safety regulations will in the future hamper the development of air commerce, there is the danger that the history of inconsistent and burdensome economic regulation which has been the bane of railway and highway carriers may be repeated in air transportation.

2. THE ECONOMICS OF AIR TRANSPORTATION

No regulatory policy can ignore the fundamental characteristics of the industry to be regulated. Certain salient characteristics of air transportation, therefore, are significant in drawing the distinction between air and surface carriage on the basis of which differences in public policy have developed.

Air transportation is predominantly interstate rather than intrastate in character. This distinction is inherent in the nature of the industry. Air transportation is economically advantageous in proportion to the length of the journey or haul, a situation that will continue in the foreseeable future with the prospective equipment.¹⁰ In the past, intrastate transportation by air has been relatively insignificant in volume, largely because there were very few intrastate route segments where the time advantage of air over surface transportation was important. Although the future is expected to witness a large increase in local air traffic, the increases in the volume of long-distance air travel should be proportionately greater so that the present relation between the two may be expected to continue.

The contrast between air and surface transportation with respect to distances traveled is significant. During the 5 years, 1938-42, the average length of the passenger journey by air was approximately 400 miles. The average passenger journey by rail is approximately 50 miles or, if we disregard the short-haul commutation travel, it is about 85 miles.¹¹

The preponderance of interstate travel over intrastate is much more marked in air than in surface transportation. In 1933 approximately 45 percent of the 132,000,000 passengers handled by the railroads moved in intrastate commerce and 55 percent of the 49,000,000 passengers who traveled by bus were intrastate passengers.¹² In September 1940

only 16 percent of the 213,000 air passengers moved in intrastate traffic, and they accounted for only 8 percent of the passenger-miles reported by the air lines for that year.¹³

A second significant characteristic of air transportation relates to the small volume of business which the air carriers have thus far handled and the relatively narrow profit margins which have been characteristic of air transportation. Air transportation has not yet attained the magnitude of big business. The following tabulation presents the gross operating revenues of all of the air carriers and of certain railroads with comparable earnings:

Operating revenues

[In millions of dollars]

	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
All air carriers.....	42.8	55.9	76.8	97.3	108.1	123.3
New Haven Railroad.....	73.0	83.4	85.6	107.6	156.1	179.5
Atlantic Coastline System.....	44.1	47.0	50.0	67.4	115.1	153.6
Northern Pacific Railway.....	57.0	63.8	68.7	85.3	119.3	151.5

This tabulation indicates that the entire domestic air-carrier industry is about equal in gross earnings to a medium-sized railroad. Air transportation presumably faces a period of rapid and extensive growth, but thus far it has barely penetrated the existing travel market and has only started to develop that new and larger future market which air transportation's unique advantages in the conquest of time and space will create.

The narrow profit margins which have been typical of air-transport operations reflect certain significant characteristics of the industry. Unlike the railroads and other public utilities, the air lines have not been under the necessity of making any considerable investment in fixed capital; their principal investment has been in flying equipment, but this item, because of the high rate of depreciation, has had more of the characteristic of an operating expense than of a fixed capital account. In their freedom from the necessity for making heavy investments in fixed capital lies a source of economic strength for the air carriers.¹⁴ Narrow profit margins may be a source of weakness as well as of strength, as net profits fluctuate sharply with relatively narrow changes in the level of gross earnings. Thus, air transportation is singularly sensitive to any developments which increase costs or curtail earnings.¹⁵

The ratio of revenues to expenses for all domestic air carriers was 108.87 in 1939,

¹⁰ Civil Aeronautics Board, Airline Traffic Survey: Origination and Destination, September 1940.

¹¹ Even if the Government had not undertaken the cost of providing airways, navigation facilities and airports, air transportation would not have been under the necessity of making an investment in rights-of-way at all comparable to those of the railroads. It must be recognized that all of the Government investments in airways, navigation aids, and airport facilities were not made for the benefit of air carriers. Private flyers and military aviation both make a greater use of such facilities than do the air carriers.

¹² This situation is aggravated by the fact that air transportation has thus far served the highest-priced segment of the transportation market. In times of curtailed national income, it is inevitable that air transportation will lose a significant volume of its traffic to lower-priced forms of transportation.

108.42 in 1940, and 108.22 in 1941.¹⁶ The narrow profit margins call for a higher degree of managerial and regulatory care than is necessary in dealing with other public utilities. Management is under the necessity of anticipating and offsetting possible reductions in operating revenues; relatively small increases in expenses may convert a profit into a deficit; investors are much more aware of changes in the condition of the company and are inclined to be more actively critical in their appraisal of management.

During the war period, all of the air carriers have experienced a great increase in the volume of travel which they have been compelled to handle with reduced fleets. The result has been that operations have been conducted with capacity, or near-capacity loads. In consequence, the ratios of revenues to expenses have increased sharply as shown in the following tabulation:

	1942	1943	1944 (12 months to November 1944)
All carriers.....	128.32	129.39	128.21
American.....	126.27	136.82	131.17
Eastern.....	145.22	147.07	138.98
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.....	126.88	120.83	123.10
United.....	130.48	135.65	146.11

The figures for 1939, 1940, and 1941 are more representative of the conditions which will prevail when operations return to normal than are the ratios for the wartime years.

A third significant characteristic of air transportation that deserves particular notice is that the industry is still in its developmental stage, both technically and commercially. Neither the size nor the peculiarities of the market which air transportation will ultimately serve can be accurately outlined at the present time. It is, therefore, essential that both management and government avoid freezing the industry into patterns which would make it less flexible in adapting itself to new economic and technical developments or less venturesome in exploring and fulfilling all of its potential opportunities for service.

Regulation came late in the history of other public utilities; only after they had attained a degree of maturity did the State or Nation step in to impose the restrictions of regulation. The norms of these older industries, the extent and character of the public service required, and the nature of the abuses to be curbed were all apparent before regulation reached that stage of evolution which the control of air transportation has already reached. In other fields of public transportation a substantial measure of competition was relied upon to insure that managements would be progressive, alert, and imaginative in fully exploiting their opportunities. Because air transportation has recently been moving in the direction of increasing competition, both by alternative routes and by parallel operations over the same route, it has been, and still is, essential that the public and the industry be able to hold the regulatory authority responsible for maintaining and fostering that economic environment which will insure the vigorous, progressive, and efficient growth of air services. That responsibility cannot be effective if it is to be administratively divided among different governments by a system of multiple regulation.

¹³ The corresponding figures for the four largest domestic carriers were, for the same years, as follows: American, 115.73, 113.89, 117.02; Eastern, 117.59, 124.44, 122.32; T. W. A., 103.30, 98.81, 96.24; United, 104.98, 104.85, 105.76.

¹⁰ Frequency of stops en route invariably increases the costs of operation since the take-off and landing and the maintenance of ground personnel and facilities are expensive.

¹¹ No figures are available for the average haul of express or cargo matter by air.

¹² Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Passenger Traffic Report, appendix I (1933). Commutation traffic is excluded from both the railway and bus data.

The developmental stage of air transportation has a further significance. In this stage it is of first importance to keep overhead costs, including the costs of compliance with public regulations, at the lowest figure consonant with safe and adequate service. The size of the market which air transportation can serve is limited by the level of charges imposed by contemporary conditions of cost. The large volume operations, which are essential both to give stability and security to the industry and capacity to fulfill its obligations to the public, can be achieved only if progressive rate reductions are possible.¹⁷ Thus the industry's rate of growth will be dependent upon the ability to keep costs as low as possible. One test of the proper governmental policy toward air transportation is the contribution which such a policy can make to the achievement of lower costs and lower rates.

3. FEDERAL REGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORTATION

The character of Federal regulation of air transportation deserves passing notice. Prior to the establishment of the Civil Aeronautics Authority in 1938,¹⁸ the Government was principally concerned with promoting and fostering the development of air transportation. Regulation to protect travelers and shipper from overcharges was lacking. Primary attention was devoted to promoting both the technological and the commercial progress of the industry. The establishment of the Civil Aeronautics Board marked an elaboration in governmental policy toward commercial aviation. The Board was charged with responsibility for the promotion and maintenance of an air transportation system adequate to the needs of commerce, the Postal Service and the national defense, but in addition to these promotional and developmental responsibilities, the Board was charged with regulating the entry of new carriers into the business, the extension or abandonment of existing routes, the reasonableness of rates charged to travelers and shippers, and the establishment of that mail rate which would be necessary to the fulfillment of the national policy.

4. CERTIFICATES OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY

If the States should require certificates of convenience and necessity as a prerequisite to engage in intrastate air commerce, how can such regulation be integrated with existing Federal controls? What effect will such State regulation have upon the present program of Federal regulation? These are pertinent questions in reaching any judgment on the wisdom of State economic regulation as currently proposed.

Four factual situations must be considered in any discussion of the above questions: The intrastate operations of an interstate airline; a geographically intrastate operation connecting with an interstate operation and serving as a feeder line; a geographically intrastate operation paralleling and competing with a segment of an interstate operation; and an intrastate operation which is wholly unrelated to and does not affect any interstate services. Under the proposed State legislation, the States would grant a certificate of convenience and necessity to any intrastate service already in operation. This grandfather clause would result in the automatic certification of existing air carriers to continue to engage in intrastate air commerce where they are already doing so.

¹⁷ See address by L. W. Pogue, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, on air transportation's post-war passenger potential. Proceedings of National Aviation Clinic, Oklahoma City, Okla., November 17, 1944.

¹⁸ By Reorganization Order No. IV the name of the Civil Aeronautics Authority was changed to Civil Aeronautics Board.

For new operations, however, an interstate carrier desiring to engage in air transportation between two cities within the same State would find it necessary to procure a State certificate. In such a proceeding, the State commission would either merely "rubber stamp" the existing Federal authorization or would issue an independent decision which, unless it were in accord with the Federal decision, would create a conflict that could only be detrimental to the development of air commerce. If the State authority should automatically grant a State certificate to any carrier having a Federal certificate, it is difficult to see where the State regulation would in any way add to the effectiveness of existing controls or would otherwise serve the public interest. On the other hand, if the State regulatory body should refuse to permit a federally certificated interstate carrier to engage in intrastate commerce, the interstate carrier would be deprived of the opportunity to render an economical and efficient service; it might be prevented from achieving a better load factor and might thereby be compelled to operate less economically and at higher unit costs. Such a result might represent the attempt of the State body to afford protection to an existing intrastate operator or it might be the result of a desire of the State agency to develop a different pattern of air service which called for the performance of that segment of air transportation by a different carrier from that certificated by the Federal Government. In either event, the Federal program for the development of a national system of air transportation would be disrupted; the requirements of the national system would necessarily be subjected to considerations pertinent to a limited State system of air transportation which clearly would be unable to make as important a contribution to the public interest of the State as the national system. Such a system of State certification of intrastate operations by interstate carriers would compel the interstate carriers, some of whom operate through 20 or more States, to petition each State where they propose to make more than one stop and obtain appropriate authorization to carry passengers and property between points within the State.

What would be the situation if a State commission should undertake to certificate carriers to engage in feeder operations, connecting with one or more interstate carriers? If such carriers are in fact feeder operations, they are subject to Federal control under the Civil Aeronautics Act since they are carrying interstate commerce. The fact that they would also be engaged in the carriage of a substantial volume of intrastate commerce would not alter their status as a component of the national air network. Feeder operators would presumably be engaged in the carriage of mail, another factor which would bring them under Federal control, especially if they required mail payments to aid in the development of their service. Such feeder-line operations, whether confined wholly within a State or operating between two or more States, would constitute a significant part of the national system of air transportation and it would seem that they would be properly subject to Federal control. If they are also subject to State regulation, the possibility exists that the State plans for air transportation may not conform to those of the national agency; the result may be jurisdictional conflicts and compromises which would seriously detract from the ability of the carrier to perform an essential public service.

An intrastate operation paralleling and competing with an interstate operation is the third type of service which the State might certificate. Here again action by the State might interfere with the Federal program of balanced and controlled competition. In view of the judicial precedents

heretofore noted, there would seem to be little doubt that a paralleling and competing air carrier operating wholly within the State could be brought under Federal jurisdiction if its operations were found by Congress to affect interstate commerce.¹⁹ If, for example, a State operator should fly between San Francisco and Los Angeles or between El Paso and Texarkana, or between New York and Buffalo, the resulting diversion of traffic from the interstate operator would undoubtedly supply the constitutional basis for the exercise of Federal control. It is clear, however, that Congress thus far has not exerted its power to impose any such economic control over intrastate air operations.

It is only in the case of the air line whose operations neither parallel and compete with the interstate carrier nor connect with the interstate carrier in such a way as to carry a substantial volume of interstate commerce that the State authority could regulate through the issuance or denial of certificates without the danger of seriously disrupting the program of regulation adopted by the Congress. It may be questioned whether many such operations will exist. Many will doubtless be started, but few will survive in such a restricted area. The economics of the market for air-transport services will normally require the local operator to adjust his operations to a market which extends across State lines.

Thus it appears that State regulation of air commerce through the granting or withholding of certificates of convenience and necessity involving as it would a multiple control by 49 governments instead of a unified control by 1, carries the prospect of an adverse effect upon the development of a national system of air transportation. The public benefits to be anticipated through such a division of regulatory responsibility would hardly seem to justify the burdens thereby imposed.

CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE FOR STATE REGULATION OF AIR COMMERCE

1. AN APPRAISAL OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR STATE REGULATION

In weighing the conclusions as to the appropriate scope for State economic regulation, the arguments advanced for State regulation must be examined, and the probable consequences, for good and for evil, of State regulation must be assayed. A number of minor considerations call for passing comment.

The case for State regulation is more impressive on the political than on the economic plane. Considerations of the dignity of the State and the possibilities of Federal encroachment, while they are potent political arguments, are largely irrelevant to the basic issues of public interest, National or State. Air transportation is essentially interstate and international in scope. The local services will be of importance chiefly as they are integrated with the interstate services. Even the local operations will be largely interstate, both in carrying passengers and goods in interstate commerce and in operating across State lines. Federal regulation will of necessity have to assume major responsibility for the development and control of such services. However anxious the Federal Government might be to avoid regulatory responsibility and however eager the States may be to preserve their jurisdiction, the economic determinants of the industry press irresistibly in the opposite direction. The regulation of air commerce not isolated from the national network, if it is to promote the national interest, must be Federal. No State body can be given jurisdiction coextensive with the operations which it must govern;

¹⁹ *United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.*, supra, note 51; *Wickard v. Filburn*, supra, note 53.

State regulation in all likelihood would become a crazy quilt of clashing colors and inconsistent patterns.

2. A BURDEN UPON AIR COMMERCE

State regulation threatens to lay a serious burden upon the development of air transportation. This is so for two reasons: State regulation is likely to result in numerous conflicting and inconsistent orders by the several State commissions and by the Federal and State authorities; the very multiplicity of regulation to which air transportation will be subjected in itself will constitute a serious economic burden which may jeopardize the development of the industry.

The burdens resulting from multiple regulation by the States and the Federal Government would be of two types. One of the serious burdens that could result from independent State action to authorize new services would arise from the competitive duplication of interstate services by intrastate operations.

Significant financial burdens could be expected to result merely from compliance with multiple regulation. Many of the air lines operate across a dozen States or more; five are transcontinental in their operations; four traverse the length of the country north and south. The compliance burdens resulting from State regulation become serious then because the carriers are subject to so many separate jurisdictions and because the earnings of the industry will not support such a burden. The small volume of air operation and the narrow margins of profit make air carriers peculiarly sensitive to increases in costs. In the years immediately ahead, it will be essential for air transportation to drive steadily and successfully toward lower levels of costs if the industry is to serve a mass transportation market which will give it economic stability and security. Any development, such as the necessity of conforming to the regulations prescribed by each of the States through which the carriers operate, might seriously impair the ability of the industry to reduce costs and perform the larger public service of which it is otherwise capable. In this respect air transportation differs significantly from surface transportation, both rail and highway; differences in the volume of operations, differences in the operating margins, differences in the proportion of local to interstate business, and differences in the number of separate jurisdictions to which air carriers would be subject, all combine to strike down any assumed analogy between air and surface transportation as a support for a multiple regulation of air commerce.

3. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

There exists among members of the air industry a not unnatural fear that the regulation of air commerce by the State public service commissions and the railroad commissions may lead to the adoption of State programs which will be contrary to the policy being pursued by the Federal Government. The future relations between air and surface transportation inevitably color much of the thought and discussion with respect to proposals for State regulation. In the Federal Government, the regulation of surface and air carriers are entrusted to two independent regulatory bodies, and it is significant that the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 does not mention the possible effects of air competition upon surface carriers as one of the matters to be weighed in deciding what development of air transportation is in the public interest.

The present movement for State regulation of air commerce recalls the campaign for State regulation of highway carriers in the early 1930's. Some of the consequences of that regulation deserve mention. The lack of uniformity of State regulations, especially

as applied to the weight and size of vehicles, brought disastrous consequences in the erection of trade barriers, which were wiped out temporarily only under the pressure of war necessities. Multiple State economic regulation might be equally disastrous for air transportation. The regulation of highway carriers, both by Federal and State bodies, was accompanied by the application of the norms and patterns of railroad regulation to the competing highway carriers. One result has been a tendency for the rates of one carrier to be set with regard to their influence upon other types of carriers. Compromise in adjusting the requirements of one form of transportation have not only deprived the public of many of the advantages which might have been expected from a more vigorous competitive development of each form of transportation, but have even deprived the public of some of the advantages in the form of low costs and low rates which were expected to follow from public investments in the improvement of highways and waterways. As applied to air transportation, there is a fear that rate differentials would be maintained between the several forms of transportation, and that new air services would be refused certificates where State authorities believed existing surface transportation adequate. The latter fear has been accentuated by a provision in a recent Kentucky statute requiring the commission to consider existing surface transport services in passing upon applications for new air services. Such a policy would, of course, be diametrically opposed to the basic principle of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 which is to encourage the maximum development of air transportation consistent with the national interest. The fear that air transportation might be subordinated to surface transportation is very real and is not without adequate foundation in past and contemporary history, both in this country and abroad.

4. THE RELATION OF STATE TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF AIR COMMERCE

Where do the States fit into the regulation of air commerce? The States may have a role to perform in the regulation of air transportation in the future. If and when the States begin to regulate, the proper exercise of their functions will require a careful articulation with the functions of the Federal Government if the result is not to handicap the development of air commerce. Any system of State control of aviation must avoid duplicate and multiple regulation of the same air carriers by both the Federal and State Governments. This principle is essential not only to avoid conflicting and inconsistent regulations but also to spare the industry the burdens which compliance with multiple regulations would impose. This conclusion is not dictated by a desire to deal more favorably with air carriers than with surface transportation companies; rather it rests upon a realistic recognition of the fact that air transportation, because of its relatively small business volume and narrow profit margins, cannot develop and effectively serve the public unless every effort is made to insure lower unit costs and reduced rates.²⁰ Such multiple regulation cannot be

²⁰ The sensitivity of air transportation to increases in cost and the importance in the public interest of avoiding unjustified and unnecessary costs were recognized by the Congress when, following the decision of the Supreme Court in the *Northwest Airlines case (Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292 (1944))*, it directed the Civil Aeronautics Board in Public Law No. 416 to study the problems of multiple and burdensome taxation of air commerce and to prepare recommendations as to the means of avoiding such taxation.

successfully defended on the ground that it is necessary to serve any essential public interest. Indeed, the prospect for purely intrastate air transportation, that is, the operation of air carriers confined wholly to the State and not engaged in the carriage of interstate commerce or the mail, could presently be cited as a basis for the establishment of State control in but a few States, and even in those States, the local air carriers will seek to place themselves within Federal jurisdiction in order to qualify for the mail payments which they require to finance their development.

If, however, the State should conclude that a public need exists for State regulation of air commerce at the present time and should undertake a program of active economic regulation, what should be the scope of the State commission's jurisdiction? Certainly every effort should be made to prevent conflict between State and Federal regulations and duplicate regulation of the same airline by both Federal and State authorities should be avoided. To insure this result each air line should be responsible to only one rather than to many regulatory bodies. Therefore, any State regulatory legislation should limit economic control to those air carriers which are not subject to Federal regulation. Air transportation in the United States cannot properly develop and fulfill the national objectives which Congress has declared in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 as essential to the national interest if it is to be subjected to varying and conflicting patterns promulgated by the Federal Government and the 48 States.

OSWALD RYAN.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

FULL EMPLOYMENT AFTER THE WAR

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. President, the most important question in the minds of the American people today is whether we will have depression or prosperity after the war. This question underlies all our debates and discussions on current issues—from price control and international-currency stabilization on the one hand, to war-manpower legislation and wartime-wage policy on the other.

To an increasing extent discussion of this question seems to center around the full-employment bill, introduced in the Senate by the Senator from New York [Mr. WAGNER], the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY], and myself; and in the House of Representatives by Representative PATMAN. One of the most interesting of the recent discussions of our post-war future appeared in the Washington Post and other newspapers throughout the country on Tuesday, March 27, in an advertisement by the McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., an outstanding publisher of business and industrial magazines. In this advertisement James H. McGraw, Jr., president of the McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., indicates that to achieve full employment in 1950 we shall need "civilian jobs of between 55 and 57 million persons, with a gross national product of between \$185,000,000,000 and \$200,000,000,000 measured at 1943 price levels."

However, McGraw points out:

Only the most sanguine optimism could lead one to expect that they will be achieved without concerted will, planning, and cooperative effort. . . . If we were to follow past patterns our war-built boom would, after a period of uncertain length, collapse into disastrous depression. . . . A repe-

tion of these things cannot be tolerated—if foresight and cooperative effort can prevent them.

Mr. McGraw then points out that the full-employment bill "may well present a test of whether or not American business can deal with problems in this area in a statesmanlike fashion." He then states that businessmen must come forward with constructive suggestions to remedy whatever deficiencies there may be in the present text of the bill.

Although it is not my intention at this time to discuss Mr. McGraw's views on the present deficiencies of the bill, I am confident that I am voicing the convictions of all the sponsors of the bill when I say that we welcome suggestions for amendment. We do not regard the bill in its present form as perfect. We are earnestly soliciting the criticisms and suggestions of businessmen, small and large, throughout this country, for without the cooperation of business, no practical and effective program for post-war prosperity can possibly be achieved.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement by Mr. McGraw, to which I have referred, may be printed at this point in the RECORD in connection with my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMERICA WANTS PROSPERITY

A book to be published early in April by the McGraw-Hill Book Co. carries the provocative title "Prosperity: We Can Have It If We Want It." Its authors, Messrs. Shields and Woodward, state in vigorously challenging terms their conviction that the United States will emerge from war with human, material, and technological resources adequate to provide a Nation-wide standard of living unprecedented in world history. They present, too, their formulation of the several policies and procedures which must be followed by Government, business, and labor if we are to realize our potential for a high and sustained prosperity unmarred by prolonged periods of severe unemployment and business stagnation such as have haunted our economic past.

The specific proposals set forth will elicit both enthusiastic acclaim and acrid dissent, for the book deals in far from gentle fashion with many of the currently fashionable panaceas for assuring prosperity by magic formula. It examines, and discards as effective guarantors of prosperity, whatever their individual merits upon other grounds, programs for public works, slum clearance, subsidizing of small business, foreign loans, social insurance, deficit Government spending, redistribution of income, the numerous formulas for monetary management, repeal of the antitrust laws, or any of the loosely phrased admonitions that Government should do nothing and allow everything to take its course untrammelled by controls of any kind.

On the positive side, the book urges clear recognition of the fact that prosperity, under a system of business enterprise, depends primarily upon the existence of competitive incentives that spur capital investment to provide better tools and equipment, that improve organization and technology to insure continuously increasing productivity per man-hour of work, and that enlarge markets by producing what the consumer wants at lower prices to the end that real incomes may be increased.

In short, prosperity depends upon profitable and expanding business and employment

opportunity, so it becomes the part of enlightened Government, business, agriculture, and labor policy to promote those measures which will forward rather than retard the major aim of expanding production.

However great the room for dissent upon the adequacy, or the phrasing, of the specific recommendations it makes, the approach of this book has one virtue of solid merit. It attacks positively the problem of what steps should be taken to achieve and hold prosperity rather than merely devising a poultice to be applied when and if we run into a decline.

Virtually all responsible spokesmen for Government, and for business, labor, and agricultural groups, are agreed upon the goal of prosperity. Moreover, they agree that, insofar as possible, it should be achieved through the effort of private enterprise, with government intervention utilized only as a last resort. But despite this unanimity, almost all public discussion of the problem has concentrated upon the nature, the extent, and the timing of such government expenditures as may be found necessary to combat deflation. Since upon this question there is far from general agreement, our procedure has created an exaggerated sense of divergence in a field in which, so far as fundamentals go, we all are in accord to quite an unusual degree.

No confusion should be caused by the fact that the generally current phrase for prosperity is "full employment." The latter phrase merely states the goal in terms of human values, which are good terms in which to state any goal. What matters is that we generally are agreed as to what we mean when we say that we want prosperity or full employment. Not only do we know what we mean, but within very rough limits we can give dimension to our concepts. There are a few whose appraisals are somewhat lower, but most competent estimators set the goals for about 1950 at an average annual employment in civilian jobs of between fifty-five and fifty-seven million persons, with a gross national product of between \$185,000,000,000 and \$200,000,000,000 measured at 1943 price levels. This contrasts with the 1944 level of non-military employed of fifty-one and one-half million, and a gross output for the end of 1944 of over \$200,000,000,000. It assumes a reduction of the average workweek to 40 hours.

It will take some such levels as these to provide employment for those who seek work, with only sufficient frictional unemployment (those temporarily listed as unemployed because of the normal turnover between jobs) to afford reasonable labor-market flexibility to both workers and employers. The non-military employment figures are generally consistent with the officially stated post-war goal of jobs for 60,000,000 workers, since the latter figure is generally understood to be an estimate of the labor force, which includes members of the armed services and an allowance for frictional unemployment.

There are a number of reasons why the estimates cannot be figured more closely, and why no one can be very confident even of the validity of the stated limits. The chief points of doubt in the employment estimates relate to how many withdrawals there are likely to be on the part of women, oldsters, and youngsters, who now are in the labor force to a number more than 6 millions beyond normal expectancy; how many men will be retained in the armed forces; and whether the post-war frictional unemployment should be calculated as approximating the current one million or the three million so listed in the prosperous year of 1929. Additional uncertainties cloud the estimates of gross national product. Notable among them is the fact that no one is sure of the war's effect upon man-hour productivity trends, in view of the fact that half of our current output has consisted of

products that had no substantial counterpart in our peacetime price or production series.

Nevertheless, despite such qualifications, it is fair to say that we do have a general conception of the magnitude of our post-war goals. Although they are well within our production potentials as demonstrated in this war, they are formidably beyond any previous record of peacetime achievement. Only the most sanguine optimism could lead one to expect that they will be achieved without concerted will, planning, and cooperative effort. Only blind recklessness could engender confidence that once attained they will automatically be held, let alone expanded, in normally healthy growth.

If we were to follow past patterns, our war-built boom would, after a period of uncertain length, collapse into disastrous depression. The very magnitude of our recent growth would contribute to the depth and duration of the subsequent trough. Yet a fall even to the level of our previous peacetime-peak year 1939, has been estimated by the Federal Reserve Board to imply unemployment for between fifteen and twenty million persons. If human values have importance, that is something that must not be allowed to occur. If business values have importance, we must not tolerate again such losses as occurred from 1930 to 1933, when sales over the 4-year period were \$128,000,000,000 less than would have been provided if the 1929 level had held, and corporate profits declined from more than \$7,000,000,000 in 1929 to an average annual loss of \$1,000,000,000 over the next 4 years. A repetition of these things cannot be tolerated—if foresight and cooperative effort can prevent them.

In January of this year Senator MURRAY introduced in the Senate a bill entitled "The Full Employment Act of 1945." It instructs the President to submit to Congress plans for eliminating both unemployment and inflation, including recommendations for correcting structural defects in the economic system. It provides for a joint congressional committee to consider the proposals of the President, to take testimony from experts and the general public on these proposals or any others it may wish to consider, and after weighing all the facts to submit its findings to Congress. It provides for an advance budgeting of the constituent parts of a full-employment economy, and commits the Federal Government to provide, in advance, for sufficient expenditures (through private contractor channels) to make up for the gap between estimated private expenditures and the amount necessary to assure full employment.

By no stretch of the imagination can the full-employment bill, in its present form, be regarded as acceptable to business. Yet, it may well present a test of whether or not American business can deal with problems in this area in a statesmanlike fashion. Such statesmanship will consist in demonstrating first, that the bill is not acceptable because of deficiencies which preclude the possibility of its accomplishing the avowed purposes; and second, that business is able and anxious to offer constructive suggestions for remedying these deficiencies.

It is easy to point to weaknesses in the bill. To mention only a few of major importance, the proposal to make advance Federal expenditures to compensate for estimated deficiencies in prospective private expenditures is completely impractical. No one in the country can predict future trends with sufficient accuracy for this purpose; no one can tell what the constituent parts of a really high, stable peacetime budget should be, for in our boom-or-bust economy we have no stable pattern to project; no one can tell, within reasonable limits, how much the Government should spend in advance to assure full employment. The bill pronounces

labor's right to work without defining commensurate responsibilities which it should exercise. It does not define the areas of proposed Government expenditure in such a way as to allay business fears of Government competition or the general public suspicion of leaf raking. Above all, the Murray bill is defective in that, despite a somewhat vague pronouncement in favor of forwarding private business activity, it recommends a single specific designed to supplement such activity rather than stimulate it.

The very definition of certain of these faults suggests their remedies. But the positive task of stating how the bill should be amended in order that it may have effective usefulness is far from simple. Yet it is enormously to the advantage of American business to undertake it. Fortunately, there is a representative group sponsored by industry, the Committee for Economic Development, which has for some time been working intensively upon the problem, and which is excellently equipped to offer sound and progressive advice. It should be used for this purpose.

American business cannot afford to take a negative attitude toward legislation in this field. Some legislation undoubtedly will pass, for the problem is one in which there is a grave Government responsibility. But equally there is a comparably important responsibility upon all citizen groups. None of them has more to gain or lose from the rise or fall of prosperity than American business.

JAMES H. MCGRAW, JR.,
President, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., Inc.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Swanson, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed, without amendment, the following bills of the Senate:

S. 122. An act to amend an act entitled "An act to establish standard weights and measures for the District of Columbia; to define the duties of the Superintendent of Weights, Measures, and Markets, of the District of Columbia; and for other purposes," approved March 3, 1921, as amended;

S. 123. An act to amend section 14 of the act entitled "An act to provide for commitments to, maintenance in, and discharges from the District Training School, and for other purposes," approved March 3, 1925, and to amend section 15 thereof, as amended;

S. 124. An act to amend section 16 of the act entitled "An act to amend the act entitled 'An act to fix and regulate the salaries of teachers, school officers, and other employees of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia,' approved June 20, 1906, as amended, and for other purposes," approved June 4, 1924; and

S. 638. An act to amend the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia by adding a new section 548a, and providing for the recording of veterans' discharge certificates.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 2122) to extend to 6 months after the termination of hostilities the period during which females may be employed in the District of Columbia for more than 8 hours a day, or 48 hours a week, under temporary permits.

The message further announced that the House had agreed to the amendment of the Senate to the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 106) to amend section 5 (k) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, with respect to the deferment of registrants engaged in agricultural occupations or endeavors essential to the war effort.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 2689) making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1946, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. TARVER, Mr. CANNON of Missouri, Mr. SHEPPARD, Mr. WHITTEN, Mr. PLUMLEY, Mr. H. CARL ANDERSEN, and Mr. HORAN were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills, and they were signed by the President pro tempore:

H. R. 2252. An act making appropriations for the Treasury and Post Office Departments for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1946, and for other purposes; and

H. R. 2374. An act making appropriations to supply deficiencies in certain appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1945, and for prior fiscal years, to provide supplemental appropriations for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1945, and June 30, 1946, and for other purposes.

EXTENSION OF SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 2625) to extend the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina in the chair). The question before the Senate is on agreeing to the amendment proposed by the Senator from Texas [Mr. O'DANIEL] as a substitute for the amendment proposed by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. STEWART] and other Senators to House bill 2625.

Mr. O'DANIEL. Mr. President, on that question I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were not ordered.

Mr. O'DANIEL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Alken	Guffey	Murdock
Austin	Hart	Murray
Brewster	Hatch	O'Daniel
Bridges	Hayden	O'Mahoney
Buck	Hickenlooper	Radcliffe
Burton	Hill	Revercomb
Butler	Hoey	Robertson
Byrd	Johnson, Colo.	Russell
Capper	Johnston, S. C.	Shipstead
Chandler	Kilgore	Smith
Chavez	La Follette	Stewart
Cordon	McClellan	Taylor
Donnell	McFarland	Tunnell
Downey	McKellar	Walsh
Eastland	McMahon	White
Ellender	Magnuson	Wiley
Ferguson	Maybank	Wilson
Gerry	Mitchell	Young
Green	Morse	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifty-six Senator having answered to their names, a quorum is present.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Texas [Mr. O'DANIEL] in the nature of a substitute for the amendment offered by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr.

STEWART] on behalf of himself, the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. REVERCOMB], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. WILSON], and the Senator from Colorado [Mr. JOHNSON] to insert a new section at the end of the bill.

Mr. O'DANIEL. Mr. President, I have little further to say with reference to the amendment which I have offered as a substitute for the Stewart amendment, except that in the discussion which has taken place on the floor of the Senate it has been brought out that 2 years ago when we amended this act the Senate adopted the same amendment. Then we were raising our Army and time was an important element. Now we have a large Army and we have more time to use in training the new inductees. There is much more reason now to adopt this amendment than there was on October 25, 1942. We adopted it then, and we should adopt it now. After we adopted this amendment in 1942, it was stricken out in conference. When it was stricken out, the impression was gained by the citizens throughout the Nation that the military authorities would give sufficient training without being bound by law to do so. Now it is brought out that the War Department gave no such assurance or made no promise at that time of any definite length of time of training which would be given to boys 18 or 19 years of age. I would not wish to make the statement that such assurance was given; but it is quite generally believed throughout the country, as indicated by letters which I have received, that the War Department gave some assurance that adequate training would be given the boys before they were placed in actual combat. Now the people have no assurance from either the military authorities or the Congress. They are completely in the dark and I think we should ease their worried minds and hearts by giving them definite assurance that their 18- and 19-year-old boys will be properly trained. I would not want to set myself up as a military authority on the length of time the boys should be trained before being placed in actual combat and I am not the one who selected 12 months as the proper time. Many military experts months ago testified that 12 months should be the minimum. I simply used the period of time the military experts insisted upon when the original 1-year selective-service training period was adopted to make the law of the land. Inasmuch as the people of the Nation are in complete confusion, and some of them believe that the boys are given practically no training before being placed in combat, I think it is imperative that this legislative body take notice of this situation and provide in this bill some limitation, whether it be 12 months, 6 months, 3 months, or 10 days. It is the responsibility of Congress to make the determination. I think it should be 12 months and should apply to both 18- and 19-year-old inductees.

I think the Congress should definitely state that there should be a 12-month period of training for the 18- and 19-year-old boys before they are sent overseas and placed in actual combat.

Two years ago I offered the same amendment, and it was adopted. If there is now any difference of opinion as to the length of the period of training which should be given to these boys, I should like to hear from Senators present if any of them feel that 12 months is too long. I believe that some time should be specified. I should be glad to hear suggestions from Senators. I believe that it is the duty of the Congress, representing the people, to give some sort of assurance to the mothers and fathers of this Nation, who are gladly giving their boys, and who are proud to have their boys go into the service. I believe it is our duty to assure those mothers and fathers that their boys will have some training.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. O'DANIEL. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. From my study of the matter, I believe that 12 months is too long a time to specify. I do not believe I can vote for the Senator's amendment, because I believe that the basic 17 weeks' training in this country, plus 2 or 3 months' training with a division behind the lines, will today give adequate training. I believe that the period of training ought to be at least 6 months. I really think it ought to be 8 months, but at the present time I feel that it is unnecessary to specify a period of 12 months. Although I have an intense interest in the subject, I cannot vote for the Senator's amendment.

Let me call the Senator's attention to the fact that as late as December 7 Under Secretary Patterson said that in general a minimum of approximately 8 months elapses between an individual's induction and his assignment under the replacement system to an active sector on the front. That statement was made in December. If the Department had stood by that practice, I would have no great objection; but when the period became as short as 5 months between the time of a man's induction and his actual assignment to an active sector on the front; it seemed to me perfectly clear that he had no training except basic training in this country. The men were being assigned to units in actual combat directly from the ships on which they arrived in Europe. I believe that after reaching Europe a man should spend 2 or 3 months in further training with the unit to which he may be assigned before he is sent into combat service, so that he will know his job. That would give him adequate training.

I cannot vote for the Senator's amendment as it is now drafted. I would be willing to vote for a period of 8 months, as the War Department suggested in December; but I believe that 12 months is longer than is really necessary.

Mr. O'DANIEL. The length of time necessary for adequate training is, of course, a matter of opinion. I think we should depend largely upon what the War Department says the length of the training period should be. When the Selective Service Act was passed there was abundant testimony of military experts that 12 months was the minimum length of training inductees should receive. My amendment is based on what the military experts testified was neces-

sary at that time. I understand that in a letter which the Department recently sent to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, it admitted that between 15 and 17 weeks' actual training is now given to each and every inductee. I believe the Congress should decide, based upon the statements of the War Department, what the length of the training period should be. It should be made the law of the land by being placed in this bill at this time. That would relieve the anxiety and heartaches of mothers and fathers. They would have some assurance from their Congress that there was a time limit, instead of being entirely in the dark, without any assurance either from the military or from the Congress.

I believe that the Congress is the department of Government which should make this decision. If any Senator wishes to suggest a modification of the amendment which would change the length of time, I shall be glad to give it consideration. However, I believe that the training period should be 12 months as specified by military experts when we set up the Selective Service Act, and inasmuch as we changed the fundamental law and reduced the age limit from 20 to 18, we should make this amendment apply to both the 18- and 19-year-old boys.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I rise at this time to bring to the attention of the Senate a letter from General Marshall, Chief of Staff, addressed to the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS], chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs. The letter is dated April 17, and it reads as follows:

MY DEAR SENATOR THOMAS: My attention has been called to certain amendments which I understand are to be proposed to H. R. 2625—

Of course, Mr. President, that is the pending bill—

One would prohibit the employment of men inducted under 19 years of age in actual combat service until they have been given at least 6 months of military training, and the other would preclude such service of men under 19 years of age until they have been given at least 1 year of training.

I am gravely concerned over the effect of either of these proposals upon military operations. Such statutory restrictions are evidently inspired by the belief that our soldiers are not properly trained before being assigned to combat units. The responsible military authorities, however, are of the opinion that the training is adequate to the requirements.

The training program is very intensive and equally thorough. Furthermore, most of the instructors now concerned with this work are veterans of actual combat experience. Under the present procedure the newly inducted soldier who is being prepared as a replacement for the ground forces undergoes a training course of from 15 to 17 weeks. He is taught how to care for himself in the field; how to employ both his primary and secondary weapons; and how he and his weapons fit into the squad and platoon. Satisfactory completion of the course means that he is qualified for service to which he is to be assigned.

I have personally inspected many replacement training camps to make certain that the work is being conducted in the most efficient manner practicable. General Lear, and now General Stilwell, give their entire

time to the direction and supervision of this work. Lear in Europe and Stilwell here at home.

After the training period is finished the men are placed in experienced units where the leadership from the noncommissioned grades upward in the hands of veterans. En route to assignment overseas the men are given further training in the staging areas here and abroad, and actual assignment in divisions, so far as possible, is made to reserve units where further training is given. Carefully developed training tests, supplemented by combat reports from overseas, have clearly indicated that the proficiency of the soldier is brought to such a level during this period of training that he is fully capable of properly filling a vacancy in a seasoned organization.

The majority of the men now being received from selective service are in the 18- and 19-year-old group, and we are in urgent need of their services. Once an individual under 19 years of age has been fully trained as a replacement, it would be most undesirable under present conditions to hold him unassigned for an additional period of 6 or 7 months. We would, in effect, have to hold thousands upon thousands of men on a waiting list after their essential training had been completed before we could utilize their services.

The War Department has made every possible effort consonant with the military situation to hold to a minimum the number of 18-year-olds entering combat. In February 1944 instructions were issued requiring the use of 18-year-olds with less than 6 months' service only after all other replacement resources were exhausted. During June of that year it was ordered that no Infantry or Armored Force replacements would be sent overseas before they had attained 19 years of age.

Mr. President, I hope Senators will listen carefully to the letter, because there has been a change in our Army and in the situation since last June.

This procedure was only made possible by the assignment of these men to divisions in this country, balanced by heavy drafts—up to 5,000 men—drawn from those divisions to supply the replacements required overseas.

In other words, Mr. President, if I may interpolate at this point, let me say that up until a few months ago we still had in the United States divisions of our Army. After the 18-year-old and 19-year-old men had been trained, we could draw from the divisions men who had been in them for some time and send them overseas as replacements, and then could put the younger men who had just finished their training into the divisions as replacements. But today the situation is that we no longer have any divisions in the United States. They have all gone overseas. They have gone overseas for the reason that we cannot fight the enemy here in the United States. If these divisions were to serve the purpose for which they were organized, to wit, to meet the enemy in combat and to fight the enemy, they had to go overseas where they could get at the enemy.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I wish to inquire whether all boys are now receiving 17 weeks of basic training in this country before they are sent overseas?

Mr. HILL. My understanding is that all boys inducted are given between 15 and 17 weeks of basic training in this country before they go overseas.

Mr. AIKEN. Then they are given 2 weeks' furlough at home, are they not?

Mr. HILL. They generally receive some furlough at home. The extent of furlough varies, I think. I would not say that all of them receive 2 weeks' furlough.

Mr. AIKEN. And it takes 2 weeks to get them overseas, does it not?

Mr. HILL. I do not know whether that is the case. If they go on a ship such as the *Queen Mary*, the time required to reach abroad is less than that. I understand the *Queen Mary* crosses the ocean in approximately 4½ days.

Mr. President, I ask the Senate to visualize the situation of such young men. They have had their basic training, which lasts from 15 to 17 weeks. They have learned what we call the school of the soldier. They have learned to use their weapons, and they have learned to take care of themselves as individuals. Then they are assigned as members of a team. When they are assigned as members of a team, they go into divisions overseas. There are now no divisions in the United States. They are put in with seasoned and trained veterans, in divisions overseas, and they take their places as members of the team.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, does the distinguished Senator from Alabama on his own responsibility say that the boys receive from 15 to 17 weeks of training?

Mr. HILL. That is correct.

Mr. LANGER. I have received letters from parents who advised me that their boys were inducted and were sent overseas in a matter of 2 weeks.

Mr. HILL. Let me say to the Senator that that situation is another one which tends to confuse our thinking. I do not think that any infantryman has been sent overseas in 2 weeks' time. I can visualize a situation in which a man who is a radio expert might be sent overseas almost immediately in case the Army had great need for a radio expert in a certain theater of war. But, so far as any infantryman is concerned, I assert that he receives from 15 to 17 weeks of basic training before being assigned to a division. As the Senator knows, a division is a fighting unit. When men go into battle they go in as a part of a division. Some men who may have been fine engineers may have been needed at some particular place and were assigned without having received much training. But I say that men who are to go into combat as infantrymen receive from 15 to 17 weeks of basic training before being placed in a combat team which, as I have said, is a division.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. The Senator is talking about men who are experts in some particular line, and have already been trained before being sent overseas. A radio engineer, or an expert in that line, may not need any extra training. He perhaps already has sufficient knowledge to enable him to impart some of it to members of the armed forces he joins.

On the subject of training, I should like to know if any man has been assigned

to infantry service overseas without having received any basic training. I have heard the statement made over and over again on the floor of the Senate that such has been the case. I have heard that letters have been received by Senators with respect to the matter. I think they should go before the Military Affairs Committee and have General Marshall and other high ranking officers called before them to ascertain the truth of those charges. It is not fair or just to send 18- or 19-year-old boys, or even 30-year-old men, into any combat group without giving them adequate training. It is not fair to men high in the military command if the statements are without authentic foundation. The charge has been made that that has been done, and I wish to see some proof of it. I should like to see the letters about which I have heard so much in the Senate. I should like to see the writers of the letters brought before some committee. If only one boy of any age has been sent into combat without having previously been given the required period of training, the War Department should be severely reprimanded for it by the Congress, and I would join in the reprimand.

Mr. President, I wish to reiterate what I said on the floor of the Senate the other day concerning 18-year-old boys. With respect to the 6 months' period of training, I cannot see how the Senate of the United States can discriminate between a boy who is 18 years old and a man with a family, whether he be 20 years old, 30 years old, or of any other age. If we provide training for one, we must provide training for all. If we provide that 6 months of training shall be given, we cannot take the 18-year-old boy and give him preference over a man who may have five children, for example, ranging from a year to eight, or even more years of age.

Mr. HILL. I agree with the Senator. The man with five children, being much the older, may need more intensive training than the agile and vigorous youngster.

Mr. LUCAS. Will the Senator further yield to me on that point?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. Today I was in the Supreme Court for the purpose of moving the admission of a colonel in the Army to practice before that high tribunal. He has been training troops at various intervals for the past 3 years. I spoke to him about this subject. He said, "Senator, the boy who is 18 or 19 years old makes a better soldier in 17 weeks or 6 months of training than the man who is 28 or 30 years of age."

Mr. HILL. The Senator knows who makes the best football player or the best baseball player. The older man always needs more training than does the younger man.

Mr. President, I am glad the Senator from Illinois has raised the question. I do not believe that any evidence can be brought forward to show that any man has been placed in an infantry division without having received adequate and proper preparation. No man is placed in combat without—to use the words of General Marshall—"going through a program which is very intensive and equally

thorough. They all go through this program."

I may say to the Senator from Illinois that I can conceive of a situation such as that which existed when Von Runstedt made his drive into the Ardennes and created what is known as the Belgian bulge. I can understand why it was necessary for the commanding officer to throw everything he had into that fight in order to stop the Nazi drive. I can understand that he might have taken a cook, or a man who had not been in an infantry division, such as a man in an aircraft division, for example, put a rifle into his hands, and said to him "You must fight." Perhaps that was the only way the commanding officer had of stopping the Nazis. I think that if he were present on the floor of the Senate, Admiral Hart, who is a former high-ranking officer of the Navy, would say that when he took a ship into battle he had every man on the ship manning a gun.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. It has been argued that possibly men who were pressed into combat service without first receiving 6 months of training were experts such as engineers, or radio technicians. I doubt whether, among the 18-year-olds, there are any engineers or expert technicians who could be pressed into service. My guess is that practically all of the soldiers 18 years of age were high-school students when they were inducted. I do not think the argument which has been made on that point is very persuasive. If untrained soldiers are not being pressed into active service, there should be no real objection to the provision for 6 months of training. I believe we all know that no boy 18 years of age will become a seasoned and well-trained soldier in such a period of time. He may receive the rudiments of military training in that length of time; he may learn the rudiments in the school of the soldier; but there is more to being trained for combat duty than that. I can appreciate that after a soldier has received his basic training in the school of the soldier it is well to give him training in a division, but that does not mean that the possibility should not be avoided of his obtaining his first training in the battle line.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, in testifying before the House Committee on Military Affairs General Edwards was asked this question by Representative ELSTON:

Are there any who have been in combat less than 5 months after induction?

He was speaking of the 18-year-old boys.

General Edwards replied:

I do not know. I do not think it is possible for anyone to get in combat in less than 5 months. I do not know of a single case that has come to our attention.

Mr. President, before reading further from General Marshall's letter, allow me to state the practical situation with which we are confronted. After these men have received from 15 to 17 weeks of basic training and are sent overseas, we all know that, so far as they are con-

cerned, their training should be continued as a member of a team. They should be placed in a unit with which they will later go into combat. They should be placed in a division. Yet if we adopt this amendment no man could be put into a division overseas that might be called at any time to go into combat unless it had been made sure that he had been in the service for at least 6 months. Divisions held in reserve which it may not be the intention to use immediately may contain some men with less than 6 months' training who may have been sent in as replacements; but who knows before the sun goes down there may come a call from General Patton or General Hodges or General Simpson or some other commander saying, "I am in distress at such and such a point in the line; I have a counterattack of the enemy to meet; send me more men; I want another division." In such a case it is not possible to stop and comb a division to see whether there is any man in the whole division who has not been in the service for at least 6 months. If it is necessary to stop and comb the division and take such men out, then just as the division goes into battle its efficiency is impaired, the efficiency of the team is impaired.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. LUCAS. This amendment if it were enacted into a law would not give a boy 18 years old who feels that he is fit and wants to fight and do the best he can even an opportunity to volunteer. Many boys 18 years of age are able and eager to do their part. I remember Bill Dudley, who was an all-American quarterback when he was only 18 years old.

The Bill Dudley's of America could not go into combat until they had 6 months training, they could not fire a gun until they had had 6 months' training. That is the situation we are in with respect to this amendment. It would be a serious detriment to the success of an army that was in a dire emergency.

I undertake to say General Marshall and Admiral King have been running the Army and the Navy from the beginning in such a way that they have the entire approval and confidence of the American people. I do not think Members of the Senate of the United States ought to become the military strategists with respect to how these boys should be trained. The most magnificent victories in all the history of the world have been achieved under the leadership of these great men. I undertake to say that no army in the world is better trained. As Anthony Eden said the other day when he was here we have the most powerful military machine on the face of the earth, the most powerful that has ever been formed in all the history of time. Why? Because they are properly trained. Because men here in the United States Congress, before Pearl Harbor and since, have stood up and backed men like George Marshall and Admiral King, who sometimes had to come and plead practically on their knees to get what

they wanted. Had we failed to follow the course they laid down the casualty list would have been much heavier today.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, one of the most remarkable things about this whole war has been the way our military commanders have won incomparable victories and at the same time held down the death rate or the casualties among our own troops.

As the Senator from Illinois has stated, the reason we have been able to do this is that Congress has been sufficiently wise to recognize that our military men are experts, that they are the ones who know the business of making war, and we have left the making of war in their hands and have stood behind them and backed them up. Napoleon Bonaparte said on one occasion that the crucial moment of a battle was the moment of victory. We stand today on the very threshold of victory; we are at the moment of victory in our battles in Europe, and what we need more than anything else is to keep the momentum going, and keep driving, driving, driving.

Now are we going to pass a law under the terms of which a military commander in Europe will have to stop his drive and undertake to comb and screen all his troops in order to make sure that he is not violating a law the Congress has passed?

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. The British have a law, the Australians have a law, and practically all the other nations have laws on the subject except the United States. So I do not think the Senator can claim that the adoption of such an amendment would seriously interfere with the war effort.

Mr. HILL. The British have had such a law from the very beginning; but what are we proposing to do now at the very moment of victory? Just when our forces are driving forward with their greatest possible power of force and speed, what it is proposed now to do is to change the rules of the game, and when that is done there can be but one inevitable result, and that is to slow down the momentum and driving power of our forces. If we had started with such a provision in the law in the beginning, as the British did, the situation might have been different, but it should not be done now; not at this very moment of victory, at this very moment when the quintessence of all our military action is to drive and to continue to drive. This is not the time to stop the commanders and require them to go through their divisions and comb and screen and check them in order to make sure that a law passed by Congress is being complied with.

I shall read further, Mr. President, from the letter of General Marshall. I had read his statement to the effect that previously these replacements had been placed in divisions here in the United States. He goes on to say:

Once all our divisions had left the United States—

And, as we know, they have all gone today—

or were within 3 months of their scheduled departure date this procedure was no longer practicable. The crisis of last December and January caused by the losses sustained in the Ardennes fighting necessitated the shipment of replacements after 15 weeks' training, otherwise our divisions would have been impotent at the moment their full power was needed to crush the enemy's final offensive effort, in preparation for the crossing of the Rhine and the great victories now being gained to the eastward.

This is what General Marshall says. Note this:

Just as soon as the military situation will permit, it is the purpose of the War Department to stop shipping men overseas who have not yet become 19 years of age, and I am hopeful that this condition will develop in the near future.

Mr. President, since the Senate knows General Marshall as a man and as a soldier and a leader, and knows of the victories the Army has won under his leadership, and that in every possible way he has endeavored to save every American life and conserve every American body that he could, it seems to me that we could trust him to do what he states is intended. As soon as the military situation will permit, there will be no more men under 19 years of age sent overseas. General Marshall proceeds:

A steady flow of trained replacements has enabled our armies to continue a course of relentless pressure on all fronts far beyond the anticipation of the enemy. This was made possible only through the unhampered use of men 18 and 19 years of age. If we had been prohibited from employing these men in the required numbers at the necessary time, I am certain that our casualties would have been much heavier, and our armies would have been denied the historic successes they have recently gained.

Mr. President, that is the statement of General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, the commander, the man who perhaps more than any other has been responsible for our magnificent victories, and for the relatively low casualty list. He proceeds:

In my opinion no restrictions should be placed by law on the time when soldiers may enter combat. It is impossible to foresee all of the exigencies which may arise in the waging of war. Carefully laid plans are frequently upset. The administration of the affairs of 8,000,000 men is a tremendous task which prohibitions of this nature, particularly in view of the constant uncertainties involved in waging war, would make almost impossible of efficient management. Should an emergency develop, such as last December, the War Department would in effect be powerless to avert the failure of an operation or a possible disaster.

Does any Senator think that, when we came near having a disaster in the Ardennes, when Von Runstedt made his drive, there was any time to stop then to make certain that no one was in a single division who had not been in the Army at least 6 months? Men who had not been in the Army quite 6 months had been put into those divisions, as they should have been, because it was only in those divisions, as a part of the divisional team that they could carry on and continue the training they had to have for their own good, as well as for

the effectiveness and the striking force of the Army.

General Marshall closes with this final comment:

Finally, I wish to submit this comment. Never before in our history have our men been so thoroughly prepared for their duties and hazards as soldiers. I, personally, and every commander in the field are even more intent on adequate training than any other group, I believe.

General Marshall says that he thinks that he and the other commanders are even more intent on adequate training than any other group, he believes. I think we can understand that statement.

Mr. President, Congress passed the Selective Service Act, to induct these men into the Army, but we ourselves do not give the orders which send them into combat; we do not give the orders knowing that as a result some men will be killed, some will lose their legs and their eyes and their arms, and some will be shattered in body and mind. Certainly no man could have a greater regard or a greater sense of responsibility for the men who go into combat than the commanders of those men, who issued the orders, who direct and lead them into battle.

If there is any one thing about General Marshall which has impressed me in the years I have known him as Chief of Staff it has been his concern, always and at all times, for the individual soldier, his concern to give the American soldier the best possible training, his concern to give to the American soldier the best possible weapons with which to make war, his concern to give to the American soldier the best possible chance for his life and his body, and not to send him into combat except when absolutely necessary and under circumstances which afford him the best possible chance for his life and his body.

General Marshall says:

We are too well aware of the costs of unpreparedness.

He and the other commanders are too well aware of what it means to send men into combat unprepared, not to give them adequate and proper and thorough and intensive training before they go into combat.

Mr. President, there is the commander of the Army, there is the man whom we hold responsible for the doing of this job. I remember after the first battle of the Marne a newspaper man said to Marshal Joffre, "Who won the battle?" His answer was, "I don't know who won the battle, but I know that if the battle had been lost who would have lost it." If, instead of the great victories our armies have won, we had had failures and defeats, George Marshall would have been the man at whom the finger would have been pointed. He is the man with the supreme responsibility, and he has done his job with supreme success.

No man could have thought, no man could have dreamed, that our armed forces would have met the obstacles and the withering fire of the enemy as they have, and won the incomparable victories they have achieved.

General Marshall has spoken for the Army. What about the Navy? We have a letter from the Secretary of the

Navy, Mr. Forrestal, addressed to the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WALSH], the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, under date of April 19, and this is what he says:

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Certain intended amendments to the bill H. R. 2625, proposing to amend the Selective Training and Service Act so as to restrict the utilization of men under 19 years of age in combat service until they have been given specified periods of training, have been called to my attention.

One of these proposed amendments relates to inductees and would prohibit ordering those under 19 years of age into combat service until given at least 6 months of training, and the other would prohibit ordering into combat service men under 19 years of age until given at least 1 year of training.

The effect of the adoption of either of these proposals would be disastrous to the administration of both the training and combat program and practices for the utilization of naval personnel and the conduct of naval operations.

Senators will notice the use of the word "disastrous." Could there be a stronger word, or one which would imply greater ill to come from such amendments than the word "disastrous," used by the Secretary of the Navy? He proceeds:

Only the preliminary training on naval recruits and inductees can be conducted at naval shore training stations. Actual training in these duties must perforce be carried out aboard ships.

These men are going to man and operate and fight on ships, so the Secretary says the real training must be on ships.

Consequently men newly received in the naval service are retained at training stations only sufficiently long to indoctrinate them into naval routine and such preliminary naval instruction as can be given them during the period of adaptation from civilian to naval life and habits. The completion of their training is accomplished by assigning these recruits to ships where they are fitted into crews in the various stages of training and experience so that they can complete their training under actual seagoing conditions and under the supervision of more experienced personnel.

Further, it should be pointed out that large numbers of naval personnel have been and are being received in the Navy by enlistment under the induction age.

As we know, many men under 17 years of age are, with their parents' consent, volunteering to go into the Navy. The Secretary continues:

These men enlist in the Navy, with their parents' consent, because they wish to fight.

In many cases it is true that new men do not see actual combat service for periods greater than either of those established in the proposed amendments. However, it would be utterly impossible to fit a program of restricted assignment into the necessary program of commissioning and manning new construction or of making replacements in operating ships of the Navy with the mandatory limitations in the two proposed amendments. To place statutory restrictions upon the utilization of naval personnel would impose such burdens upon the planning and operating forces of the Navy as to materially interfere with the present efficient prosecution of the war.

At the present time, in view of the manpower situation, every effort is being made to maintain the personnel of the Navy within the limits of its authorized strength. Re-

cruits are principally for the purpose of taking care of attrition, and in cooperation with the Army, virtually all of the approximately 25,000 men per month being taken into the Navy are from the 17-year-age group. The Navy has reached that stage of the war where it has adequate ships to enable it to train men at sea. To be obliged to retain these men for the proposed specified periods at training stations ashore would require an expansion of facilities which are now being curtailed, an increase in the authorized strength—

That means more men to be drafted—and in the retention of men in an ineffectual training status ashore.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. From a reading of mail which comes to our offices the impression sometimes seems to prevail that large numbers of men who are freshly inducted are thrown into battle before they have 6 months' training. I am wondering whether in the testimony taken before the Committee on Military Affairs there were any figures available as to the number of freshly inducted men with less than 6 months' training who had gone into action.

Mr. HILL. I will state to my distinguished friend that it has been difficult, as he can well imagine, to obtain such figures, but the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS], asked that question of the War Department. The War Department advises the Senator from Utah that on the basis of the best estimates it can obtain, in 1944 and in 1945 at the very maximum, not more than 10,000 men in the 18-year-age group were sent into combat without having completed at least 6 months' military service in the United States.

Mr. TYDINGS. I think it is also true that as to the 10,000 men who had received perhaps less than 6 months' training before they were put into battle zones, it is the policy of the Army and Navy to put them with seasoned troops in relatively small numbers, because a green man who has had 5 months' training, when associated with men, 99 percent of whom have had battle experience, is really in better hands than if he were a member of a wholly green regiment which has had a year of training but which has never had any battle experience whatsoever.

Mr. HILL. The Senator is exactly right. The practice is to put these men in with trained and seasoned combat veterans, and the Senator from Maryland, as a distinguished soldier of the last war, I think will agree with me when I say that I would rather see a son of mine, who perhaps had not received quite the 6 months' training, go into combat as one individual with a great number of trained and seasoned veterans than have him receive more than 6 months' training and go into combat with a lot of other men who were not seasoned and were not trained and had not had combat experience.

Mr. CORDON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. CORDON. The question which occurs to me Mr. President, is whether there is any reason why men who have had more than 6 months' training would have to be sent in as groups rather than in turn be, as it were, sandwiched in with other men who have had battle experience? Could not the Army, after giving 6 months' training, still spread the group among trained divisions?

Mr. HILL. The Army might do that; but the Senator must bear in mind that when an army is in combat and fighting a stubborn and fierce foe, such as we are fighting in both wars, and there is a division composed largely of trained veterans, the commanding general can never know just when he may have to use that division. The division must be ready and available, if need be, to move into a combat zone at any time.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. I think the argument that strictly 18-year-olds should not be placed in combat without 6 months' thorough training appeals to every man, and we would all like that to be done. I certainly would. But I think sometimes there occurs a situation such as this: Let us suppose that a recruit has had what may be called his preliminary training and is assigned in the nature of a replacement to a division in the rear area where the majority of men, almost the overwhelming majority, are seasoned troops; let us suppose that a break such as the Ardennes break, or a drive over the Rhine, or what not, suddenly requires the employment of a division with some men in it of the kind I have described, and that the employment of that division was not anticipated at the time the action commenced. It certainly would not be feasible in the situation I have described, which I am sure happens quite often, to send with the battle orders the instruction, "Before you move make sure to comb out all the 18-year-old boys who have not had 6 months' training."

I think the important thing for us to know is that the Army and the Navy are giving the men 6 months' training with the expectation that they probably will not be employed until they have had the 6 months' training, rather than to draw a hard and fast line.

I was particularly impressed with the argument made by the Senator from Alabama about the Navy, which was an angle that had not occurred to me, that after a man has completed his boot training, which normally we will say takes 90 days, he is assigned to a ship. Probably less than 1 percent of the men on the ship to which he is assigned have had less than 6 months' training. As the campaign opens, that ship may be in San Francisco, but because of the loss of other ships, or a change in plans, it may not be feasible to let the ship remain there.

I like the idea of 6 months' preliminary training as a policy. I would be reluctant to do anything which would appear to be opposed to that policy. However, as this debate unfolds I can see a great deal of difficulty about approaching it from the standpoint of lawmaking. I

am wondering whether or not, in the absence of a requirement of law, it might be possible to have the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy issue a general order carrying out the policy which the authors of the amendment have in mind, rather than for us possibly to embarrass the future success of some operation by trying to encompass it by lawmaking.

Mr. HILL. Let me say to the distinguished Senator that General Marshall, in the letter which I have just read, has endeavored, in the strongest possible language, to assure us that all these men have adequate and proper training. As he says, the training program is very intensive and thorough, and the policy is not to use the men until they have had 6 months' training, and when they are used, to see that they have had proper training. He makes this further statement:

Just as soon as the military situation will permit, it is the purpose of the War Department to stop shipping men overseas who have not yet become 19 years of age; and I am hopeful that this condition will develop in the near future.

Mr. TYDINGS. What is the date of the letter?

Mr. HILL. April 17.

Mr. CORDON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. CORDON. Was not assurance given Congress, at least informally, by the head of the Army at the time the draft age was reduced, that those young men would not be sent into action until after they had had at least a year's training?

Mr. HILL. No, Mr. President. That idea has gone abroad, and I am glad that the Senator has called attention to it.

Mr. CORDON. I wish to know what are the facts.

Mr. HILL. In a letter under date of October 23, 1942, addressed to the then chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Hon. Robert R. Reynolds, when this question was before the Senate for consideration, General Marshall made this statement:

I could give you many other examples where it would be unnecessary and undesirable to hold a man out of a combat theater for 12 months. It would be almost impossible for the Army to operate under such mandate. We would in effect have to put thousands upon thousands of men on the shelf after their essential training had been completed before we could use them. In the Air Corps alone possibly 500,000 such men would be involved. Incidentally, the Navy and the Marine Corps enlist men of 17, and I am told that the average age of the entire corps is below 20.

There was no such assurance. On the contrary, General Marshall made a categorical statement to the very opposite effect.

Mr. CORDON. Did he not also, however, give some assurance along that line?

Mr. HILL. I will tell the Senator where the idea of the 1 year's training came from. It arose in this way. The evidence shows that at least a year is required to train a division. It must be

remembered that when we first mobilized our Army we started organizing and mobilizing divisions. That meant that the men who were called into divisions would be at least a year in divisional training. The truth is that most of our divisions have had far more than a year's training in the United States before going overseas. The One Hundred and Sixth Division, which caught so much of the force of Von Runstedt's drive, had had 17 months' training in the United States before it went overseas. That is the way in which the idea of 1 year's training arose. A minimum of a year was required to train a division, but not to train an individual.

Mr. CORDON. What assurance or re-assurance was given to Congress at that time with reference to what would be the policy with respect to boys 18 years of age?

Mr. HILL. The assurance then given to the Congress was that such boys would be thoroughly and adequately trained before being sent into combat.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. I think perhaps I can answer the Senator's question. The Senate adopted an amendment providing that no boy should be sent into combat before he was 19. It went to conference, and when the conference report was submitted to the Senate the statement was made on the floor by the conferees that the amendment was eliminated in conference because the complicated administration necessarily involved in the handling of large numbers of men by the Army made it important not to impose any express limitations. I believe that is stated in a letter from the President, which was published in the RECORD of October 23, 1942.

The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. GURNEY] was in charge of the bill at the time. I asked him whether any assurance had been received from the Army that proper training would be given. The Senator from South Dakota stated that assurances had been received that the inductees would receive every bit of training that it was necessary for them to have before being sent into combat service, and that "the very great majority of those who go into front line combat will have 12 months' training, as they have had in the past."

Furthermore, on June 7, 1944, less than a year ago, Lieutenant General McNarney stated to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs that there was an order that no young man under 19 years of age assigned to the Infantry should be sent overseas. That order was subsequently extended to include other men.

So while perhaps there has been no promise, nevertheless, it was the declared policy of the administration, and the conference report was adopted largely with the knowledge that that was the declared policy of the administration.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, when the distinguished Senator from South Dakota stated, back in 1942, that the average man would have a year's training, he was exactly correct, because, as I say, at that time we were still forming our

divisions, and men who were being inducted were assigned to form new divisions. The minimum training period for a division here at home was a year. General Marshall himself called attention to the fact that the Army until military necessity required otherwise, did not send any men overseas until they had attained the age of 19 years. But he said that when military necessity required a change, the Army had been forced to change the policy, and had done so. In the letter from which I have read, he states that as soon as the military situation will permit, he will go back to the policy of not sending overseas any men who are under the age of 19.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. I wish to suggest that that is the reason why statements by the War Department mean nothing on this question, because the department reserves the right to change its policy at any time it wishes to change it, and the Department is the only agency which can possibly be the judge of military conditions.

Mr. HILL. Not only does it reserve the right to change the policy, but I maintain that it ought to have the right to change it. I maintain that the responsibility for the conduct of our troops in the field in combat against the enemy is the responsibility of the War Department and its field commanders. They must be able to meet situations as they arise.

Mr. TAFT. Then it seems to me that the Senator's argument would justify the department in drafting boys 17 years of age if they were needed.

Mr. HILL. No.

Mr. TAFT. We have said when a man may be inducted. Surely we may say when he may go into active service, without interfering with any military discretion in the conduct of the American Army.

Mr. HILL. The War Department has no authority to issue regulations with respect to the ages at which men shall be drafted. Only Congress can enact a law to draft a man; but after he is drafted, inducted into the service, and turned over to the Army, then it is the business of the Army to train him and make the best possible use of him in order to bring this war to the speediest possible conclusion.

The Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives cannot attempt to run the Army or say how the Army shall be organized or what shall be done about the administration or organization or the fighting of the Army. That must be done by the War Department and its field commanders.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. I do not agree at all. I see no reason why we should not say that no man should go abroad until he is 18 years and 6 months old. It seems to me that is entirely a matter for the Congress, and that it would be no interference with the actual operation of the Army. I wish to point out that as late as December 7, 1944, Under Secretary of

War Patterson made a statement in which he finally admitted that the practice had been changed, but that no notice had been given to the public. On December 7, 1944, he finally said:

This change in the replacement system has brought no relaxation in the thoroughness of preparatory combat training. In general a minimum of approximately 8 months elapses between an individual's induction and his assignment under the replacement system to an active sector of the front.

I say that the present evidence shows that in December, January, and February it was not an exceptional case, but it was the regular rule, that men were inducted and sent abroad in less than 5 months, and in many cases were wounded and killed in approximately 5 months from the time when they were inducted. That is not in accord with the War Department's own policy. If the War Department cannot be trusted to conform to its own policy it seems to me we can properly enact a requirement which will make the War Department conform to its own policy.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I take sharp issue with the statement of the Senator from Ohio that it was a rule to send the men into combat with only 5 months of training or with less than 5 months of training. According to the evidence which we have from the War Department, of all the millions of men who were sent overseas last year and up to now in the present year, only an estimated 10,000 men had to go into combat at a time when they had not received 6 months of training in the Army. Most of those men went into combat because of the unusual situation which confronted our military authorities. For instance, there was the need to stop von Runstedt, the need to keep him from reaching Antwerp and thus perhaps prolonging the war 2 or 3 or no telling how many years longer, during which thousands of our men would be killed. In the second place, some of those men may have gone into combat because of the magnificent successes which our armies have achieved and which have enabled them to move forward so rapidly. They have moved forward with astounding speed, through the Siegfried Line, across the Rhine River, and into Germany, and today they stand at the very gates of Berlin itself. We have not been able to hold back those divisions long enough to enable their commanders to stop and see whether every man in a division of perhaps 15,000 or 20,000 men has had at least 6 months of training. Those men received their basic training. According to General Marshall, they had been thoroughly and adequately trained when they were put in, side by side, with the veterans, those who knew combat, those who knew how to handle themselves in combat. The younger men were put into the team with them.

Mr. LANGER and Mr. KILGORE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Alabama yield, and if so, to whom?

Mr. HILL. I yield first to the distinguished senior Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I am sorry that the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois [Mr. Lucas] is not now on the floor of the Senate. An hour or so ago I stated that I had received from North Dakota a letter stating that a boy had been sent overseas in a comparatively short time, namely, less than 4 months. The Senator from Illinois challenged me to produce the letter. He said he had heard a great deal about such letters but none had been produced. I wish to read the letter. It is from Mrs. M. N. Kringlie, of Portland, N. Dak. I took up her letter with the War Department. I hold in my hand a letter which I have received from Brig. Gen. Robert H. Dunlop, acting for The Adjutant General. His letter was written in Washington on March 23, 1945. It absolutely substantiates everything said a few minutes ago by the distinguished senior Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], when he said that last fall the Army was using men who had received only 4 or 5 months of training.

I now read the letter I have received from Brigadier General Dunlop:

MARCH 23, 1945.

DEAR SENATOR LANGER: I again refer to your letter of March 9, 1945, with which you enclosed a letter from Mrs. M. N. Kringlie, Portland, N. Dak., concerning the training of her son, Pvt. Lyle S. Kringlie, before being sent overseas.

The length of the replacement-training period was originally 13 weeks.

The training period was not 5 months, as was stated in a letter written to the distinguished Senator from Ohio, but it was 13 weeks.

I read further:

As the war progressed, however, we found it possible to meet our needs for replacements and at the same time increase this training period to 17 weeks. This schedule was followed until very recently, when the increased tempo of our operations overseas resulted in the demand for replacements from overseas commanders becoming so urgent as to require the reduction of the training period to 15 weeks.

So we have a letter of the kind the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois was so anxious to see an hour or so ago.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, March 23, 1945.

HON. WILLIAM LANGER,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR LANGER: I again refer to your letter of March 9, 1945, with which you enclosed a letter from Mrs. M. N. Kringlie, Portland, N. Dak., concerning the training of her son, Pvt. Lyle S. Kringlie, before being sent overseas.

The length of the replacement training period was originally 13 weeks. As the war progressed, however, we found it possible to meet our needs for replacements and at the same time increase this training period to 17 weeks. This schedule was followed until very recently, when the increased tempo of our operations overseas resulted in the demand for replacements from overseas commanders becoming so urgent as to require

the reduction of the training period to 15 weeks.

This reduction in the training period represents no departure from our well-defined policy that soldiers will not be committed to combat until they are adequately trained for their anticipated duties. Battle experience, as well as the results of the most adequate tests that we have been able to devise, demonstrates conclusively that the average soldier in 13 to 17 weeks can be brought to a training level that permits him to fill a vacancy in a trained team. An individual replacement joins a trained organization and thus works side by side with experienced men. Under such conditions the replacement performs acceptably well from the outset and, following the lead and being guided by the advice of the more experienced men in his unit, quickly fits himself into the operations of the unit as a team.

There are many factors that affect the length of time that a soldier may stay in the United States before he is sent overseas. Some types of training requires more time than others; experienced men have to be used as a nucleus for new organizations and many other men are not physically qualified for overseas service but are able to perform necessary tasks in this country. Also, some individuals are sent overseas as replacements for organizations already there. Since a soldier is fully qualified for overseas assignment of this kind immediately upon completion of his basic training, some may be sent overseas for this purpose after a comparatively short period of service in this country.

In other instances, soldiers, after their basic training, are assigned to a unit in the United States which is receiving its team training. In the case of a large unit, involving the combined use of all arms, a year or more is usually required to weld it into an effective combat organization. Obviously, therefore, those soldiers who are assigned to units in team training in this country will normally remain in the United States considerably longer than those who were selected to be sent overseas as replacements. Both, however, are fully trained for their anticipated duties.

All men sent outside the continental limits of the United States are given a physical examination prior to their departure, and each man must be physically qualified for the duties he is to perform.

Mrs. Kringlie may be assured that every care will be taken to safeguard the health of her son while he is in the military service and that he will not be assigned to any duties which he is not qualified to perform.

With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, am I to understand that the writer of the letter said that the training period was 13 weeks?

Mr. LANGER. That statement appears in the letter.

Mr. HILL. I understand that General Marshall said the training period is from 15 to 17 weeks.

Mr. LANGER. How does that compare with what was said a few moments ago?

Mr. HILL. It may be that that particular man had 15 weeks of training. There is no conflict between that letter and what General Marshall himself has said.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. Here is the case of a boy who was fatally wounded 5 months and

5 days after he was inducted into the Army. He is a boy I knew. I know his parents in Cincinnati. He was not the boy to whom I referred several months ago, who was a close neighbor of mine, and who was killed approximately 5 months and 10 days after he was inducted. But the one to whom I now refer was a boy from Cincinnati, Frederick Toe Water, a little boy who was a friend of my son's, a boy who was rather immature. He was inducted into the Army. He received 15 weeks of training. He was inducted on September 4. He landed in France on January 30. He was immediately sent to the front, in Luxembourg. He arrived there on February 4. He arrived alone. He knew no one in his company. Two days after he arrived, they attacked across the river in Luxembourg. He happened to have been given one of the newest guns. The older men in the company liked his gun better than theirs, so they took his gun away from him and gave him one of the older ones. He was out in front, in a fox hole. His company had to retreat from the river, and he was finally left behind. He was the last man out and he was wounded as he came out. He was taken to a hospital and he died 3 weeks from that time.

I say that boy had no chance. He had no job in the company; he was of no value to the company in connection with the attack in that particular sector or in connection with any defense which might have been put up. My point is that he was of no real value to the Army. The Senate was very doubtful whether we should draft boys 18 years of age. The medical testimony was to the effect that many boys 18 years of age are fully matured and are the best fighters in the world, but that many others are not mature. We finally decided to draft the boys 18 years of age; but certainly if we do draft them, they are entitled to have a chance, and once they go abroad they are entitled to find out what their jobs are and to make friends with the other soldiers in their companies, so that when they finally fight they will fight among friends, and will not be neglected.

I hold in my hand correspondence relating to the case of Paul V. Bidwell, of Bethlehem, Pa. He enlisted on August 24, and was killed 5 months and 9 days after he enlisted. It was the regular practice in those months, after the boys had 15 weeks of training, to send them to Fort Meade, where they stayed for 2 days, and then send them abroad. They landed in France, and they were at the front within 3 or 4 days thereafter.

I say that policy was a mistaken one, and that the commanders of those companies would have been better off if they had not had such men. Certainly it is utterly unjust and unfair to such young men to put them into combat service under those conditions.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I invite attention to the fact that the distinguished Senator from Ohio is mistaken when he says the period of training is 15 weeks; it is 13 weeks.

Mr. TAFT. It was reduced from 17 weeks to 15 weeks. I have heard that it has now been reduced in some cases to 13 weeks.

Mr. O'DANIEL. Mr. President, in line with the subject which is being discussed, I wish to quote from a letter which I had placed in the RECORD on April 20. The letter was written by Bertha E. Kinser and reads, in part, as follows:

AUSTIN, TEX., March 31, 1945.

DEAR FRIEND: Received your letter of March 21. It was indeed nice of you to express to us your sympathy in the loss of our only child, our little 18-year-old son, John D. Kinser. Bless his heart; he lived a beautiful life. He only had 3 months and 10 days' training before being sent overseas for combat. He left P. O. E. around January 18 or 20, and was killed February 20.

The letter bears out the statements which have been made to the effect that men are being placed in actual combat, and killed, within a short time after their induction.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, every Senator and every person in this country has been deeply concerned over the policy of the Army with respect to 18-year-olds. During the debate which took place in the Senate a few days ago the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. REVERCOMB] made an observation which I think was entirely correct. Some of our allies refused to send out of their respective countries men of only 18 and 19 years of age. It seems to me that it is now becoming apparent, not only to Senators, but to all the people of the country, just how great has been the contribution of the United States to the success of the prosecution of the war in Europe.

Mr. President, the Army justifies its conduct in putting young men into active military combat by saying that it is sometimes necessary to use such men in order to maintain pressure upon the enemy. God knows that if that had not been done at times the military situation might now be different. Not one of our allies could have kept any considerable amount of pressure upon the enemy. Our allies either did not have the men, or they were located at places other than at the front. Furthermore, they were too weak in strength and too few in numbers to conduct alone the successful fight which is about to be cumulated in the taking of Berlin and the virtual breaking of organized resistance in Europe. I think when we undertook the job of furnishing men and supplies to help wage war, we committed ourselves to a tremendous task. When the American people ascertain just what contribution they have made to the war effort they will be amazed. Two or three months ago Mr. Churchill stated the proportion of British soldiers to the American soldiers who were being used in the war in Europe. It is no wonder that the casualties on the Western front have been from 60 to 70 Americans to 1 British or Canadian. When the complete story is told the proportion will probably be 100 to 1.

All of us know that soldiers who do not receive an adequate period of training suffer greater casualties than those who

have been well trained. We have suffered a great number of casualties. I have said that we suffer them in part because of not having been prepared for the war. We were not ready for it. Many of us refused to recognize that the war was coming. When it finally arrived we had to start from scratch and develop our armies. I have the greatest sympathy for the men whose responsibility it was to develop the Army, train it, and make it ready and fit for waging war.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield in order that I may be permitted to comment upon his statement?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. I do not think it was necessary, even under the circumstances then existing, to take boys into the service who were as young as some of those who were taken. I wish to read from a letter of Secretary Stimson under date of March 30, 1945, written to Hon. GEORGE MAHON of the House of Representatives:

According to February figures, there were approximately 8,050,000 men in the Army, 5,150,000 of whom were overseas. Of the 2,900,000 on duty in the United States, almost half (roughly 1,400,000) have already been marked for overseas duty and are being trained accordingly either in tactical units or as individual replacements and students in replacement training centers, training regiments and schools; 180,000 others were in Army hospitals.

Yet, we take boys who have had almost no training who, in 5 months would have numbered approximately 300,000 or 400,000 men, and 400,000 of the 1,400,000 referred to in the letter are not being sent abroad.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, we know that the War Department did everything it could in order to build an Army without taking the younger men. In testifying before the House committee on this bill General Edwards said:

We have a program of retraining. When we became so short of replacements last fall, the entire Army in the United States—

"The entire Army in the United States," I repeat to the Senator from Ohio, which means the 1,400,000 men—and overseas—

That means the Army overseas—

for that matter, was combed to get general servicemen who were in some other branch who were physically able to be used as combat replacements. We combed the Air Forces. We took 65,000 out of the Air Forces. We took 40,000 men out of the antiaircraft. We took a total of 200,000 men out of the other branches to retrain as infantrymen, because that was what we needed at that time.

In other words, in order to provide replacements the War Department started to squeeze as many as possible out of the other branches and put them into the infantry and into combat teams. That process was followed both in the United States and overseas in order to get out of other branches as many men as possible who were qualified to go into combat, and particularly into infantry units overseas.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, there is nothing in the Senator's statement which is inconsistent with the statement which I made. My point is that altogether there are 2,900,000 men on duty in the

United States. Of those the Secretary of War has said 1,365,000 are in essential service of supplies jobs. They are being used as rapidly as it is possible to replace them by other men. But in addition to the men in the service of supplies there are 1,400,000 who have been accepted and trained for foreign service. In addition to them, every available man has been combed from the service of supplies.

Mr. HILL. The 1,400,000 men to which the Senator referred evidently include many of the very younger men.

Mr. TAFT. Yes; but they could not include more than 400,000.

Mr. HILL. The testimony which was given before the House committee shows that the War Department did everything it could do in order to get every available man needed for service in the infantry divisions and the combat units on the front line before bringing in the younger replacements.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I wish to point out that at the very most there are approximately only 80,000 of these young men. So if we had a 6 months' supply of them there would be only approximately 480,000. The others have been drafted, have enlisted in the Navy, or have been inducted into other branches of the military service. So that of the 1,400,000 there should not be, I should judge, more than 400,000 of the younger men who have been trained less than 6 months.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alabama yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. CHANDLER. If the Senator from Ohio will look at the RECORD of last Thursday, during the debate on the pending bill he will find that I put the figures into the RECORD, because I wanted to show that our commitments to overseas service had been 5,150,000 soldiers, who, according to the report of the Secretary of War, were overseas in February, out of a total of 8,050,000, and as I understood, of the 2,900,000 left in this country in February about 1,500,000 were earmarked for overseas duty and were going to be sent as soon as replacements could be obtained for them here.

Mr. TAFT. No; not replacements for them here, but they could be sent as soon as they were trained.

Mr. CHANDLER. Some of the 1,365,000 left in essential service here might be sent if the military authorities keep their declared intention; indeed sooner or later all are going to see overseas service in the Army at some time or other when other soldiers can be brought back from overseas. I wanted the Senate to know the tremendous force we had committed to this battle.

The Senator from Alabama will remember that the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff undertook to justify it on the theory that it was necessary to keep pressure on the enemy, whereas it used to be the rule to fight a division for a while and then take it out of the combat line and substitute another division. I cannot tell whether that is right or wrong, but it has contributed to the achievement of victory. Instead of taking a division out of the line, they have infiltrated young men, some of

whom have not had the maximum amount of training, and kept the division going. As it suffered losses new men were placed in the line and the division continued to keep the pressure on. In doing that we have lost some men, but in the long run lives may have been saved.

What burns me up is the great commitment in men we have made over there, so far beyond the number ever conceived or imagined by the American people. It might have been necessary, it might have been impossible to achieve victory without it; but certainly no American Senator and no citizen of the country has to apologize for the magnificent contribution that young American manhood has made to the great victory which is about to be achieved.

Mr. HILL. The Senator, as he speaks of the great victory which is about to be achieved, knows well that the reason we are on the eve of this great victory is that we have kept the pressure on the enemy; we have continued to drive and drive and drive. If we had ever stopped that driving and given the enemy a chance to catch his breath and dig in, the chance to construct new fortifications on new and perhaps more advantageous terrain, we might have been much further from victory than we are today, and that would have meant the cost perhaps of thousands of American lives.

Mr. CHANDLER. Certainly we were the only ones who could keep pressure on the enemy. Does anyone know of an army belonging to any other country that could have kept pressure on the enemy as we have kept it? I say that when the whole thing is looked at from the standpoint of history, it may be that we may have contributed more than we were expected to contribute by the American people, but certainly whatever we have contributed has been decisive.

Now we have reached the stage where organized resistance is about to be finished in Germany, and, according to the information I get from the military authorities, we are not going to be able, unless something happens I do not know about, to use against the Japanese more than half of our divisional strength. The war against the Japanese is going to be principally a naval battle. We have some 3,200,000 men in the Navy of the United States. It is a magnificent Navy. It is probably the greatest accumulation of fighting ships and fighting men that any other country or combination of countries ever got together in all the history of time.

I know that no Senator and no citizen of the country wants to continue sending young men into combat who are not sufficiently trained. That is a tragic thing. It may be because of our original unpreparedness, and I think it is. Somebody said the other day, "Suppose the Senate adopted the amendment, I think probably it would not be hurtful now, because whatever may be done if a commander has the soldiers and is faced with an emergency he will use them." In the Navy men are trained on the ships; they are placed on ships, and, if the ship is fired on, the captain of the ship will fire

back, and he will use the men on the ship whether they have had 2 days' training or 6 days' training or 6 months' training or more.

But it would not be hard for the Senate to advise the Chief of Staff of the attitude of the people of the country. I know Senators have received letters from fathers and mothers, as no doubt the Chief of Staff has received letters from them. They feel that if this is a necessary contribution, well and good, but it ought not to be continued unless the military situation is, as the Senator from Michigan said the other day, an extraordinary one. I do not know about the words "extraordinary" and "unusual." They may mean just more of the same; I do not know whether they mean anything; but certainly if I were the commander of a division on the western front and I had in my outfit men 18 years old, not fully trained or adequately trained, in an emergency I would have to use them, as in the case of the One Hundred and Sixth Division that went into a so-called quiet sector and was suddenly overwhelmed. We cannot pass a law to keep naval and military commanders from using soldiers and sailors if they have them and have to use them.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. President—

Mr. HILL. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. BURTON. I wish to express my appreciation of the presentation that the Senator from Alabama has been making of the fundamental arguments involved in connection with the pending bill. It was considered in the Committee on Military Affairs, and, as I recall, the fundamental argument which impressed me there—and I wish to press further the question to the Senator—was this: Realizing the full necessity of giving these young men the best possible training, and adequate training for the respective jobs they will have to do, the question is, Would an act of Congress contribute to the clarifying of that policy, or would an act of Congress really handicap the policy? I wish to ask, suppose this amendment were adopted that a man should be given 6 months' military training; would it be possible for Congress in any way to assure that the kind of military training received would be of benefit to him under the circumstances he would finally face?

Mr. HILL. The Senator is absolutely correct about that. When General Marshall says that all these men have been adequately and properly prepared, I am sure he is speaking the truth. As the Senator from Ohio knows, and every other Senator knows, in the Army there are all types of men, just as there are in civilian life. One man with 5 months' training might make a far better soldier than another man who had had 12 months' training. All the Army can do is to put them through what they consider to be and what they find to be an adequate and thorough course of training. I do not know but that some men who have been in the Army less than 6 months have been killed, but that does not mean that they were not properly trained and it does not necessarily mean

that if they had 12 months' training they would not have been killed or that if they had had 12 months' training they would have been efficient, capable soldiers. There are some men, perhaps, who never make real top A-1 soldiers, some men who, because of their physical and mental make-up, never reach that degree of proficiency which it is desirable that every soldier should reach. But I wish to insist on this floor, and I want the country to know, that General Marshall and the War Department have not sent men into battle who had not had a thorough and intensive and an adequate course of training.

Mr. BURTON. Is it not also true, I ask the Senator from Alabama, that, even though the training be extended for many months, that is no guarantee that a man will not be hit by a bullet?

Mr. HILL. The Senator knows that officers have gone to Europe as observers who were there hardly 48 hours before they were moved up to the front line and were hit and perhaps killed.

The Senator knows furthermore that in this day of modern warfare, when bomber and fighting planes with machine guns, and heavy artillery, and rocket bombs are used, there is no longer any little area which can be denominated as a combat area. Many square miles of territory, wherever soldiers are today on the other side of the Atlantic, may well be combat areas.

Mr. BURTON. As I understand it, the Senator's argument is that even though we adopt an amendment—it has to be a short amendment, a general amendment—when we have enacted it, requiring 6 months' military training or a year's military training, we have not required what is really needed, because we cannot go into detail to make sure that a man gets the kind of training he needs to fit him to go into combat service.

Similarly, we use the general term "combat" to describe what the man be kept out of. A man gets a bronze star if he is in a combat zone, so that he is likely to be in "combat," in a broad sense even though far from the front line. The only way the Army could be sure to comply with our amendment would be to keep all new men out of zones where it is not at all important that they have combat training or front-line training. It would mean a waste of manpower.

"Combat zone" is much broader than "front line." So that even though we do the best we can in the Halls of Congress to provide for the war we cannot manage the front line and we are likely to interfere with it rather than help it.

It seems to me the proposed legislation would be futile because it could not guarantee the right kind of training. Furthermore, it would keep men out of many zones where they should be.

Mr. HILL. I thank the Senator from Ohio for his contribution. He is exactly correct. There is no way for the Senate by an amendment to do that which we all desire, to wit, to make sure that every man who goes into combat has had training sufficient to make him a proficient soldier, so to speak. On the other hand, by adopting such an amendment we can greatly harass, impede, and impair the operation of our armies and of

our armed forces. We can put a terrible burden upon them. We can even take a chance here of slowing up the momentum with which our forces are driving today, and if we do that we may well postpone the day of victory, and cost thousands of American lives.

Mr. BURTON. We might sacrifice more lives than we could possibly save by any amendment we might adopt.

Mr. HILL. I will say to the Senator that, so far as my opinion is concerned, we would not save many lives by adding such an amendment, but we might invite the sacrifice of thousands of lives.

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. MAYBANK. In connection with a letter read by the Senator from Ohio, does the figure 1,400,000 as the number of troops in this country, include the troops on unlimited service, on leaves of absence, or those returned from war zones because of having completed their tours, or because of having been sent back to rest?

Mr. HILL. I have not recently seen a break-down of those figures, but I am quite certain that they do include many men to whom the Senator from South Carolina has referred.

Mr. MAYBANK. The Senator will correct me if my information is wrong. As I remember from the testimony of both General Hamble and others before the Committee on Military Affairs, they said that by May there would be practically no trained divisions or trained men in this country who were not on limited service, or who had not seen action, or who perhaps were not in the service units used to supply ships at the water-front ports, and various other places. Am I correct?

Mr. HILL. The Senator is absolutely correct.

Mr. MAYBANK. I thank the Senator.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I had been reading the letter from the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal. I continue reading from his letter:

It should also be pointed out that men encounter the same risks at sea whatever their age and that the risks are based largely on the efficiency and training of those in a supervisory capacity which on every ship is composed of officers and petty officers with advanced training and mature experience. The performance of all of the numerous types and units of the Navy justifies approval of the continuance of the practices now in effect, without hampering arbitrary time limitations on utilization of men.

As to the Marine Corps, it is the present practice, even under the extreme combat pressure and high casualties encountered, to afford recruits 5 months' training in the United States and further training in a combat unit on the advanced fronts which is in preparation for future operations. It is the experience of the Marine Corps, based on its combat record, that this training is adequate.

In order to maintain unceasing pressure on the enemy at sea, which has advanced the end of the war beyond the anticipation of the enemy or of our people at home, it is absolutely essential to maintain the orderly progress of training and flow of replacements for those who have long sustained their efforts on the far-flung battle fronts which cannot be accomplished, if restricted as proposed in the intended amendments.

Sincerely yours.

In other words, Mr. President, what the Secretary of the Navy is saying that if we add these restrictive amendments we cannot keep the flow of replacements going to relieve the men who have been out on the seas and on the battle fronts, and who now are greatly in need of relief.

I call attention to the fact, as I read it in the beginning, that the Secretary of the Navy said that these amendments "would be disastrous to the administration of both the training and combat program and practices for the utilization of naval personnel and the conduct of naval operations."

Mr. President, I have detained the Senate longer than I had intended. We have here the strongest kind of a letter from General Marshall urging that these amendments be not adopted, and setting forth the strongest kind of reasons why they should be rejected. We have also from the Secretary of the Navy a letter stating that the adoption of the amendments would be disastrous to the administration of the Navy and the utilization of its personnel, and in carrying on its operations. To General Marshall and to our Army commanders, and to Admiral King and to our naval commanders, we have looked for the protection of our country, for the defeat of our enemies, for bringing us the victories which they have brought us in such magnificent and incomparable fashion.

As was said earlier today, General Marshall and Admiral King and our Army and Navy commanders have been able to bring us these victories because we of the Congress have been willing to let them conduct the war. We have been willing to let them administer and operate the Army and the Navy as they deemed best, and we have not sought to tell them how that operation or that administration should be carried out. When they have come to us and asked for money with which to build ships and airplanes and guns, with which to provide all the munitions of war, we have given them what they have asked. We have sustained and supported them, and they in turn have given us the most incomparable victories in all the world's history. Why should we now at this late moment, just as we stand on the eve of final victory in Germany, refuse to let them carry on the operations against Germany without our interference? If we put the pending amendment on the bill, and the amendment becomes law, no one can tell how much it may impede and hamper the operations of our armed forces in Germany. No one can tell to what extent such an amendment may result in slowing down our forces, and impeding their momentum and driving power.

We all know that the great secret of military success lies in this, that when once the enemy is on the run, once an advantage is obtained over him, the drive against him must be continued and intensified. That is exactly what we are doing in Germany today and what we have done during the past week. We have been driving and driving and driving the enemy, and winning victory after victory. Are we now going to stop that drive? Are we going to say "Stop" to our armed forces under Patton and

Hodges and Simpson and Bradley and Eisenhower? Are we going to say, "You have got to stop driving the enemy and you must examine every division and every combat unit and see whether you are carrying out a law which the Congress has just passed"?

Senators, that is the proposition which confronts us. We are nearly at the end of the road, and we have approached the end of the road much sooner than might have been expected, because of the fact that we have let Marshall and Eisenhower and Bradley and Patton and Hodges and Simpson and the other great commanders conduct the operations of our armed forces on the other side. Are we now to inject ourselves into those operations? Are we now to take the full authority out of the hands of the commanders and do the thing which they are now begging us not to do and which they say will be disastrous if we do it? That is our responsibility.

We must answer the question whether we will say to General Marshall, "You have done a wonderful job up to date, but now, on the very moment of victory, we are going to take some of your authority away from you. We are going to make a decision ourselves. We are going to impose our own will on you and on our armed forces."

Mr. President, since this war began I for myself have followed but one course, and it is that of allowing our military and naval commanders a free hand and sustaining and supporting them. I shall continue to follow that course. I am not going to say to General Marshall, or to General Eisenhower, or to General Patton, or to General Hodges, or to any of the other commanders that I put my judgment ahead of theirs, and I am not going to assume the terrific responsibility of perhaps prolonging this war at the cost of the lives of thousands of American boys.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Texas [Mr. O'DANIEL] as a substitute for the amendment offered by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. STEWART] and other Senators to House bill 2625.

Mr. O'DANIEL. I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. HILL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Fulbright	McMahon
Austin	Gerry	Magnuson
Bailey	Green	Maybank
Bankhead	Guffey	Millikin
Bilbo	Hart	Mitchell
Brewster	Hatch	Moore
Buck	Hawkes	Morse
Burton	Hickenlooper	Murdock
Bushfield	Hill	Murray
Butler	Hoey	O'Daniel
Byrd	Johnson, Colo.	O'Mahoney
Capehart	Johnston, S. C.	Overton
Chandler	Kilgore	Pepper
Chavez	La Follette	Radcliffe
Cordon	Langer	Revercomb
Donnell	Lucas	Robertson
Downey	McCarran	Shipstead
Eastland	McClellan	Smith
Ellender	McFarland	Stewart
Ferguson	McKellar	Taft

Taylor
Thomas, Okla.
Tobey
Tunnell

Walsh
White
Wiley
Willis

Wilson
Young

Mr. BANKHEAD. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry. Several members of the conference committee—

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The result of the quorum call has not been announced.

Mr. BANKHEAD. I wish to inquire if several Senators who are in session in a conference committee with Members of the House, in the committee room of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, practically in the presence of the Senate, can be recorded as present.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Seventy Senators have answered to their names. A quorum is present.

Will the Senator from Alabama please restate his parliamentary inquiry?

Mr. BANKHEAD. I wish to know if several Members of the Senate, who are in conference with Members of the House on a very important appropriation bill, in the committee room of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, which as we all know is practically within the hearing of the Senate, can be recorded as present, at their request, without leaving the conference?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the rule they may not be so recorded, but they may be excused.

Mr. BANKHEAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. REED], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. GURNEY], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CAPPER] be excused.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Alabama? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Texas [Mr. O'DANIEL] to the amendment offered by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. STEWART] on behalf of himself the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. REVERCOMB], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. WILSON], and the Senator from Colorado [Mr. JOHNSON].

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator will state it.

Mr. HATCH. Is the amendment offered by the Senator from Texas in the nature of a substitute?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. That is correct.

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. REED (when his name was called). I have a general pair with the Senator from New York [Mr. WAGNER]. I understand that if he were present and voting, he would vote as I am about to vote. So I am free to vote, and I vote "nay."

The roll call was concluded.

Mr. HILL. I announce that the Senator from Virginia [Mr. GLASS], the Senator from New York [Mr. MEAD], and the

Senator from Nevada [Mr. SCRUGHAM] are absent because of illness.

The Senator from Florida [Mr. ANDREWS] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Missouri [Mr. BRIGGS] and the Senator from New York [Mr. WAGNER] are absent on public business.

The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MYERS] is absent because of a death in his family.

The Senator from Montana [Mr. WHEELER] is absent on official business. The Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS] is detained in a committee meeting.

The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], and the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS] are absent visiting various concentration and prison camps in Europe.

The Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] is absent as a delegate to the International Conference at San Francisco. He has a general pair with the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG].

I further announce that the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], and the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS], if present and voting, would vote "nay."

Mr. WHITE. The Senator from Illinois [Mr. BROOKS], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] are absent on official business.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] who is detained on official business, has a general pair with the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS].

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent on official business as a delegate to the International Conference at San Francisco. He has a general pair with the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY].

The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. BALL] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Idaho [Mr. THOMAS] is absent because of illness.

The result was announced—yeas 9, nays 66, as follows:

YEAS—9

Bilbo	McCarran	Evercomb
Bushfield	Moore	Stewart
Langer	O'Daniel	Young

NAYS—66

Aiken	Guffey	Morse
Austin	Gurney	Murdoch
Bailey	Hart	Murray
Bankhead	Hatch	O'Mahoney
Brewster	Hawkes	Overton
Buck	Hayden	Pepper
Burton	Hickenlooper	Radcliffe
Butler	Hill	Reed
Byrd	Hoey	Robertson
Capehart	Johnson, Colo.	Russell
Capper	Johnston, S. C.	Shipstead
Chandler	Kilgore	Smith
Chavez	La Follette	Taft
Cordon	Lucas	Taylor
Donnell	McClellan	Thomas, Okla.
Downey	McFarland	Tobey
Eastland	McKellar	Tunnell
Ellender	McMahon	Walsh
Ferguson	Magnuson	White
Fulbright	Maybank	Wiley
Gerry	Millikin	Willis
Green	Mitchell	Wilson

NOT VOTING—21

Andrews	George	Thomas, Idaho
Ball	Glass	Thomas, Utah
Barkley	Johnson, Calif.	Tydings
Bridges	Mead	Vandenberg
Briggs	Myers	Wagner
Brooks	Saltonstall	Wheeler
Connally	Scrugham	Wherry

So Mr. O'DANIEL's amendment in the nature of a substitute for the amendment of Mr. STEWART was rejected.

HONORARY RANK OF COLONEL TO MAJ. EDWARD J. KELLY, SUPERINTENDENT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA POLICE FORCE

Mr. BILBO. Mr. President, with the kind consent of the leaders on both the Democratic and Republican sides of the Chamber, I wish to request unanimous consent for the consideration of House bill 2687, Calendar No. 193.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be read by title, for the information of the Senate.

The CHIEF CLERK. A bill (H. R. 2687) to grant the honorary rank of colonel to Edward J. Kelly, Major and Superintendent of the Metropolitan police force of the District of Columbia.

Mr. BILBO. Mr. President, without taking much of the time of the Senate, I wish to state that Major Kelly, who is now the head of the Metropolitan Police force of the District of Columbia, has been a member of the police force for 39 years, rising from a private to its commanding officer. The bill provides an expression of appreciation and recognition of his services which have been devoted to the police force of the District of Columbia all these years. The bill was passed by unanimous vote of the House of Representatives, was sent to the Senate, and has been referred to the Committee on the District of Columbia, from which is has been reported without amendment. The bill involves no increase in salary.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. BILBO. I yield.

Mr. WHITE. If the bill involves no increase in salary, and if it will make any contribution to the efficiency of the police force of the District of Columbia, I shall have no objection to it.

Mr. BILBO. The bill would do us no harm; it would do Major Kelly a great deal of good, and it would help the morale of the police force of the District of Columbia.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the bill (H. R. 2687) to grant the honorary rank of colonel to Edward J. Kelly, major and superintendent of the Metropolitan Police force of the District of Columbia, was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

WAR BOND DANCES FOR CONGRESSIONAL PAGES' AIR ARMADA

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, last year I had the privilege to bring on the floor of the Senate the message of our pages regarding the War bond dances at the Shoreham Hotel to raise the cost of a congressional pages' air armada. Those War bond affairs were a great success in respect to the amount of War bonds purchased, as well as in attendance. The Army Air Force helped and encouraged them last year, and will do so again this year. They are making two planes available to be christened outside of the Capitol on April 30, one for the

Senate pages and one for the House pages.

President Truman, our former colleague, Mr. RAYBURN, the Speaker of the House, and Mr. Lynn, the Architect of the Capitol, have given their approval to this affair. The pages are doing this in order to induce the youth of the Nation to become "brothers in bonds" with them, and to give their own War bond affairs in order to have armadas representing their States or communities, as well as to start a rocket plane armada in order to speed the Pacific warfare to restore the world to peace and order. The pages feel that the more War bonds the people have after the war, the greater will be the prosperity of the Nation in the post-war period. They feel, furthermore, that the more planes the Nation and people own, the larger will be the air traffic between the United States and our Latin American neighbors when peace is restored. Thus, closer relationships will be fostered by the interchange of each other's products and industries.

Therefore, to that end, they have invited the young people of the Latin American diplomatic and military corps, as well as others of their nations, who will be in national dress of their countries.

Although I have not consulted him, I understand that the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CHANDLER] will be the master of ceremonies on that occasion. Music will be furnished by the official band of the Army Air Force. A program has already been worked out. After the christening ceremony, on April 30, the band will play for the dance at the Shoreham Hotel from 8 o'clock p. m. until midnight. This dance will be by congressional invitation only, with each Member receiving an equal number of invitations.

There will be no expense attached to the ceremony in front of the Capitol or to the affair at the Shoreham Hotel. However, those who attend will be able to buy War bonds, War stamps, or stamp corsages at both affairs.

The pages are having made up a sponsorship plaque on which will be inscribed the names of those who buy bonds. The plaque will be hung in the pages school, or wherever Congress would like to have it placed.

EXTENSION OF SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 2625) to extend the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question now recurs on the amendment offered by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. STEWART], for himself and other Senators.

Mr. McCLELLAN obtained the floor. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator will state it.

Mr. TAFT. What is the status of the amendment proposed by the Senator from Massachusetts? Has it been accepted?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. It has not yet been offered.

The pending question is the amendment offered by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. STEWART] on behalf of himself and other Senators.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. WALSH. I assume that at the proper time my amendment, which has been printed, to the amendment of the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. STEWART] and other Senators will be accepted by him.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. STEWART. Let me say that the Senator from Arkansas has an amendment which he is about to call up or offer. The purpose of the group of Senators sponsoring the amendment which I have offered is to accept the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas and also to accept the amendment which was sent to the desk the other day by the Senator from Massachusetts, the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment which I offer.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be read.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. At the end of line 8, it is proposed to strike out the period and add the following:

of such character and to the extent necessary to prepare such inductees for combat duty.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, in view of the fact that the sponsors of the original amendment have agreed to accept my amendment as a modification of it, I merely wish to say that in the course of debate last Friday the suggestion was made that possibly the original amendment might be construed as permitting an inductee to be used in combat simply after remaining in the military service for 6 months, regardless of whether he had received proper training, and that such service, without adequate training, might be regarded as compliance with the amendment. In order that there may be no misunderstanding as to the intent of Congress, I propose in my amendment that the Congress provide that the military training shall be "of such character and to the extent necessary to prepare such inductees for combat duty." I think that with the adoption of that amendment to the pending amendment there could be no misinterpretation of the intent of Congress.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. STEWART. I think the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas, which has just been read, as well as the amendment sent to the desk the other day by the Senator from Massachusetts, both of which we have accepted as modifications of our own amendment, strengthen and clarify the amendment we offered. Certainly they emphasize the purpose of our amendment. On behalf of the sponsors of our amendment, I say that we are very glad to accept them.

I think the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas makes perfectly plain

and clear the intent of the group of Senators who introduced the original amendment, namely, that young men 18 years of age shall be trained for combat service for a period of 6 months before they are placed in combat. The amendment of the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee likewise clarifies my amendment. The authors of the amendment have no purpose or intention of undertaking to interfere with volunteers. I understand that on a rather large scale the Navy is taking volunteers under 18 years of age. We have no intention of interfering with that program or interfering with the training of men who have been inducted at places other than within the borders of the United States, particularly as referred to in the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts which provides that they may be trained on board ships on the high seas.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] has been proposed, but the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WALSH] has not as yet been offered. The Senator from Tennessee has a right to modify his amendment.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts was read at the desk a few days ago, and I ask that it now be reread by the clerk.

Mr. WALSH. I will offer my amendment so that the Senate may act on it or that it may be accepted by the Senator from Tennessee as a modification of his amendment.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I will not object to the request of the Senator from Tennessee that the amendment be read, but I think that the situation would be expedited by acting first on my amendment and then on the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. STEWART] may modify his amendment at any time before it is acted upon by the Senate.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I suggest that the situation would be simplified by the Senator from Massachusetts offering his amendment now and letting the Senate act upon it.

Mr. MURDOCK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STEWART. I yield.

Mr. MURDOCK. As I understand the present parliamentary situation, the Senator from Tennessee has modified his amendment by including the amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts and the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas. When we vote on the amendment of the Senator from Tennessee are we to understand that his amendment includes both the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts and the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. STEWART. That is correct. If I have not already done so, I now ask leave to modify my amendment so as to include the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts and the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will read the amendment of the Senator from Tennessee as modified.

The CHIEF CLERK. At the end of the bill it is proposed to insert the following:

And provided further, That no man under 19 years of age who is inducted into the land forces under the provisions of this act shall be ordered into actual combat service until after he has been given at least 6 months of military training of such character and to the extent necessary to prepare such inductee for combat duty; this proviso shall not be construed as preventing the assignment of enlisted men of the Navy or Coast Guard and the reserve components thereof to duty for training on vessels of the Navy or Coast Guard and at naval bases beyond the continental limits of the United States.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Tennessee as modified.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I wish to propound a question to the Senator from Massachusetts. Let us assume that a man who is less than 19 years of age has had 5 months of training and is on a ship at sea. The ship is ordered to proceed to some theater of action where fighting is taking place. How would that man be taken off the ship?

Mr. WALSH. I do not believe that would be necessary. He is not supposed to be ordered upon a ship which is bound for actual combat until he has been trained for the period named.

Mr. TYDINGS. That may be true, but I have in mind that the man was assigned to a ship which was not expected to go into combat. Because of some change in the military situation it becomes necessary for the ship to be directed to proceed to the place of combat because its presence is considered essential to insure victory.

Mr. WALSH. As I understand the basic part of the amendment of the Senator from Tennessee, it contains the word "ordered." No one shall be ordered into combat. The amendment proposed by me would give the Navy an opportunity to place enlisted men or officers on naval vessels which had not been ordered into action and where necessary training could be given. It would not in my opinion prevent one from participating in an unexpected conflict with the enemy.

My amendment is based upon the assumption that if the amendment of the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. STEWART] is adopted it might handicap the Navy in giving early training on vessels to its enlisted personnel. If my amendment is adopted it will make it clear that the Navy can continue as in the past to train its youthful personnel.

Mr. TYDINGS. I sympathize with the Senator's purpose.

Mr. WALSH. There are many vessels on which a man could be placed that would not be ordered into conflict. The point I wish to develop is that there is not in my proposal any prohibition against the man going on to a naval vessel at any time or at any place for combat training.

Mr. TYDINGS. I realize there may be the best intention in the world to carry out the understandable motive of

the Senator from Massachusetts, but the Navy is often in the position of finding it necessary to order a ship to some theater of action. On that ship there may be 10 or 20 men who had not received 6 months of training. That is the situation which I have in mind.

Mr. WALSH. The situation to which the Senator refers is not a serious one because the law does not apply to volunteers. It applies only to draftees. Few men now are taken into the Navy except as they volunteer.

Mr. TYDINGS. I do not believe the situation is fair to volunteers.

Mr. WALSH. The amendment of the Senator from Tennessee excludes entirely volunteers. I understand this amendment is to protect only men who are drafted into the service by requiring that they be given a certain degree of training.

Mr. TYDINGS. I can see the philosophy back of the amendment. It seems to me to be a practical proposition that a man may be placed on a ship which may be sailing up and down the Pacific or the Atlantic coast, and come in contact with an enemy submarine. Under the strict letter of the law the commander would have to turn around and sail away from the submarine because if he engaged in combat he would be taking a new man into active service.

Mr. WALSH. In my opinion the amendment would protect an officer under such circumstances who found it necessary to fight the enemy. The basic amendment before the Senate provides that men shall not be placed on vessels known to be combat vessels until having been given 6 months of training. But, in my opinion, if it should become necessary to make an attack the officer in command should, of course, have the right to proceed into action.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I should like to ask a question. If the vessel were attacked and it sought to defend itself, as I imagine it would, would it not be in combat?

Mr. WALSH. In my opinion, if this amendment should be adopted, it would not be applicable in such a case, and the officer in command of the vessel could use those on the vessel who had not had the full training period provided for by the amendment.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, if the Senator will allow me to interrupt, should the vessel wait until it is attacked? It should take the offensive and put the enemy out of business before the enemy could sink it. Who wants to sit around with an enemy submarine in the neighborhood and wait until his vessel is shot at?

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I think the Senator from Massachusetts explained that when he said that no inductees at all under 19 years of age were being taken into the Navy. That completely answers the question.

Mr. TYDINGS. But the policy might be changed in a month, and it looks to me as if with the ending of the war in Europe we will be facing a naval war in the Pacific, for the time being, rather than a land war.

Mr. STEWART. It would be judged on the basis of existing law.

Mr. WALSH. In answer to the question of the Senator from Alabama, the vessel upon which a boy under 18 years of age was serving, under the circumstances spoken of, would be drawn to attack by the enemy, not ordered by our own Navy.

Mr. HILL. Will the Senator from Maryland yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. HILL. I submit that it does not make any difference how the attack comes; if they exchange fire, as they no doubt will do—and certainly our ship, as the Senator from Maryland has said, will be trying to get in the first lick—then the boy will be in combat. The ships will be in combat, and he will be in combat.

Mr. WALSH. The strong word in this amendment is "ordered." It is to prevent ordering a man into combat, either in the Army or the Navy, until he has had a prescribed amount of training. I emphasize again the word "ordered." I think it is a false interpretation, and an extension of the real purpose and intent, to claim that if a boy who is only 4 months in service meets an enemy who shoots at him, he would not be justified in combating the attack under the circumstances.

Mr. HILL. Will the Senator from Maryland yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. HILL. The boy of whom I speak would be acting under orders. Every man on the ship would be under orders. Can anyone conceive of a worse or more confusing situation than to have them not under orders?

Mr. WALSH. According to the Senator's interpretation, Congress would never have a right to suggest that a boy get even 1 month's training. The purpose of the amendment is to inform the Army and Navy that they are not to take raw recruits, without a certain degree of training, and order them into combat service.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, if the Senator from Massachusetts will allow me to interrupt him, it seems to me that in order to carry out the philosophy of his amendment—and I see what he is driving at—it would have to carry some connotation such as this, "wherever it can be anticipated," or "directly."

Mr. WALSH. My amendment is an attempt to modify the force of the amendment of the Senator from Tennessee, and to give the Navy's interpretation of the amendment so that it should not be denied the opportunity of training its enlisted personnel who enter through the draft from receiving their early training on naval vessels.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Maryland yield to me?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. CHANDLER. I think all of us recognize that the rough service is the Infantry, the walking soldier. The Navy is getting volunteers, because the fellow who waits to be drafted now and expresses a preference for the Navy has literally no chance; he is put in the Infantry right away. The Navy is getting the benefit of that situation, and young men are volunteering, because except for

the time a Navy man is actually involved in combat, he lives with some degree of comfort on a ship, while he is training, or while he is in a fight, and the one who is training on a ship would not necessarily be on a combat ship, on a battleship or cruiser or destroyer. He would not have been ordered to combat.

Of course, as I said a few days ago, it makes no difference what kind of a law we pass, if someone shoots at one of our boys and he has something with which to shoot back, he is not going to say, "I am sorry, Congress says that until I get 6 months' training I cannot shoot at you." Whatever he has he is going to throw at the enemy, that is certain.

Mr. TYDINGS. The Senator from Kentucky has put his finger on what I think we could logically accomplish, rather than try to accept something which, in my judgment, is not humanly workable. I think we are almost down to the situation where the Congress of the United States calls on the War Department and the Navy Department not to use men under 19 years of age until they have had 6 months' training, wherever it can be conceivably possible. It is theoretically possible for a submarine to come up and shell a camp along the Atlantic Coast, and we would not have time then to get word out to tell all the 18-year-olds to go 10 miles to the rear, that the remainder were going to see what they could do about it. In my opinion, we have an idea here, but we have not the language to carry it into effect logically.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Maryland yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. MAGNUSON. What the Senator says shows how impracticable it is to try to legislate for this purpose. It is true that most men in the Navy today are not inductees. That is because, I say to the Senator from Kentucky, the Navy is a much better service, in the opinion of most boys. Nevertheless, not all the young men who want to go into the Navy, can be taken care of. But suppose the Pacific war became primarily a naval war, and the Navy were not getting the number of men required; they would have to draft men; and there was a time when they had to. We put them through 90 days' boot training, then they are assigned to a cruiser, an aircraft carrier, or a destroyer, all combat ships.

I ask the proponents of this amendment, what are they going to do with the men at the end of the 90-day period, when they finish their boot training? The cruiser might be used in combat right away.

The sentiment behind the amendment is fine, but I do not know how it can be worked out for the Navy training. The Army presents a different story. The Infantry presents a different story. But I do not know how it could be worked out in the Navy.

Mr. TYDINGS. The Senator has suggested in substance what we can do, that is, request the Army and Navy not to take into combat boys under 19 years of age, wherever it is conceivably practicable. But without putting the words

"conceivably practicable" in the amendment, I do not think the officials can function under such an amendment.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. WALSH. In my opinion, if the word "practicable" were inserted in the amendment of the Senator from Tennessee, we might as well have nothing at all. The reason for my amendment is that the Navy wanted it clearly understood that the provisions of the amendment of the Senator from Tennessee should not be construed as being broad enough to prevent training on naval vessels.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Of course, we have some training, but we have not enough. The men have to be put on board ship at some place.

Mr. WALSH. Some kind of ship; yes.

Mr. HAWKES. Mr. President, will the Senator from Maryland yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. HAWKES. I should like to see if an addition I may suggest to the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts would cover his point. His amendments provides:

This proviso shall not be construed as preventing the assignment of enlisted men of the Navy or Coast Guard and its reserve components thereof to duty for training on vessels of the Navy or Coast Guard.

I suggest adding the words "not being directed into combat."

Mr. TYDINGS. At the time of assignment?

Mr. HAWKES. Yes.

Mr. TYDINGS. Or a day after assignment?

Mr. HAWKES. Any time.

Mr. TYDINGS. If they should be directed into combat, as the Senator knows, the day after they were assigned, the whole purpose of the amendment would be defeated.

Mr. HAWKES. I am saying it would not prevent enlisted men from being put on these vessels provided the vessels were not being directed into combat.

Mr. TYDINGS. The point I make is that after 3 months' training, if a man is attached to a ship within a week thereafter, but the ship is not being directed into combat, but is at sea for training purposes, and thereafter a situation evolves which makes it necessary to send that ship into combat, there would be no way of getting men who had not had the 6 months' training off the ship.

Mr. HAWKES. I thought the Senator had the point in mind that the man would have to fight if there were a submarine present and the boat on which he was placed were attacked. Perhaps I have not made my point clear. The point I am trying to make is that the purpose is not to send the sailor into combat on that vessel.

Mr. TYDINGS. Let us assume that the amendment the Senator offers is agreed to. The man in question has performed his 90 days' training. Ten days thereafter he is assigned to Cruiser X. Cruiser X is not intended to go into combat for another 5 months. So the men are out on a training cruise 500 miles offshore when a great naval battle looms and it is necessary to send every avail-

able ship into that fight. The man in question is on that vessel. He is at sea. According to law, if the amendment were agreed to, it would be illegal for that ship to take part in the battle. That was the point I was making. I am not taking issue with what the Senator is attempting to do, but I do not think anyone has done it yet by any of the amendments suggested.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, may I say that we have very few training ships in the Navy. I would wager that 90 percent of the men in boot training are on board the ships on which they are going to serve, and all the ships we have are being used as potential combat ships. May I place in the Record the fact that we are still relying on inductions in the Navy. Last month 13,700 men were required to be inducted into the Navy. We did not have a sufficient number of volunteers.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I should like to say a brief word in my own behalf.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, before the Senator does that, will he yield to me?

Mr. TYDINGS. I should like to yield to the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] before I begin. He has been standing for a considerable time waiting for me to yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, it seems to me we are rather straining our interpretation of the original amendment. The amendment provides that "no man * * * shall be ordered into actual combat service," and so forth. In the illustration the Senator from Maryland gave of men who were in training on the ship when a submarine attacked it, that would not be ordering the men on the ship into combat service. That would be combat action overtaking them.

Mr. TYDINGS. But the other point I make is that after they are on the vessel in training, and a naval action takes place somewhere, and the naval authorities think it is necessary to make every ship available to go to that area, and they flash word for the ship to proceed to Leyte, or wherever it might be, would not that be ordering the ship into action before the 6 months' period of training was completed?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Under those circumstances, that is true.

Mr. TYDINGS. That is the objection I make to the amendment.

Mr. McCLELLAN. If I correctly understand the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts, it would protect the Navy under such circumstances.

Mr. WALSH. The amendment was prepared so as to prevent the amendment offered by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. STEWART] from forbidding the Navy ordering on any vessel at any time any enlisted man in the Navy, for fear he might sometimes get into combat.

Mr. McCLELLAN. In other words, if the amendment proposed by the Senator from Massachusetts is adopted, the Navy would feel free to place such men on ships which might be called into combat, and therefore the amendment of the Senator from Tennessee would not prohibit it.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. HILL. I wonder if the Senator from Maryland has examined the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts. His amendment would put men in the land forces, which means the Army, under this inhibition, but not men in the naval forces. Is that the purpose of the amendment?

Mr. WALSH. No, Mr. President; there was an error in the printing. The only part of my amendment that is a modification of the Senator's amendment commences in line 8.

Mr. HILL. Beginning with the words "this proviso shall not be construed?"

Mr. WALSH. Yes.

Mr. HILL. In other words, as I understand, when the Senator offers his amendment he will modify it by striking out lines 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 down to the semicolon, so it will begin with the words "this proviso shall not be construed?"

Mr. WALSH. Yes; the Senator from Tennessee will accept that part of my amendment.

Mr. STEWART. Yes. Will the Senator from Maryland yield to me?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. STEWART. I was about to call attention to that very thing. The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. BAILEY] called my attention to it. In the print of the amendment intended to be proposed, identified as "amendment intended to be proposed by Mr. WALSH" the words "or naval" are left out. That is an error made by the printer in printing the amendment intended to be proposed by the Senator from Massachusetts, which was asked to be printed merely for the information of the Senate.

Mr. President, I accepted the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts, but not the entire print that is on the table. I accepted the amendment as I understood it, beginning at line 8; which reads:

This proviso shall not be construed as preventing the assignment of enlisted men of the Navy or Coast Guard, and the Reserve components thereof, to duty for training on vessels of the Navy or Coast Guard and at naval bases beyond the continental limits of the United States.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment has been so modified.

Mr. STEWART. Then do I make it clear that I intended to accept that portion of the amendment intended to be proposed by the Senator from Massachusetts, from line 8 on down, as I have read?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk has the amendment at the desk.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. In order to meet the objection of the Senator from Maryland, I suggest a further amendment to the Walsh amendment, which now is as follows:

This proviso shall not be construed as preventing the assignment of enlisted men of the Navy or Coast Guard and the reserve components thereof to duty for training on

vessels of the Navy or Coast Guard and at naval bases beyond the continental limits of the United States.

It seems to me that naval training is a very different thing from Army training. There is no objection to assigning a man to a ship shortly after his boot training, and it seems to me that the Senator might suppose that when the amendment provides "training on vessels of the Navy," it means training vessels. I do not think the amendment meant that when the Senator offered it, and I would suggest that it might read "duty for training on combat vessels of the Navy or Coast Guard."

That is what I think the amendment should mean.

Mr. TYDINGS. Under the case I visualize, of course, if the vessel were needed quickly it would be sent to the area where it was needed.

Mr. TAFT. It would be sent to the area where it was needed. That is obviously correct. I wonder if the Senator from Tennessee would be willing to add the word I suggest to the Walsh proviso.

Mr. TYDINGS. Just a moment. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator from Ohio if his proposal applies to all enlisted men, both inductees and volunteers, or simply the one group only.

Mr. TAFT. I had not considered that point. I merely wanted to suggest that men could be placed on combat vessels for training, and clearly if they are combat vessels then the men go on combat vessels, that is all.

Mr. TYDINGS. And does it apply to marines who are stationed on battleships, and who are land fighters, and who will be sent ashore if it is necessary under the case we visualize before the 6 months have expired? I am not saying that in any captious sort of way, but it seems to me that if we are attempting to establish a policy it would be unfair to take an 18-year-old boy in the Marines and let him charge up to the top of Suribachi on Iwo Jima and then allow the Army counterpart the opposite privilege or restriction.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. I do not think it should include Marines. The Marines are not trained on the ships and, so far as I know, the Marines who have been sent abroad have been trained for far more than 6 months. I doubt if any Marine replacements have been sent abroad without having received 12 months' training. I do not believe that the exception should apply to Marines. I myself think they should have 6 months of land training just like a soldier. A sailor on a ship has his friends around him, he is not subjected to individual attack, so to speak, and it seems to me he ought to be properly excepted from the entire provision.

Mr. TYDINGS. And that would prevail whether he was a volunteer or an inductee?

Mr. TAFT. Yes. I am only making a suggestion, not proposing an amendment.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Let me say to the Senator from Ohio that, although the Navy has some training ships, there are not nearly enough training ships to afford 3 months' training on training ships for all the men who come out of boot camp.

Let us assume that a man leaves the Great Lakes boot camp. He is assigned and receives his orders to proceed to San Francisco to board the cruiser *Cincinnati*. He goes aboard the cruiser *Cincinnati*. The cruiser *Cincinnati* is a combat ship. The minute it "hoists the hook" in San Francisco Harbor it becomes a combat ship. He finishes training aboard ship. If the Navy could not do that, it would have piled up in all the ports of embarkation men who had finished boot training at Great Lakes or Farragut and who were waiting for 6 months to elapse before they could board the ship to which they were assigned.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, the Senator must have misunderstood me. He is not telling me anything that I do not know. My suggestion was to insert the word "combat" before "vessels" so that it would be clear, beyond any question, that the men could be sent to combat vessels. That was my suggestion.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. CHANDLER. I ask Navy and Marine Corps supporters to be reasonable. Only about 2 or 3 percent of the 500,000 men in the Marine Corps have been inducted. The rest are volunteers. They have had superb training. They have had maximum training. The Navy may use some of those men, of course. It gets the pick of the volunteers. There is no more rugged service than that of the GI soldier who wades through the mud with his gun. He has the roughest time of all. This is an amendment for the benefit of the infantryman. Let us give the hard-pressed Infantry soldiers a little relief.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. STEWART. Of course, we are assuming a purely imaginary condition. As I understand, through an agreement with the Army, the Navy does not now get any men under 20 years of age. I venture the assertion that, as a matter of policy, all the younger men are going to the Army. It is my opinion that today there is not a seaman in the United States Navy under 19 years of age who has not had 6 months' training. So we are assuming a perfectly imaginary condition. If, when the war turns in full force to the Pacific, such a thing as has been debated occurs, we can consider the matter again and repeal any laws which may hamper the operations of our armed forces, either on sea or on land. I am trying to view the problem in a realistic light. I venture the assertion that today there is not a man in the United States Navy under 19 years of age who has not had 6 months' training. So we are dealing with an imaginary situation.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. HILL. On the question of the number of inductees entering the naval service, last month the Navy got 29,541 of the men who came in under selective service.

Mr. STEWART. What were their ages?

Mr. HILL. I cannot give the breakdown by ages. Some of them were 18 years of age.

Mr. STEWART. I understand that since the first of the year the Navy has not received a man under 20 years of age.

Mr. HILL. The Senator's understanding is incorrect.

Mr. STEWART. No; I have the information.

Mr. HILL. Starting in October 1944, there were 24,247—

Mr. STEWART. What were their ages? We are dealing here only with men under the age of 19.

Mr. HILL. I understand; but in that number there were bound to be some under the age of 19.

Mr. STEWART. I understand not.

Mr. HILL. The Selective Service has not culled out the men under 19. The Navy gets its proportionate part.

Mr. STEWART. I have been informed to the contrary.

Mr. HILL. I believe the Senator's information is incorrect.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President—

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield to me?

Mr. TYDINGS. I will permit the Senator to complete his statement, after which I will decline to yield further.

Mr. HILL. I wish to call attention to the fact that in the month of April the Navy received 27,500 inductees.

In connection with the Marine Corps, and what it was to receive, I have before me a letter from the Secretary of the Navy dated April 19, or Thursday of last week, addressed to Hon. DAVID I. WALSH, chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate. Secretary Forrestal had this to say:

As to the Marine Corps, it is the present practice, even under the extreme combat pressure and high casualties encountered, to afford recruits 5 months' training in the United States and further training in a combat unit on the advanced fronts which is in preparation for future operations. It is the experience of the Marine Corps, based on its combat record, that this training is adequate.

One further word, and then I shall let the Senator from Maryland make his speech. Just as there must be training on ships for Navy men, so there must be training in divisions for Army men.

Mr. TYDINGS. What the Senator just read referred to the Marine Corps.

Mr. HILL. The Marine Corps is very similar to the Army. When a man finishes his boot training in the Navy, as the Senator from Washington has stated, he must be placed on a real, honest-to-God ship, to proceed with his training so that he can take his place as a part of the team on the ship. In the same way, when a man finishes his basic training in the Army, he must be placed in a division,

so that he may receive training which will enable him to take his place on the team, the team being the division.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, all I have to say about my own position is that I look with a great deal of favor on the effort by the military and the Congress to give every man—even those over the age of 18 or 19—6 months' training before they are thrown into an active theater of war, as being in the best interests of ultimate victory.

A moment ago the Senator from Alabama read certain figures, to the effect that in recent months, out of 8,000,000 men in the Army, only 10,000 under the age of 19, who had not had quite 6 months' training, were in combat areas, and sometimes in combat. It seems to me that the Army is trying to accomplish in practice what we are trying by law to compel it to do. I have reached the conclusion that perhaps, all things considered, the Army is doing what we wish to have done as well as it can be done.

To begin with, there can be very little logic in requiring an inductee to have 6 months' training, and not requiring a volunteer to have 6 months' training, if there is anything at all in training.

Secondly, in my judgment it is just as important for a man over 19 years of age to have 6 months' training as it is for a man under 19 years of age to have such training. In my judgment, the man over 20 years of age would need the 6 months' training a great deal more than would the man who is 19 years of age.

Sharing, as I do, the opinion of those who have sponsored these amendments, it is rather difficult for me to find the means of achieving the desired result much better than it is now being realized.

The Marine Corps is quite similar to the Army. Its primary operation is to land somewhere and fight on land. Its greatest fame has been based upon such operations throughout its history, and throughout all the days of this war.

I am not speaking in opposition to this amendment, but I do not believe it practicable in its present form. Nor do I believe that it would ever be carried out on the field, because of situations which will arise which cannot be visualized at the time a man is assigned to a ship, regiment, or other unit. I believe that before writing such a rigid requirement into law, it should be further considered. Considering the scope of the operations abroad, and the number of men over there who have not had 6 months' training, and who might have been utilized, I believe that the very fact that only 10,000 men have had less than 6 months' training is a high tribute to those who are directing our armies.

As we know, the situation in the Navy is vastly different. The only way for a man to receive training in the Navy is to go on a ship. There is no way in God's world to learn how to fire the guns of a ship, or to be a part of the ship's life, without serving on the ship. As the Senator from Washington has pointed out, if all of them were required to have 6 months' training first, there would be a 3 months' hiatus when the training would virtually stop, and a man would not be progressing military-wise at all. Therefore I make the recommendation

that before we adopt the amendment, the committee should give it further study. We had better not adopt it in its present sketchy and indefinite form.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TYDINGS. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. I have been concerned with this question for some months. In February I spoke in the Senate concerning the case of a boy who was killed a little more than 5 months after he was inducted. Since that time I have received more than 3,000 letters from all over the United States, citing many similar cases. I have referred to some of them today—those who were killed at some time between 5 and 6 months after they were inducted into the Army. For a long time the Army said they needed 17 weeks of training. Then they skimped it down to 15 weeks of training. Finally they got down in some cases to 13 weeks of training. The regular rule was that just as soon as those boys received that training they were sent home on 10-day furloughs, and then they went to Camp Meade, and then immediately were shipped abroad. I do not know about the 10,000 who have been referred to, but I say that practically every 19-year-old boy who was inducted during the period from June to September followed the same course, and that thousands of them were sent abroad within four months from the time when they were inducted, and that many of them reached the front within 5 months from the time when they were inducted, and that many of them were wounded or killed after that time.

Mr. President, I should like to have printed in the RECORD a letter I wrote to the Secretary of War on March 12, which I now read in part:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Since February 27, when I called attention in the Senate to the fact that many 18-year-old boys had been killed or wounded within 7 months—

At that time I said 7 months, but these cases show it has been less than that—of the time when they were inducted into the Army, I have received literally thousands of letters protesting without exception against the apparent War Department policy of sending 18-year-old boys to the front immediately upon the completion of their basic 15 weeks' training. Many instances have been cited with clippings which show that a large number of boys have been killed or wounded less than 6 months after their induction, and long before they were 19 years of age.

When the first draft bill was passed, the statement was made that men could not be trained short of 15 months. Congress finally enacted legislation based on the theory that 12 months was the proper period.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. HILL. The Senator has stated that the bill was passed on the basis of the understanding that men could not be trained in less than 15 months. I do not think the Senator should say that the theory was that men could not be trained in less than that period of time. The theory was that divisions could not be trained in less than 12 months' time. As the Senator must know, there is a vast difference between the training of an in-

dividual soldier and his preparation to become a member of a team and the training of the great team or division, which constitutes 15,000 or 20,000 men. There is the greatest difference in the world between training a team of 15,000 or 20,000 men and training an individual.

Mr. TAFT. That is quite true. It is quite true that General Marshall demanded 18 months of training when we started. Subsequently he testified that he accepted 12 months' training as a compromise, but that in his opinion 15 months of training had always been necessary. Of course, that included the training of divisions. However, at that time he had the National Guard divisions all formed, and they were going to put the new trainees into the National Guard divisions. So we had at least started on the formation of new divisions. The actual situation is not at all clear from the testimony submitted at the time. The distinction was not one which was clearly made.

When we argued whether an 18-year-old boy should be put into the Army, and when the argument was made that they were too young, the Army and everyone else said, "Well, they will not go into combat service until they are 19 years old." Perhaps they did not intend that, but that is what they said at that time. There was not a flat statement that such men could not be properly trained in less than 12 months, if divisions had already been formed; but the implication was perfectly clear to the people of the country that the men would be in the Army a year before they would go into active service.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. I think all the statements to which the Senator from Ohio has referred were made, but I think they are subject to some misinterpretation. In appearing before the Appropriations Committee to obtain money for camps and training, General Marshall said that he had to start out with a very small trained force, that he had to dilute that force in order to extend it and train green men. He said that when he got those men adequately trained or approximately trained, he had to dilute the force again, until he could bring about a reasonable degree of efficiency throughout the whole Army.

After General Marshall has gotten what is basically a splendidly trained army, with division, brigade, army, and corps training thrown in, and with equipment in addition, he said it would not thereafter take the length of time to develop a good soldier that it would take in the beginning, when he had only a small trained army and millions of new men to train quickly, with the result that the dilution was so terrific that he could not get the desired efficiency in less than a year or 15 months.

Mr. TAFT. At any rate, in the Senate we adopted an amendment providing that no boy should be sent into combat service sooner than 1 year after he was inducted.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. HILL. I know the Senator from Ohio desires to be fair to General Marshall. I take strong exception to having the Senator create the impression that General Marshall ever said to the Senate or to the country that the individual soldier would receive or would require 12 months of training. The truth is that when the question of lowering the age limit under the Selective Training and Service Act was before the Congress, with the proposal that the age limit be reduced to 18 years, General Marshall wrote a letter to the then chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Senator Reynolds, of North Carolina, under date of October 23, 1942, in which he said, among other things:

A rifleman—

Mr. President, who is a rifleman? He is the infantryman, the one we have been talking about all afternoon—

A rifleman, when he finishes his 13 weeks of basic training, is prepared to take his place in an experienced squad at any time. If 8 or 10 men in the squad have had team training, the trained rifleman can be inserted in the squad without detriment either to himself or to his unit.

I could give you many other examples where it would be unnecessary and undesirable to hold a man out of a combat theater for 12 months. It would be almost impossible for the Army to operate under any such mandate. We would, in effect, have to put thousands upon thousands of men "on the shelf" after their essential training had been completed, before we could use them. In the Air Corps alone possibly 500,000 such men would be involved.

Incidentally the Navy and the Marine Corps enlist men of 17, and I am told that the average age of the entire corps is below 20.

He specifically said that he could give many instances when it would be undesirable and unnecessary to hold men out of combat until they had received 12 months of training.

Mr. TAFT. However, Mr. President, we passed a bill providing that they should be held out of combat for 12 months, and that bill went to conference. Subsequently we received the letter of October 23, 1942, from General Marshall, and also a letter from the President of the United States, addressed to the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. GURNEY], reading as follows:

MY DEAR SENATOR: Concerning the proposed legislation to lower the selective-service age now before the Senate, I have been told that several limitations will be proposed in the form of amendments. It appears to me that the complicated administration necessarily involved in the handling of large numbers of men in the Army as well as the urgent necessity for correcting the present deficiencies as to age, make it important that limitations other than those now included in the bill be avoided.

The emphasis was all on the difficulty of administration. While General Marshall says that an individual can be trained in less than 12 months, he has indicated that after the basic training has been received he must be given some additional training; that he cannot step from the basic training directly into active combat. That is the policy which the Army has adopted within the past 6 months.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. HILL. There is another thing which the Senator must realize. He speaks about the emphasis being placed upon the difficulty of administration. When that letter was written in October 1942, we had been at war for less than a year. We were then in the process of forming and activating new divisions. Nearly all those divisions had to be given anywhere from a year to 18 months of training. So our problem then was different than it is now. That is the reason General Marshall at that time did not lay emphasis on the efficiency of divisions as he does today. The situation was entirely different. The Senator realizes that 2½ years have passed since that letter was written. In the meantime all our divisions have been sent overseas.

Mr. TAFT. For the reasons which the Senator has stated I voted against the proposal to require 12 months' training. But at that time, and at no time since then, has anyone claimed that a man can be properly trained for active combat service in the Army in less than 6 months. I do not believe the Senator can point to any statement made by any responsible official of the Government to the contrary. They have said that at times it was necessary to use men who had not been properly trained; but, so far as I know, neither General Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson, nor any other prominent official of the Government has said up to this time that any man can be trained for the Infantry service in less than 6 months.

Mr. HILL. General Marshall has never said that he had to use men who were not properly trained. He said that there were cases in which he had to use men who had not received a full 6 months of training. But the Senator cannot refer to any statement made by General Marshall in which he said that men had been used in combat service who had not been properly trained.

Mr. TAFT. I read from a letter which I sent to Secretary of War Stimson under date of March 12, 1944:

I quite realize the emergency situation which arose in December, but the letters which I have received appear to show an almost uniform practice of sending 18-year-old replacements directly from the point of debarkation to the front. I wish to ask whether that practice cannot be changed so that young boys sent abroad may have some time and some training with units which are in reserve or behind the line, before they are actually sent into combat. The present practice appears on the surface to be not only unfair to the boys themselves but not very helpful to the units which receive green recruits in the midst of a battle.

I should be obliged for such statement of War Department policy in this regard as you care to give me.

In order to be completely fair, Mr. President, I desire to read the reply which I received from Secretary Stimson under date of March 31, 1944, which states the War Department's case:

DEAR SENATOR TAFT: I have your letter of March 12 regarding the replacement training received by 18-year-olds and suggesting that these men be given additional train-

ing overseas before they arrive in combat areas.

In my statement on the subject to the press on March 1, I mentioned, in passing, that oftentimes the Infantry replacements receive additional training overseas. A copy of the statement is attached for your information. I also am enclosing two additional statements which may provide a further understanding of the steps we have taken to insure proper training for Infantry replacements. You may find of particular interest the attached description of the division reinforcement training center established at the instance of Maj. Gen. Terry Allen. I believe General Allen's comments bear directly upon your suggestion that the 18-year-olds receive additional training overseas.

It seems to me that the Secretary admits in his letter that the military authorities are trying to provide the additional training, that it should be provided, but that in order to be properly trained a man should have some training with his unit overseas after he arrives if his training in this country has been of only 17 weeks' duration.

Secretary Stimson proceeds:

I believe you are aware that our most pressing need from now on will be Infantry replacements. Our monthly calls on Selective Service are 100,000 a month, which is barely enough to provide the necessary number of men physically qualified for Infantry training. Actually, the full monthly quotas for which we have asked have not been provided by the Selective Service System. The reasons for this are numerous. In order to meet our needs Selective Service had to screen and rescreen the remaining manpower in the Nation. Agricultural and industrial deferments have made large manpower blocks unavailable, with the result—and I believe this is not generally understood—that it is unavoidable that the younger age groups must be called and constitute a considerable percentage of those who are called.

Since our most pressing need is for infantrymen, it likewise is absolutely necessary that the majority of the newly inducted men, including those in the younger age group, now enter Infantry training.

In the final analysis, Infantry is the arm which wins battles. Likewise, it is the arm which suffers the heaviest casualties. Infantry bore the brunt of the German offensive in the Ardennes. In order to withstand that offensive it was necessary that infantry be used unstintingly. All available replacements were used to maintain the strength of the infantry units so that the fight could be successfully continued. As a result, the Ardennes offensive failed.

I may say that I do not believe it can be shown that by putting these younger men in without having given them any training there was any material effect on the Ardennes offensive.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. How does the Senator know that the Ardennes offensive did not fail because 18-year-old boys were there to help stop the Germans?

Mr. TAFT. From all the testimony and statements I have heard on the part of the men who took part in the other war, an officer in combat would rather have 20 men with previous training than 80 men without it. I believe that they will say that replacements arriving in the middle of a battle are not of much help to them.

Mr. McMAHON. I cannot understand how the Senator can put his judgment

against that of generals who were on the field of battle, and who have spoken with reference to the necessity of using the troops which were used. The fact remains that with the use of those troops the German offensive was stopped. Our officers did not put anybody into combat who was not needed, and they put everybody in on whom they could lay their hands.

Mr. TAFT. If a unit which had been in reserve had been moved into the active sector, it might have had some effect on the outcome. However, I cannot believe that any military officer will say that the addition of a few raw recruits in the middle of a battle has any actual effect on the result of the conflict. After talking with military men, I am quite willing to place my judgment on that point against that of Secretary Stimson even after he has talked with military men.

Mr. McMAHON. I may say that I would much prefer to accept the judgment of men whom we have charged with the responsibility of leading our forces, than to accept the judgment of the Senator from Ohio upon the necessity of using men who are available.

Mr. TAFT. I have never had any doubt that the Senator would prefer accepting the judgment which he has indicated.

Mr. McMAHON. I am glad the Senator from Ohio has not been disappointed.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, it seems fairly obvious that the reason these men were all used, whether it did any good or not, was that the Army had made a gross miscalculation as to the number of infantrymen who were required. They have not trained enough infantrymen from the beginning, and they got themselves into a hole, it is true. I do not think there would have been any difference if we had placed the year's training requirement or the 6 months' training requirement in the law.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, I think the Senator from Ohio is absolutely correct in that statement. When the Army makes a mistake, there is no Senator or citizen of the country who does not regret it, and we do not want to magnify it and call attention to it, because really that will not do any good. But they did make a mistake as to the number of infantrymen required, and they had to take men out of the Air Corps and put them into the Infantry in order to get a sufficient number. That might not have been true except for the fact that our brave allies, who fought long and hard, did not have the men to put into the offensive, and we had to supply a great number of men in the actual fighting.

I do not wish to go along with those who insist that the Army and the generals never make mistakes, because they do make mistakes, just as the rest of us do. The American people are deeply concerned, because when the generals make mistakes, the American people have to pay for them with the lives of their sons.

Mr. TAFT. I thank the Senator, and agree with him.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I did not hear the first part of the letter of the

Secretary of War. Does the Secretary of War in his letter say anything about the almost complete break-down of our intelligence service, which permitted the enemy to bring up a large army unobserved, and effect the Ardennes breakthrough?

Mr. TAFT. No; that is not discussed. I now proceed with the letter, Mr. President:

Our field commanders realize far better than anyone else that a replacement who has received additional training in a quiet sector or in a reserve unit is better than a replacement who has not.

That seems to me a perfectly clear statement, that we would be better off if these men did have 6 months' training, or even longer, so far as that is concerned.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. CHANDLER. The Senator from Ohio has referred to what happened in the last war. According to the Baker report, every American soldier who went overseas—and there were more than 2,000,000, about 2,050,000, in fact—had 6 months' training before he went overseas. Then those soldiers had 2 months' additional training, and went into a quiet sector before they went into the line. The service seemed to have been better organized than it is at this time, even though we have sent 5,150,000 men overseas, according to the report made in February.

Mr. TAFT. I think it is clear that everyone agrees that the training is necessary. The Secretary's real answer is this:

Unfortunately, during the past several months we have had few reserve units and fewer quiet sectors. Our field commanders have had no choice but to employ every means at their disposal, including replacements newly arrived. To forbid them to use all the means available in grave emergencies or when swift exploitation may mean great success would contravene every precept of successful military operations. Actually, our field commanders have generally followed the practice of giving replacements additional training in the theaters before they are committed to battle. This was true in Tunisia and Italy, and is true when circumstances permit, in the active theaters today. Various reports from the European theater indicate that such training, when it can be given, is thorough and good. You will note the intensiveness of the program in the attached comments of General Allen. Another example is a recent report from the Mediterranean theater which states that divisions in the Fifth Army have an assigned overstrength of 5,000 men which was deliberately ordered so that future replacements for those divisions might be provided the additional training to which you refer.

It must always be borne in mind in time of war, however, that emergencies, which are the rule and not the exception, will at times prevent such training overseas, and in such cases our commanders must not be hampered by arbitrary restrictions. They must be allowed to use all means under their control in the manner in which their best judgment dictates.

Our opposition to the statutory training restriction to which you refer was not based solely upon our desire to avoid administrative difficulties involved in the retention of young soldiers for specified periods in the United States. This played a part, of course,

since the administrative difficulties would have been enormous. Our greatest concern was derived from our knowledge that recurrent, urgent needs would develop for additional manpower during emergencies unavoidable in war. These emergencies have occurred. This is now the peak of our national effort, and we are straining our entire replacement system in an effort to meet the manpower demands overseas. There doubtless would have been catastrophic results had our hands been tied by a statutory restriction during these past critical months.

Mr. President, I think Secretary Stimson makes the strongest statement that can be made, but it does not convince me. In the first place, he admits the soldiers should have this training if we want them to be good fighters. It does not convince me, because I believe very strongly that if the Army were properly organized, if they had had in the statute in the beginning this provision, the 6 months' restriction, no boys would have been sent abroad before they had been in the Army 6 months, we would not have cut down the 17 months, and we would have found the necessary replacements among the 1,400,000 men who, the Secretary said on March 30, were in this country marked for shipment overseas, ready, almost, to go overseas, men of all ages, so that, so far as I can see, it was completely unnecessary to send the 18-year-old boys overseas in order to provide the replacements. It is perfectly clear to me that they did not need to go, that the Army did not have to have them under the circumstances, and that there was no tremendous emergency which required that, except that they happened to be the men at that particular point at that time.

So far as I know, I have never received a letter indicating that any boy had gone into combat in the Pacific area with less than 6 months training. There have been boys in the Atlantic area shipped abroad after 4 or 5 months, but so far as I know, I have received no letter stating that any boy was injured in 6 months, or even 8 months, from the time he was inducted and sent to the Pacific area. I see no reason why that policy cannot be established in the European theater. If there was a crisis, the crisis is over; and the amendment provides no serious restriction.

The marines get combat training at home. They are taken to California and spend 2 or 3 or 4 months practicing landing on various islands which have been set aside for that purpose. There is no reason I can see why soldiers cannot be treated in the same way in some combat training in the United States, even if there are not any activated divisions.

Certainly we are not asking anything unusual when we ask that a man shall have at least 6 months' training before he is actually sent into combat service. I do not believe any Army officer will say that a man sent in without 6 months' training is adequately trained for the combat service to which we are sending him. It is not fair to him, it is not fair to the unit. If properly organized in advance, any intelligent policy should require that the men who actually go into battle be adequately trained for the task they are sent to perform.

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ATROCITIES
IN EUROPE

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I submit a resolution and ask unanimous consent for its present consideration.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will read the resolution.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Whereas General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe, requested by radio on April 19, 1945, that Members of Congress go to Europe for personal inspection of the conditions of unspeakable horror at Nazi concentration camps for political prisoners;

Whereas, in response to the invitation of the War Department that six Members of the Senate go to Europe in accordance with the request of General Eisenhower, the following Members of the Senate have gone to Europe: The Senator from Kentucky, Mr. BARKLEY; the Senator from Georgia, Mr. GEORGE; the Senator from Utah, Mr. THOMAS; the Senator from Illinois, Mr. BROOKS; the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. WHERRY; and the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. SALTONSTALL; and

Whereas it is important that the Senate have an official and permanent record concerning the conditions in such camps and concerning the treatment otherwise accorded by the Germans, and their allies in Europe, during the present war to political prisoners and to other civilians in the areas occupied by them: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Members of Senate above-named are hereby constituted a committee of the Senate; and such committee is hereby authorized and directed to make a study and investigation with respect to the treatment accorded by the Germans, and their allies in Europe, during the present war to political prisoners and to other civilians in the areas occupied by them. The committee shall report to the Senate from time to time the results of its study and investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, at this time I am compelled to object to the request for present consideration of the resolution.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold his objection for a moment?

Mr. WHITE. Yes.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. I shall vote for the resolution if it comes to a vote. However, I think it is a bad precedent for Members individually to appoint what afterwards turns out to be a Senate committee, and then after the committee is appointed, initiate the formal proceedings and make the committee an entity of the Senate. Some time ago four or five Senators were selected and became an entity of the Senate, and went around the world, without really any Senate action. I think members of the Foreign Relations Committee without regard to seniority, who were deserving of support when momentous events were taking place, have been overlooked in some cases. Hereafter, I think the Senate would be wise if it were to discontinue the practice of having these committees which are self-appointed in the name of the Senate.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. HATCH. I certainly feel at liberty to reply to the Senator from Maryland on this question, because it was upon my suggestion earlier today, perhaps inadvertently made, that the resolution was drafted.

Mr. TYDINGS. I think the resolution is a good one.

Mr. HATCH. I think so too. I wish to say in behalf of the Senate of the United States and the Members who have gone overseas, that I know personally that the majority leader, the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY] went overseas against his wishes, against every personal claim a man might have. I do not want to go into the personal matters. If it is insisted upon, I will do so. I wish to say with respect to the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] that there never has been a braver man in the Senate of the United States than he. If Senators want me to go into details about him I will do so.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alabama yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. I have no disposition to asperse the Senator from Georgia or the Senator from Kentucky or any other member of the committee. I am calling attention not to the character of its personnel, but to the manner of its appointment. I do not like to have a committee appointed after it has left the country on official business as the committee of the Senate. That ought to precede its departure if it is to represent the Senate. Otherwise they go as individuals and not as representatives of this body.

I am not criticizing in the slightest way any member of the committee. I grant that a better committee could not have been selected. The point I make is that it ought to have been appointed by the Chair or selected by some committee in pursuance of a resolution adopted, and not by one-man procedure.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. HATCH. I wish to add one further thought. I was very earnest about this matter earlier today because I knew something about the conditions under which these Senators went overseas. I do not agree and never have agreed to any department of Government appointing any Member of the Senate of the United States upon a committee. But I know the emergency which arose, and the conditions under which these Senators went to Europe. As servants of the Senate they went at their own personal sacrifice.

Mr. President, I say that in now adopting the resolution, thus ordering the Senators to go and giving them authority, the Senate honors itself, whereas if it rejects the resolution or if objection is made to its consideration, the Senate dishonors itself and dishonors its own representatives.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alabama yield to me?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. WHITE. The Senator from New Mexico has used harsh language.

Mr. HATCH. No, Mr. President.

Mr. WHITE. The Senator has used harsh language both with respect to whatever the Senator from Kentucky did and with respect to my participation in the action.

Mr. HATCH. Did I use harsh language?

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, we have been using language rather loosely here. We have talked about a committee, but I want to assure the Senate that the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY] knows what his authority is, and he knows the limitations of his authority. He knows that without Senate authority he could not appoint a committee of the Senate or a subcommittee of the Senate. Difficult as some may find it to believe, I have been a Member of the Congress long enough to know that I could not name a committee of the Senate or members of a committee.

What we have done in fact is to recommend Members of this body to go as a group to Germany. They have not been named officially as a committee of this body. Neither the Senator from Kentucky nor the Senator from Maine would presume to claim to have such authority or, if they had such authority, would presume to act upon it.

Mr. President, let me say a further word. I objected to the consideration of the resolution largely because of the interest taken in the matter by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. LA FOLLETTE]. So far as I personally am concerned, I have no substantial objection to the resolution itself. I simply feel that after the act has been done, after the men have been recommended to the War Department by the majority leader and by me, after they have gone, and are now on foreign soil, I think adoption of the resolution is rather an unnecessary act. I know of nothing that it accomplishes. I think the Senators who are now abroad at the solicitation of the War Department, and who went, as the Senator from New Mexico has said, with great reluctance on their part—and I affirm that statement without reservation, for I do not know of a single one of the six Senators who did not agree to go with this group with the very greatest reluctance—I think they have been subjected to a vote of censure if we adopt the resolution. They are overseas. They are on the ground. By this time they probably have undertaken and have made the kind of survey for which they were invited to go overseas. If I had my way I would leave the matter right there.

I have objected to consideration of the resolution for the time being, because, as I said, the Senator from Wisconsin has expressed great interest in it. Whether he would pursue the matter beyond the present objection I do not know. I do not want to, but I am not going to consent to the disposition of this matter in the absence of the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I wish to say in connection with the resolution that a good many Senators have spoken to me today expressing very strongly the feeling that since this committee, or this group of Senators, perhaps I should say, has gone overseas because of

an urgent request from General Eisenhower, the commanding general of our armed forces in Europe, to make this very important and historic investigation, it ought to be a committee of the Senate, it ought to have the added strength, shall I say, which it would have as a committee of the Senate, so that the report which it might make will be the report of a committee of the Senate, and be made to the Senate, rather than for the Senators to go simply as individuals, so to speak, who accepted an invitation from the War Department, and report as individuals.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. CHANDLER. I intended to support the Senator's regulation. Why does the Senator think the Senator from Kentucky introduced his resolution today? I was not a party to the appointments, and I regret that some consideration was not given to the attempt which I made to place the action on a basis which could be justified.

With respect to the only trips of this nature which I have taken, one was authorized by the Senate, and the other was authorized by my committee. I believe that if a committee authorizes a Senator to make a trip, and he can make the necessary arrangements, it is none of the business of the Senate, if he is traveling on committee business. I believe that the committee has sufficient authority.

I am sorry that the acting majority leader and other Senators who cooperated with him did not accept the resolution which I offered in good faith. I said it was not competitive. The resolution provided for representatives of the Senate and of the House. If the Senator intends to press his resolution, I will support it. However, I believe that the Senate might have given more consideration to the honest and faithful attempt on my part to deal with the situation satisfactorily.

Mr. HILL. As I stated to the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, I find myself very much in sympathy with his resolution. As I understood his resolution, it would establish what we might call a permanent commission on war crimes.

Mr. CHANDLER. Those who are over there now could have been members.

Mr. HILL. The members were to have been appointed by the President of the United States. The resolution provided for certain personnel, and covered a field perhaps not at all covered by the group which has now gone to Europe.

Mr. CHANDLER. I believe that the problem could have been worked out.

Mr. HILL. I think it can be worked out.

Mr. CHANDLER. I wish the Senator would undertake to do it.

Mr. HILL. I felt that if we were to establish a permanent commission, more consideration should be given to the question.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. WHITE. The whole situation is most embarrassing to me, because I cannot

miss the plain implication of some of the things which have been said. I wish to add the suggestion that we let this question go over until tomorrow. So far as I am concerned, when tomorrow comes I shall not interpose objection to consideration of the resolution, although I believe it to be unwise.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. STEWART. I should like to make an observation about the situation. As I understand, last Saturday morning—or perhaps Friday night—an urgent message was received from General Eisenhower, requesting that 12 men be sent from the Membership of both Houses of the Congress to view what he described as conditions of inhumanity, and so forth, in Germany which were beyond any description which had been sent here by the newspapers. He asked that those men come at once, in order that they might view the situation firsthand. He stated that certain things were being held in status quo until they could arrive. There were some things that could not be delayed very long. So time was of the essence. Time was an element which had to be taken into consideration.

If those men had waited until today, when the Senate and House convened, so that Members of the committee could be selected by the two Houses, a full day, a day and a half, or perhaps even two full days of valuable time would have been lost. The request came from General Eisenhower, the commander in chief of the forces in the European area. I think it was well responded to. Whom should the War Department contact to have this request complied with, other than the leaders in the House and Senate?

The question is whether we shall approve what Senate and House leaders did in our absence, so to speak. So far as I am concerned, I would not want the Senate to vote as to whether or not I should go over there. I would not want to make the trip. I believe that the right men went. Other men just as well qualified could have been selected. But it was a matter of acting in an emergency, and using the best discretion. I believe that we should ratify and confirm, without criticism, what has been done.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Is it not possible that this resolution can be printed and passed over until tomorrow? It is apparent from the wording of the resolution that the request came from General Eisenhower on last Thursday. It could have been brought to the attention of both Houses on Friday. Just why that was not done, I do not know. I do not know that anyone else knows. But it seems to me that there is a great deal in what the Senator from Maine has said. Passing a resolution of this nature after the committee has already departed might be regarded more as a reprimand than as a grant of authority.

I have no desire to censure Members of the Senate who have gone on the trip. I believe that the War Department is

subject to censure. In the first place, I believe that the appointment of a congressional committee should be announced by someone in authority in Congress, and not by the War Department, as I understand was done. Neither do I understand the reason why the War Department hand-picked 15 or 20 publishers and editors to take over there, when, as I understand, several hundred representatives of American newspapers are already on the ground. The whole thing has an air of mystery about it, from the time the message from General Eisenhower was received on Thursday up to the present moment. It seems to me that passing this resolution might be considered complimentary, or it might not be considered complimentary to the committee. I should like to think it over before voting on it.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, after the distinguished Senator from Maine made the statement which he did, namely, that he did not wish to agree to the resolution at this time in the absence of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin, it was my intention to withdraw my request. A number of Senators were on their feet asking me to yield. I did not wish to be discourteous to them and deprive them of the opportunity to ask questions. That is the reason why I did not immediately withdraw the resolution. But, Mr. President, in view of what the Senator from Maine has said, I withdraw the resolution temporarily.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. I wish to make it perfectly plain, lest there be any misunderstanding, that I am not making my point because of any personal desire I might have in connection with this trip, because frankly it would have been impossible for me to go. I would not have wanted to be invited to go, because I might have felt that it was my duty to go, even though it would have involved very great inconvenience.

Furthermore, I should like to point out at the risk of reiteration, that I am not reflecting on the membership of the Senate or on the majority leader or minority leader in dealing with what they might have considered to be an emergency. However, I am most emphatically and unrelentingly protesting the appointment of a committee *ex post facto*. I do not think it is a wise policy for the Senate to adopt. If we are to have standing committees or special committees, they should be created in the regular manner. I can well appreciate that the leaders on both sides acted in an emergency on what they considered to be a very difficult problem, and I do not intend any personal criticism. However, the establishment of the committee in the way in which it has been done might be considered a precedent. I wish to register my personal protest against it being considered a precedent. So far as I am concerned, it will not be a precedent.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. Like other Senators, I desire it to be distinctly understood that nothing I shall say in the few minutes

I shall occupy is intended to be, or is in the slightest degree a reflection upon the men who were delegated to go upon this highly important mission. In the first place, my judgment is that, even though this resolution has been withdrawn, in view of the observations which have been made, it is well to point out that there is no need for it, and that there would have been ample justification for its rejection, had it been considered by the Senate. The delegation which has gone forth needs no authority from this body to make the examination which is proposed to be made. It will derive its authority, obviously, from the War Department—from the Army—and it is not necessary that it be clothed with any indicium of authority from the Senate in order to carry out that highly important mission. It seems to me that before undertaking either to adopt or reject or otherwise determine what should be done with a resolution such as that proposed by the Senator from Alabama, the Members of the Senate should make a thorough determination of the facts surrounding the selection of the members of the delegation. I also desire that nothing which I have said or which I shall say shall be regarded as the slightest reflection on the majority leader or the minority leader, as the minority leader will well realize in just a moment. It seems to me that there might be a situation under which we might take action along the lines of that proposed by the Senator from Alabama. For instance, if there were an immediate emergency which arose after a Friday recess of the Senate, and if the majority leader and minority leader then acted in good faith, as they undoubtedly did in the present case, and if the selection thus were made, I can see very strong reason for the adoption of some such resolution, if there was any affirmative need to clothe the members of the delegation with authority.

I return to the statement that I think there is no need whatsoever for the resolution; but I realize that there might be such an emergency situation so that it might be necessary or desirable to clothe the committee with some such authority. I am not certain about the timing of the situation, and I doubt very much whether the other Members of the Senate are. I understood the Senator from Vermont to say that the message from General Eisenhower or some word from him had come, not on Friday, but on Thursday. I understood our minority leader—and I have no doubt of the correctness of what he said—to say that the word came from General Eisenhower on Friday afternoon. The Senate was in session Friday afternoon. I have not heard any statement as to whether the news came to the majority leader and the minority leader before the recess was taken or after it was taken. On the one hand, I say that if there was a condition of emergency which arose after the recess was taken, I can well understand how it would be entirely proper for our body this afternoon to act upon a resolution designed to clothe the committee with authority, although even then I fail to see any necessity for such authority. On the other

hand, if the War Department could have given the Senate the right to select the committee before the taking of the recess on Friday afternoon, but if it failed to do so, in my judgment we should not under any circumstances adopt this delegation as an official delegation of the Senate of the United States.

As I view the situation, more than this immediate incident is involved. To my mind a very important principle is involved, one to which the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] referred earlier today, namely, establishing the precedent that the War Department itself, a branch of the executive department of the Government, may undertake to select the representatives of the legislative department who shall represent it or shall make the investigation to which reference has been made. To my mind, the situation involves a danger in respect to having the executive departments or agencies of the Government ignore the Senate. If the fact is that the War Department had no opportunity to make the situation known to us before the recess was taken on Friday, but failed to do so, the situation involves the danger of establishing a precedent for the War Department to select two Members of our body, regardless of however outstanding they are or whatever position they occupy, to make an investigation for the Senate of the United States.

Therefore, I think it is very important in connection with this matter to ascertain when the War Department received the news of the desire of General Eisenhower to have such a delegation sent abroad, whether the news was communicated to any Member of the Senate before or after the recess was taken on Friday, whether the War Department suggested that the selection be made by the majority and minority leaders of our body, and whether the War Department suggested, perchance, who should be on the delegation, or any portion of the membership of the delegation.

So, Mr. President, I rise at this time to state that, in my opinion, it was appropriate that the resolution be withdrawn. To my mind there is no need for it; in the second place, I believe we are in the possession of vastly insufficient facts to enable us to form a judgment in regard to the matter; and in the third place, a situation such as the one I described a moment ago may exist, in which case it would be a dangerous and improper precedent to have a branch of the executive department of the Government select the Members or Representatives of the legislative department of Government who would undertake to speak for the Members of this body, or who at least would be considered as having the right to do so.

So, Mr. President, I am very happy that the resolution has been withdrawn.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I simply wish to say that the resolution offered by the Senator from Alabama states that on April 19 an urgent message was received from General Eisenhower. That was Thursday. So it would appear that the War

Department could have consulted with the leaders of the Senate before the Senate took a recess on Friday afternoon, had the War Department been so minded.

For that reason, it appears to me that if anyone is subject to censure, it is not the Members of the Senate, who have gone in performance of their duties as they see them, but it is the War Department, for its failure to consult with the Senate before selecting the Members of the delegation.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President, I was unavoidably absent from the Capitol Building for a few minutes. I understood that my name came into the discussion. It was reported to me that the able senior Senator from Maine said he could not agree to submission or consideration of the resolution in my absence. Inasmuch as my name has been mentioned, I think perhaps I should state very briefly my position on this matter. Perhaps I am now reaping the appropriate penalties for having offered some unsolicited advice to both the minority leader and the acting majority leader. I emphasize that it was unsolicited; but it seemed to me that under the circumstances under which the committee was selected, the committee was properly selected and it could perform all the functions desired by General Eisenhower and the War Department; and so far as I was personally concerned, I felt that a very able personnel and a properly-selected personnel from both sides of the aisle had been chosen; but it seemed to me that it was not possible by retroactive action to change the character of the committee.

The only unsolicited advice I offered was that no resolution should be adopted, in view of the fact that other Senators had earlier in the day indicated that they did not think such action would be taken. I took that position because obviously the objection of a single Senator would prevent even the submission of the resolution until there had been an adjournment of the Senate. So it seemed to me, in view of the obvious importance of the mission of the committee, that it would be a mistake to have the Senate spend 2 or 3 days in debate on the status of the Members of the committee, because their status has nothing to do, so far as I can see, with the mission upon which they are now embarked.

I hope the debate which has occurred here today will not in any wise result in a misunderstanding by the people of the country or by the Senators in question regarding the attitude of their colleagues in this body.

Therefore, Mr. President, I feel that we should let this matter rest. The committee, as an unofficial committee of representative Senators, was properly selected in the usual manner; and able men, in whom the Senate has full confidence, I feel, have gone upon this mission. It seems to me that we should not continue to debate a technical situation which in no wise can either add to or detract from the important mission upon which they are embarked.

It was only for the reason that my name had been mentioned that I wished, for my own satisfaction, to state my own position, perhaps at the risk of paying

the penalty visited upon those who rush in where angels fear to tread.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield to the Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I wish to add a few words to what I have already said.

I think the Senator from Maine [Mr. WHITE] said that the Senator from New Mexico had spoken rather harshly concerning the action of the acting majority leader and the acting minority leader. I did not do so.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, I did not refer to the acting majority leader or the acting minority leader, but the majority leader and the minority leader. I thought there was a tone of castigation in the Senator's voice.

Mr. HATCH. I assure the Senator from Maine that nothing of the kind was intended. Mr. President, I approve the action of the minority leader and the action of the majority leader. Earlier in the day I stated that I approved the choice of the committee which had been made. I did not wish to speak for the Republican side of the Chamber, and perhaps I did not pay as high a compliment to the Members on that side as I did to the Members on this side. I thought the Members on the other side could speak for themselves.

Mr. WHITE. If the Senator from Alabama will yield, I will speak of the attainments of the minority members of the committee.

Mr. HATCH. I did say that in my opinion they were well chosen. However, I pointed out that on this side of the Chamber a better group could not have been selected to go from the Democratic side of the Senate than was selected. I reaffirm that statement of belief.

Mr. President, I had no criticism to make of anyone. I knew these Members were embarking on what was perhaps a perilous, unpleasant, and disagreeable task. They were taking the journey in response to what they thought were the demands of the commander in chief in the European theater of the war, General Eisenhower. I approved it. I was utterly surprised and dumbfounded—in fact, I was dismayed when I came onto the floor of the Senate today and heard the quibbling which was taking place in regard to this matter. I thought that this great body should have arisen as one man, endorsed the selection of the committee, and said that it is our committee, that we would back our majority leader and our minority leader in the selection of the men who were on their way abroad at the risk, perhaps, of their lives in the performance of a most disagreeable duty.

Mr. President, apparently that was a very naive thought for me to entertain. I have been a Member of the Senate for 12 years, and I thought I understood the Senate. But I do not understand it. At least, I do not understand why any Member should object to this resolution—with all due respect to my friend the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. LA FOLLETTE]—when already the authority and the right of this committee to make the trip has been detracted from by the re-

marks made here on the floor of the Senate. We are now meekly sitting down and saying, "Let the detractors detract." Very well. If that be the will of the Senate, I have nothing else to say except that, as one Member of the Senate, I approve this resolution—it is my resolution, I may say—wholeheartedly. The request was made by General Eisenhower for a committee of Congress to visit the European theater and observe for themselves the terrible and awful things which have been taking place with reference to the treatment of American soldiers. I approve his request. That is my resolution.

I approve the action of the majority leader and the minority leader in selecting the committee which was selected to represent this body. I am not saying anything about the other House. That side of the Capitol does its own work. But, so far as I am concerned, I give full authority to this committee to do the work which has been laid out for it to do. Other Senators may do as they wish.

Mr. President, the Senate may stand on its prerogatives. Once a distinguished President of the United States said—well, I shall not now quote what he said, but shall do so on another occasion. However, Mr. President, I am not interested in technicalities. Never would I consent for 1 moment to the War Department, the Interior Department, or any other Department of the Government, selecting as a committee any Members of this body. It just happened that an emergency situation arose, and the Senate leaders met it in the best possible way, a way which is not open to objection or to exception.

I assume full responsibility, I may say to the Senator from Alabama, and I urged him to submit his resolution. It is a resolution of confidence with respect to our own colleagues. I told the Senator that if he did not submit it I would, and I would have done so. I am willing to do it now. The Senator has withdrawn it for the day. That is his privilege.

Mr. HILL. The Senator recognizes, of course, that we cannot obtain action on a resolution of this nature at the present time without unanimous consent.

Mr. HATCH. I so understand.

Mr. HILL. I wish to say to the Senator from New Mexico that he has voiced absolutely my sentiments in this matter. Here was the commander in chief of our armies in Europe, who had found a situation there of such consequence and of such importance that he felt that a committee of representative Senators should come there and observe the situation with their own eyes. He cabled to the War Department asking that such a committee come immediately. We know why he said "immediately". It was because the conditions in those concentration camps are so horrible that death will wipe out much of that evidence of horror within the next few hours of time. If the committee were to see the situation in its true light and be in position to bring back to the Congress and to the people of America a true report and an accurate picture of what the situation is in those prison camps, it was necessary for the committee not to hesitate, not to delay, but to go immediately.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I shall yield in a moment.

Mr. HATCH. I had not finished my remarks.

Mr. HILL. Because of the urgent request and insistence on the part of the War Department that the committee be appointed, and that it go abroad immediately the selections were made and the committee departed. As the Senator from New Mexico has well said, the members of the committee went contrary to their own personal wishes, contrary to their personal welfare, we may say, and contrary to what they wished to do. They felt that a situation of this kind, of such importance and consequence to the country and to the future of the Nation, should be attended to immediately, and they accepted the appointments. They put aside their personal feelings their personal desires, their own comfort and wishes in the matter, and departed for Europe. They had no time to stop to debate, to call meetings of Senators and to consult them. Perhaps, although I am sure, from what the Senator from Maine said this morning, he consulted with as many Senators on his side of the aisle as he could, and I am sure the distinguished majority leader, although I was not in the city at the time, consulted with those who were available on this side of the aisle.

Now these Senators have gone to perform a duty for our country. They have gone to answer an urgent call from the commander of our forces in Germany, and certainly nothing should go out from this body which would carry to the American people, to our allies, or to others across the seas, the intimation that anyone on this floor is in any way critical of the fact that these Senators have gone, or does not realize the importance of the mission on which they are engaged, or the necessity for their going, and it should not go out that we do not send with them the best wishes of every Member of this body for the success of their mission.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President I had not quite concluded.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President—The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alabama has the floor. To whom does he yield?

Mr. HATCH. I do not yield for any purpose right now.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alabama has the floor.

Mr. HATCH. He yielded to me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has not yielded to anyone. To whom does the Senator yield?

Mr. HILL. I yield to the Senator from New Mexico, and I am sure he will make his remarks brief.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thought the Senator from Alabama had yielded to me. I am sorry if I misunderstood him.

The only thing I desired to add was that when I expressed my own personal opinion—and I said it was merely one Senator speaking—I wanted the word to go out to the nations of the world that I know whereof I speak, in expressing my confidence in this committee of the Sen-

ate of the United States, when I say I speak not one voice, and I do not speak for a majority of the Senate, but I venture to say I speak for at least three-fourths of the Senate of the United States, and if these Senators had a chance, they would speak by their votes a similar voice.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. HILL. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting several nominations, which was referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. McCARRAN, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

Bernard J. Flynn, of Maryland, to be United States attorney for the district of Maryland; and

W. Bruce Matthews, of Maryland, for appointment as United States marshal for the District of Columbia, vice John B. Colpoys, deceased.

By Mr. McKELLAR, from the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads:

Leon O. Boling, to be postmaster at McCleary, Wash.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. If there be no further reports of committees, the clerk will proceed to state the nominations on the Executive Calendar.

POSTMASTERS

The legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations of postmasters.

Mr. HILL. I ask unanimous consent that the nominations of postmasters be confirmed en bloc.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nominations are confirmed en bloc.

THE NAVY

The legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations in the Navy.

Mr. HILL. I ask unanimous consent that the Navy nominations be confirmed en bloc.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Navy nominations are confirmed en bloc.

THE MARINE CORPS

The legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations in the Marine Corps.

Mr. HILL. I ask unanimous consent that the Marine Corps nominations be confirmed en bloc.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nominations are confirmed en bloc.

Mr. HILL. I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of all confirmations of today.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the President will be notified forthwith.

RECESS

Mr. HILL. As in legislative session, I move that the Senate take a recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 44 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Tuesday, April 24, 1945, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate April 23 (legislative day of April 16), 1945:

Capt. Carl F. Holden, United States Navy, to be a rear admiral in the Navy, for temporary service, to rank from the 10th day of August 1943.

Capt. Edwin T. Short, United States Navy, to be a commodore in the Navy, for temporary service, to continue while serving as commander of a transport squadron, and until reporting for other permanent duty.

Capt. Samuel P. Jenkins, United States Navy, to be a commodore in the Navy, for temporary service, to continue while serving as commander of a transport squadron, and until reporting for other permanent duty.

Capt. Alexander S. Wotherspoon, United States Navy, to be a commodore in the Navy, for temporary service, to continue while serving as commander of a transport squadron, and until reporting for other permanent duty.

Capt. Harvey E. Overesch, United States Navy, to be a commodore in the Navy, for temporary service, to continue while serving as chief of staff to commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and until reporting for other permanent duty.

Capt. Richard W. Bates, United States Navy, to be a commodore in the Navy, for temporary service, to continue while serving as commander, motor torpedo boat squadrons, United States Pacific Fleet, and until reporting for other permanent duty.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate April 23 (legislative day of April 16), 1945:

IN THE NAVY

APPOINTMENTS IN THE NAVY

Clyde B. Camerer to be a medical director in the Navy, with the rank of rear admiral, for temporary service, to continue while serving as district medical officer, Fourteenth Naval District.

William W. Warlick to be a commodore in the Navy, for temporary service, to continue while serving on the staff (logistics) of the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean areas, and until reporting for other permanent duty.

Ruthven E. Libby to be a commodore in the Navy, for temporary service, to continue while serving as senior naval member of the Joint War Plans Committee, and until reporting for other permanent duty.

IN THE MARINE CORPS

APPOINTMENTS IN THE REGULAR CORPS

To be second lieutenants

Walter R. Bartosh John R. Fields
Robert E. Johnson Wilcie A. O'Bannon
Thomas J. Cushman, William R. Morrison
Jr.

POSTMASTERS

MISSISSIPPI

Ola B. Jones, Crowder.
Leonard B. Robinson, Moss Point.
Sam Ben Hudnall, Porterville.

NEW YORK

George E. Hlavac, Bohemia.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MONDAY, APRIL 23, 1945

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., pastor of the Gunton Temple Memorial Presbyterian Church, offered the following prayer:

Most merciful and gracious God, Thou knowest the deepest yearning of our hearts. We are earnestly and penitently waiting for the glad tidings that the armed forces of evil have been conquered and that the war lords who defiantly walked the iron highway of destruction and death have been forever driven from their bloody thrones.

Grant that we may prove worthy of military conquest by accepting the challenge to achieve that glorious spiritual victory when men everywhere shall clasp hands in friendship and find their security, not in weapons of warfare but in implements of welfare.

We are praying especially for those representatives of our beloved country who are soon to share in planning for a just and durable peace. Gird them with clear minds and courageous hearts; as the ambassadors of a Christian nation, may they not be afraid to match the demands of the most tangled and difficult problem with the claims of the spirit of the Prince of Peace, who came to rule the world with the scepter of justice, righteousness, and love.

Hear us in His name. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, April 19, 1945, was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Frazier, its legislative clerk, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment concurrent resolution of the House of the following title:

H. Con. Res. 43. Concurrent resolution authorizing the printing of additional copies of House Document No. 143, current session, entitled "Further Prosecution of the War," an address of the President of the United States.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 906. An act granting a franking privilege to Anna Eleanor Roosevelt.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the amendment of the House to a bill of the Senate of the following title:

S. 105. An act to extend the life of the Smaller War Plants Corporation.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed, with amendments in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a bill of the House of the following title:

H. R. 2689. An act making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1946, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate insists upon its amendments to